By Iain Douglas-Hamilton

Transcription

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2 Comments on the Report Decision-making mechanisms (DMM) and necessary conditions for a future trade in African elephant ivory Consultancy document for the CITES Secretariat (no 2011/046) By Iain Douglas-Hamilton The authors of this consultancy document, on a Decisions Making Mechanism (DMM) for a future ivory trade in Africa elephant ivory, are well known, well respected, and dedicated to the concept of conservation through sustainable yield utilization. In theory there could be a legitimate ivory trade, even if it came only from natural mortality. In practice, however, this report comes at a time when there is a broad consensus within the conservation and scientific community that the current demand for ivory cannot be met by the existing supply. It is acknowledged that demand for ivory is driving the illegal killing of elephants. The principle recommendation of the DMM report is to set up an international Central Ivory Selling Organization (CISO), along the lines of the De Beers cartel. However, DeBeers only worked well so long as there were was a virtual monopoly on diamond marketing and no independent diamond producing countries. De Beers control came apart when countries like Sierra Leone entered the market in an uncontrolled manner (which incidentally led to the Blood Diamond human rights abuses). In the case of ivory production there are some 34 or more elephant range states in Africa whose elephants produce ivory. The report gives no explanation of how controlling a legal ivory output from a handful of states in Southern Africa will diminish the flow of illegal ivory and illegal killing from elsewhere. If illegal killing and trading continue, as seems overwhelmingly likely, this means that the CISO will not contrary to the claims in the document be able to control or influence demand in any real way. Currently, most of the elephant populations in Africa already appear to be in decline, or are likely soon to be so. The key to securing a future for elephants therefore lies in reducing demand for ivory overall. The draft report should be judged in the light of whether or not it is encouraging or discouraging this demand. Unfortunately the logic of the Central Ivory Selling Organization (CISO) will be to promote demand for ivory, by trying to maximize prices, just as DeBeers does for diamonds. Thus under the proposed Decision Making Mechanism the main driver of illegal trade, a high ivory price, will be reinforced not diminished. The temporary advantage to the few select countries allowed to trade will be outweighed by the increased risk to elephants in the vast majority their range in Africa. The authors also do not consider the possibility that once illegal killing has exhausted the ivory supplies of West, Central, Eastern Africa, and the vulnerable parts of Southern Africa, that the excessive demand will then move down to the

3 remaining Southern African states of Namibia, Botswana and South Africa, which so far have enjoyed relative immunity to high levels of poaching for ivory. There is already some evidence from MIKE that ivory poaching is moving south with record levels of illegal killing recorded in the Southern African region in For the first time the PIKE levels (proportion of illegally killed elephants out of the carcass count), for this region as a whole, exceeded 50%, the level at which it is thought elephant populations are no longer sustainable. Zimbabwe, Mocambique, and Zambia recorded MIKE site values of between 64% and 89 % PIKE. Only three MIKE sites in Southern African are so far avoiding this trend, Kruger, Chobe and Etosha, with PIKE values between 0% and 33%, but it is likely only a matter of time before they too succumb under the present world regime of excessive demand for ivory. The authors acknowledge that the ivory trade historically has driven down elephant numbers in the late 19th century and that protective measures introduced in colonial times allowed a recovery. Once again they acknowledge the same process happened in the 1970s and 1980s, especially in East, West and Central Africa. They allow that in East Africa a considerable recovery was made following the ivory trade ban in In other words for a large proportion of the time the ivory trade ban worked. I agree in this case with their interpretation. The one off sale permitted by CITES in 2010 differed from previous one off sales, in that China for the first time was included as a legitimate buyer. This is what seems to have destabilized the entire system for controlling the illegal ivory trade. Recent studies by Esmond Martin, ETIS, and investigations by the EIA, IFAW, WWF and BBC Panorama have shown that domestic controls in ivory sales in China are not working. The majority of ivory currently on sale in China comes from illegal sources. Demand is flourishing as never before, with most Chinese buyers unaware of the negative effect of their buying on elephants. In other words the domestic controls that were supposed to be adequate, and which were used to justify the one off sales that included China as a buyer, have failed. None of this is taken into account in the report. Currently, in 2012 there is no let up apparent in the illegal killing of elephants. Unprecedented large scale killings have been reported from Cameroon, Garamba, Northern DRC, Kenya, Tanzania, Mocambique and many other countries. News reports and research results by August 2012 suggest that this illegal killing is more widespread and at a greater level across the continent than in any year since the ivory trade ban of A key point for the Secretariat to consider in their own drafting of a DMM is that the only way to protect elephants in the long-term may be to reduce demand for ivory. This is already a CITES policy for rhinos and many other species. Legal sales of ivory have not reduced demand, nor are they ever likely to do so, so any additional legal sales will contribute to the destruction of elephant populations.

4 Furthermore, it does not seem likely that any legal offtake of ivory (as proposed in the DMM) would result in sustainable, functioning populations. We do not know how skewing the age structure of elephants (to reduce older male numbers) will affect their biology (mate choice/fitness etc), but we do know that it has dire behavioural consequences, which could result in damage to other endangered species as well as human populations, as happened in the case study of Pilanesberg. In summary, despite an interesting historical analysis, the report for a DMM suffers several major flaws, not restricted to the following: - it focuses disproportionately on the southern part of Southern Africa, that is on Appendix II elephant populations, without critical concern of how any legal ivory trade could be conducted without facilitating a parallel illegal trade in the rest of Africa. - it does not consider the latest data, MIKE, ETIS and individual research programmes, showing elephants are decreasing in all four regions across their range. - it underestimates very significantly the lack of enforcement capability in elephant range States and ivory-consuming States. -the authors do not address whether a legal trade could meet present levels of demand, which seems unlikely. - It appears to assume that the approval of Japan and China as trading partners can continue to be accepted without question, which is particularly unfortunate with regard to China. - it does not address the very significant role played by Thailand as a major (if illegal) consumer market and thus a major source of demand for illegal ivory. - the report does not acknowledge excessive demand as the main driver of illegal killing of elephants. - it does not consider the dangers to elephants of further stimulating demand for ivory. - it does not consider the danger to Southern African elephants once Central and Eastern elephant stocks are exhausted. - it fails to address properly the very significant role now played by large-scale organized crime."

5 Fiona Maisels: comments on the final report by Martin et al. Decision-making mechanisms and necessary conditions for a future trade in African elephant ivory The report is based on a number of assumptions which, although they may hold true for the elephant populations of Southern Africa, are not true for other parts of Africa. The report recognizes that there is a huge elephant poaching problem throughout most of Africa, but addresses only trade as a mechanism for stopping it, whereas there is no guarantee that legal trade would stop illegal trade. Many hughly pertinent points have already been made by Hilde Van Leeuwe and by the Amboseli Group, so I need not repeat them here. I list instead the assumptions made by the Martin et al report, and show how they are not actually held up in the region outside the very narrow Sothern African context (and perhaps not even there, especially Zimbabwe). 1. Assumption: the law is respected, enforced, and any deviation will be punished The first assumption is that there is already workable, transparent, and responsible wildlife and economic management systems in all of the elephant range states. Unfortunately, when one looks at Transparency International s Corruption Perceptions Index (Corruption_Perceptions_Index 2011), the range states of all the forested countries except Gabon are among the 30% most corrupt countries on earth. Many others of the West and East African countries, plus Zimbabwe, fall within the bottom most corrupt countries on Earth. By contrast, three of the countries that were allowed to trade in the 2008 one-off sale are in the top 15% least corrupt of the sub-saharan African states (and in the top 35% globally). The Central African countries in particular have repeatedly shown an inability to maintain transparency in a variety of fields, of which the pertinent ones in this discussion are wildlife management, law enforcement, and economics. The most visibly dysfunctional state is the Democratic Republic of Congo, which has had a sharp decline in elephants in its protected areas in the last two decades, which shows no sign of slowing (Beyers et al. 2011). Military personnel have been involved in elephant poaching in all of the important Parks of the country, ongoing in the Okapi Faunal Reserve, Bili-Uere area, and Salonga National Park. The most recent publicized elephant poaching in DRC was a helicopter-assisted killing of 22 elephants in Garamba National Park in March Either this was directly assisted by the military or it was carried out by a powerful organized crime group (or both). The weapons used for elephant killing in DRC, northern and south eastern Cameroon, CAR and the Republic of Congo are almost always military weapons (AK47 and the like), and/or heavy duty rifles, arms available through collusion either with the military (or with militia groups in CAR, eastern DRC and northern Cameroon). The recent removal, by extremely well-organised poachers, of most of the elephant population of a well-known National Park in Cameroon (Bouba Njida) in the first three months of 2012 (Platt 2012) was in the Cameroonian and international press for weeks without the Cameroon Government actually implementing any action other than meetings in a nearby town. Only when foreign embassies (EU and USA) got involved did Cameroon send army personnel (and a helicopter!) to the site, but they were no match for the better trained, better armed, and doubtless far more highly motivated poachers, who appeared to be a militia group from the Sahel area of either neighbouring Chad, CAR, or Sudan (reports of their provenance are very varied). The end result is that the ivory (probably over 4 tons of it, at a conservative 10kg per elephant) has vanished, the Park s elephants are mostly dead (or will die, as the non-ivory bearing young have lost their mothers), and the previously existing tourism business that employed local people will almost certainly have to shut down. If the Government is not interested in stopping poaching in one of its best known National Parks, from which it earned a regular revenue from tourism

6 annually, how well would it be expected to manage an annual legal elephant kill without chaos and corruption ensuing? In general in Central and West Africa, wildlife laws are not really seen as equivalent to laws against people or property. The law enforcement agents see animals as meat, and as fair game for everyone. The laws themselves are generally rather good, and would prevent wildlife crime of all kinds if enforced. They are generally not enforced at all, or a small bribe allows a hunter or trafficker to ensure the law is not enforced. Here I repeat the section about Japanese complicity in illegal ivory sale, what I mentioned in the questionnaire (the rest you already have so I will not repeat myself); Shortly before the last one-off sale, the official Japanese ivory delegation went to southern Africa to choose the tusks that they would like to buy. The delegation was composed of people who were experts on different types of ivory. They were surprised to see a great deal of forest elephant ivory mixed in with the savannah elephant ivory, but not so surprised that they didn t choose the forest elephant ivory to be allocated to Japan. Forest elephant ivory is greatly valued in Japan for its superior carving properties (it is hard and compact and perfect for the names on hankos and for the plectrums for Japanese musical instruments) (Nishihara 2003). This information from a Japanese conservationist who talked to the delegation later, in Japan. Needless to say there was not supposed to be any forest elephant ivory in the lot available for the one-off sale. Therefore the tracking of the chain of custody does not work even at the beginning of the chain- the forest elephant ivory must have come from further north (DRC/ Congo/ Gabon/ Cameroon?) and been laundered into the available ivory for sale. Profitable wildlife crime in Central Africa (especially ivory poaching and trafficking) is often organized or highly abetted by powerful government figures (Governors, heads of police, Generals or other high-up military officers, etc) who can ensure the impunity of poachers and their guns and vehicles. Many seized weapons come back into circulation time and time again after having been handed in to the relevant authority. 2. Assumption: Demand is lower than the potential production rate The report assumes that about tons of ivory would be able to be sustainably produced by the whole of the African elephant population (which they erroneously assume is >500,000): the last African Elephant Database figures quoted are now five years old and evidence from West, East, and Central Africa shows that there is currently a reduction in elephant populations, rather than an increase or even a maintenance of numbers (Beyers et al. 2011; Bouche et al. 2011; Wittemyer et al. 2011). It also assumes that the current, badly poached and demographically skewed populations would have to be given time to re-establish normal population structures before being harvested (they ran the model for 300 years): in other words in the absence of poaching, a frankly impossible scenario in today s economic and low law-enforcement Africa. The demand for ivory from China is increasing (Martin & Vigne 2011; Vigne & Martin 2011) as is its price (Wittemyer et al. 2011). In December 2011 the price paid for a kilo of ivory directly to a poacher was $200 in northeastern Gabon. In April 2012 it is now $300 (and it is also the same rate in Kenya). In the early 1990s it was around %7. The price in China is currently thought to be only about $750, so the gap between price to hunter and price earned at the China end of the chain has been greatly reduced, and very rapidly. This is due to the economic boom in China, where the proportion of households classified as wealthy (earning over $24,000) comprises presently about 17% of the population, and will rise to about 43% in 2015 (McKinsey&Company 2011). If just 10% of the

7 2011 households wished to buy a 20 gram piece of ivory each year, this would require 153 tons of ivory. If they wanted a 50 gram piece, that would be 382 tons. In 2015, the relevant quantities will be 384 and 980 tons. If average tusk weight is 6 kilos (Hunter et al. 2004) the smallest number of elephants required to fulfil this tonnage would be over 22,000 (20g piece weight in 2011) and up to 32,000 in 2015, for the 20 gram ivory piece. 3. Assumption: a legal ivory trade will replace the illegal ivory trade There has been no evidence for any kind of replacement activity in a parallel activity in sub-saharan Africa: the bushmeat trade. In many countries there is a flourishing, illegal, almost completely uncontrolled bushmeat trade running parallel to the legal trade. Legally traded animals are usually the rapid-breeding rodents and blue duikers; illegally traded ones are generally the larger ungulates (buffalo, pigs, large antelopes) and primates. Legally traded animals have been killed either with a gun during the day, or using traditional plant-based snares; illegally killed ones have been caught with wire or nylon snares, or by spotlighting. In many cases the officials who are supposed to control the trade are actually either turning a blind eye in return for a bribe, or are even organizing it. Why would legal ivory trade replace illegal trade? What would stop them both being carried out alongside each other? There is very little precedent for any wildlife law in the Central African countries being adhered to, with the recent an honorable mention of Gabon, which is now trying to control the excesses of the last couple of decades, but there is still some way to go. The train lines, roads, and aircraft of all the forested countries are in constant and profitable use for wildlife product transportation from the remote, more wildlife-rich provinces to the capital cities. The national rail company of Gabon has printed notices at its railway stations requesting passengers to package up their bushmeat properly so that the blood does not mess up other passengers luggage. The air companies of the Republic of Congo ensure that bushmeat does not get carried in the seating area of their aircraft, but rather in the hold, for the same reason. In both countries it is illegal to carry bushmeat on a plane, but this is not relevant to either passengers, the air company, or the Government forestry agents who control the luggage: a small fee is paid by the passengers and the baggage gets through. Why would ivory be any different? 4. Assumption: the economics have been worked out It takes a great deal of money to effectively protect wildlife from poaching, especially if the wildlife in question provides a very high profit to the poacher. The obvious example is the massacre of South Africa s rhinos in the last couple of years, despite the nation having one of the best protection forces on the continent and being one of the richest countries in Africa. It costs roughly ten times as much to effectively protect wildlife from poachers in a forest than it does in a savannah (Jachmann 2008) due to the difficulties of visibility and travel through forests. It costs roughly $1,000,000 to effectively manage a forest park of 3-4,000 km2 in Central Africa (except in Gabon, where it costs almost three times as much, due to Gabon s much higher salary and logistics costs), with a guard squad of about 20 people in the absence of serious organized-crime style ivory poaching. It will cost a great deal more to combat the new wave of poaching: many parks are now ramping up to 50 or more guards. All the National Parks in Central Africa are paid for by conservation NGOs (WWF, WCS, AWF, Africa Parks, etc) with either a small Government input (10% or so) or nothing. Some of the Central African countries could easily afford to pay for their Parks through their considerable oil revenue; they choose not do so. Why would they choose to pay for ivory trade management? The costs of enforcing the CISO do not seem to include the recruiting, training, and annual salaries of the (possibly hundreds of) additional officers who would be required to ensure that ivory from all the elephant range sites (Parks, Reserves) collected and transported to the central holding area was legal, documented and marked, and did not vanish in transit. An economic analysis of the possibility of opening up the bushmeat trade to legal exploitation was carried out in 2008 (Wilkie et al. 2006) and the results clearly showed that the costs of employing all the additional officers to monitor and enforce compliance with tax and wildlife law was far more expensive than the revenue gained by taxing the meat itself. 5. Assumption: the diamond market is a good model for ivory

8 The comparison with the diamond market is seductive, but there are huge amounts of diamonds available,. Elephant numbers are extremely small compared to the growing Chinese market. It is true that if there is a demand for a commodity, the users will get hold of it whether it is legal or illegal. But even if there are legal tusks available, the cost of effectively protecting the elephants is so high that illegal operators will still prefer to penetrate the protective net, poach elephants, and traffic their tusks to destination at a far lower cost than the wildlife authorities (or the CISO) are paying (this is what is currently happening with bushmeat across Central Africa, as the cost and effort of growing meat (animal husbandry) is orders of magnitude lower than simply hunting (and poaching). In addition the unofficial diamond market can be seen daily in Central Kinshasa, where unofficial ivory is also openly traded; both in full view of the police and wildlife authorities. Global Witness, one of the founders of the Kimberley Process, has recently (December 2011) resigned from it {Global_Witness, 2011 #77950} as it has proven to be very weak and poorly enforced. The diamond market is thus an extremely poor model for an ivory trade market in today s extremely corrupt markets. The real solution is to convince Chinese consumers that ivory is an old-fashioned material that no-one would admit to owning who sees footbinding or pigtails as fashionable these days? There is a groundswell in China now that is changing hearts and minds- ivory is no longer sold on the Chinese Alibaba internet site; there have been various protests by youngsters against the use of live bear bile extraction, and there are over 3500 green NGOs in China today. References Beyers, R., T. Sinclair, J. Hart, F. Grossman, S. Dino, and B. Klinkenberg Resource wars and conflict ivory. The impact of civil conflict on elephants in the Okapi Faunal Reserve: PLoS One 6:e Bouche, P., I. Douglas-Hamilton, G. Wittemyer, A. J. Nianogo, J. L. Doucet, P. Lejeune, and C. Vermeulen Will Elephants Soon Disappear from West African Savannahs? PLoS One 6. Corruption_Perceptions_Index Corruption Perceptions Index Transparency International. Hunter, N., E. Martin, and T. Milliken Determining the number of elephants required to supply current unregulated ivory markets in Africa and Asia. Pachyderm 36: Jachmann, H Illegal wildlife use and protected area management in Ghana. Biological Conservation 141: Martin, E. B., and L. Vigne A report on the soaring demand for elephant and mammoth ivory in southern China. Elephant Family, The Aspinall Foundation and Columbus Zoo and Aquarium McKinsey&Company Tapping China s luxury-goods market. Page 48. McKinsey Quarterly. Nishihara, T Elephant poaching and ivory trafficking in African tropical forests with special reference to the Republic of Congo. Pachyderm 34: Platt, J Cameroon Elephant Massacre Shows Poaching, Ivory Trade Require an International Response. Scientific American

9 Vigne, L., and E. Martin Consumption of elephant and mammoth ivory increases in southern China. Pachyderm: Wilkie, D. S., M. Starkey, E. L. Bennett, K. Abernethy, R. Fotso, F. Maisels, and P. Elkan Can Taxation Contribute to Sustainable Management of the Bushmeat Trade? Evidence from Gabon and Cameroon. Journal of International Wildlife Law and Policy 9: Wittemyer, G., D. Daballen, and I. Douglas-Hamilton Rising ivory prices threaten elephants. Nature 476:

10 Dan Stiles: comments on the final report by Martin et al. Decision-making mechanisms and necessary conditions for a future trade in African elephant ivory COMMENTS ON 'DECISION-MAKING MECHANISMS AND NECESSARY CONDITIONS FOR A FUTURE TRADE IN AFRICAN ELEPHANT IVORY' E A p. v The data do not seem to support the statement 'As a result many elephant populations began to recover although a low level of illegal trade continued until 2005 when it began to increase to the present high levels'. CITES CoP16 document E 'ELEPHANT CONSERVATION, ILLEGAL KILLING AND IVORY TRADE' shows in Fig. 4 that seizure numbers and weights prior to 2005 equalled or exceeded seizures made after 2005, with the sole exception of The 2010 and 2011 high numbers are exceeded in Numbers and weights of seizures in 2007 and 2008 were below most of those seen pre It is true that the number of large-scale seizures has increased, but the cause cannot be inferred without research on the question. Vigilance by Customs and other law enforcement has increased in recent years, which must have had a positive affect on seizure numbers, therefore alternative hypotheses explaining increased seizure numbers should be tested. Domestic market scale has declined from pre-2005 levels in Japan, Thailand, Viet Nam, DRC, Cameroon, Republic of Congo, Ethiopia and Egypt, the only countries with pre- and post data. China has comparable data only for parts of southern China. Guangzhou market scale has increased, while it decreased in Fuzhou. Post-2005 data for northern China, particularly Shanghai and Beijing, are not available. A more accurate description of ivory trade levels would be a steady decrease in scale from 1990 to about 2008, then a probable upsurge since 2009 in illegal raw ivory trade, with a concomitant increase in elephant poaching. Worked ivory trade levels have not increased, with the possible exception of China (a proper survey of the north-eastern urban centres of China is urgently needed). 1

11 vi 'Equally, it [the decision-making process] provides the basis for a legal market to establish market control for ivory, control that presently rests in the hands of the criminal syndicates that are able control both the supply and the price of illegal ivory.' It is debatable whether these so-called criminal syndicates control most global supply or prices. Where most ivory is consumed, China, the government sets prices and illegal raw ivory seems rarely to exceed those prices (currently USD 500-1,000/kg). In Japan, legal cartels in Tokyo and Osaka set the quantities released and prices. In Europe and the USA, open legal markets govern prices. In SE Asia, where most new ivory is illegal, ivory smugglers can only get what carvers can afford, which are prices similar to those set in China. The economic law of supply and demand determines prices, not criminal syndicates. Rather than view raw ivory controlled by a few Mafia-type organizations, it is probably more accurate to describe ivory supply as provided by numerous, small-scale criminal entrepreneurs, mainly African and East Asian. The main point should be, who benefits from ivory, regardless of what prices are. Currently, it is mainly criminals and the Chinese government. The owners - African governments - receive no benefits while expending resources on law enforcement and management. p. 7 'The practice of selling ivory stockpiles at lengthy, irregular intervals departs from normal commercial practices. It results in substantial losses to those selling ivory and, because the supply of legal ivory is irregular and uncertain, it provides no incentives to ivory traders to confine their trade to legally available ivory.' This is an extremely important point that needs emphasizing. To bring ivory traders on board it is essential that they believe regular supplies of raw ivory at fair prices will be available for the foreseeable future. p. 24 Step 1 As I queried in the draft, why should a legal trade start only in current Appendix II countries? A new CITES decision would be needed to authorize trade and lay out the parameters, which could include listing all countries that apply and satisfy specified criteria. I see no reason to restrict trade to only four countries. Step 3 Why restrict buyers to Japan and China? All CITES Parties should be able to apply if they so wish. p. 25 ff Section The proposed process intends to involve the CITES Secretariat and TAGs in a complex mechanism of managing multiple elephant populations in both international and national contexts. This is not CITES' remit, nor does it have the human and financial resources to undertake such an ambitious task. While it would be highly desirable that this be done with or 2

12 without legal ivory trade I do not think it advisable, or even possible, for CITES to take responsibility for this. p. 28 'It seems entirely beneficial for conservation (including higher-valued land use) that the value of this ivory should be re-invested in the areas where it originated. The aim of the CISO would be to secure this value for the producers of ivory.' Another key point. How are ivory producers defined? Governments, private landowners, people who share communal lands with elephants? Beneficiaries must be clearly defined, and they will probably differ from country to country. p. 28, footnote ,000 is the estimate for the entire continent. If all countries proposed on p. 34 participate, ~ 75 tonnes (not 100) annually would be available, according to their method of calculation. p f An external audit would be a monumental exercise, as it would presumably involve vetting ivory from the source countries. Who would pay for this? CISO from the levy? (If e & f are implemented, it would greatly facilitate the auditing). p d and Footnote 25 It would be the policy decision of each Range State country to determine where proceeds would go. CITES/CISO cannot make that decision, though they can make recommendations. With the possible exception of South Africa, I would guess most African governments would control all sales and not allow the private sector to participate. Since only ivory from government stocks are allowed to sell to CISO, it will be easy for governments to control this. They would determine distribution of sale proceeds at the national level. p d I can foresee government resistance to an outside body setting prices. I think the system would have to start with auctions, but methods need to be devised to prevent collusion amongst buyers to lower prices. This is one reason why more countries than just Japan and China should be included at the beginning. p (2) Defines the producers as the Range States, so it is really up to them to decide how the proceeds will be distributed, though fairness and buy-in from stakeholders would be promoted by the system proposed here. p (4) (and 6.1.4) imply that CITES would no longer decide which countries were approved to sell and buy ivory; the decisions would be made by CISO and they would inform CITES. This would seem to abrogate CITES responsibilities. I think international law under CITES would require it and the Parties to continue to authorize which countries would participate in CISO, though CISO staff could handle the administration of it. p Resources to fund the considerable number and scope of activities laid out in the process would be considerable. A levy big enough to provide the funds might price ivory above initial illegal ivory prices. The system might have to be pared down to make economic sense (for example, I've never heard of P-4 secretaries in the UN). The staffing and budget put in the original proposal would be completely out of the question. The staff expenses were considerably underestimated, and the budget did not include operational costs, overheads, etc. p. 34, top I think it essential that the proposed countries be included in any regulated trade process. If Central African governments believed that they could benefit more from their ivory through CISO than with the current piecemeal corrupt activities, they might improve their management and law enforcement in order to join, which is critical for forest elephants. General comments: The proposed mechanism is an excellent starting off point to devise a regulated, legal ivory trade 3

13 system. The authors have taken into consideration most of the main concerns to make the system work for the benefit of elephants, Range States and the ivory industry. If approved by CITES, CISO may not work as well as hoped to reduce elephant poaching, but it most certainly would improve the situation that prevails currently. It might seem contradictory, but I would include associated activities aimed at reducing ivory demand by consumers, similar to efforts made by governments and NGOs to reduce harmful but legal tobacco and alcohol consumption. It is essential for the mechanism to work in the long run that demand not exceed legal supply. How proceeds are to be handled needs to be explained in more detail. Will CISO simply turn over to participating Range State governments the full amount, minus the levy, after each sale? Will CISO prepare its staff and operating budget based on levy income estimates, and retain 100% of the levy amounts? Will CISO be a UN affiliated organization, as the original budget implies? Daniel Stiles Member IUCN/SSC AfESG 17 August,

14 George Wittemyer: comments on the final report by Martin et al. Decision-making mechanisms and necessary conditions for a future trade in African elephant ivory The authors have reduced opinion based statements in the document. But conjecture is still common and unfounded assumptions by the authors seems to out weight what could be a more meaningful dialogue. The authors failed to address the criticisms of their harvest model, which is a non-trivial component on a technical report on legal ivory trade, but continue to quote results from it (see comments below). More generally, the authors have not adequately identified the core issues necessary to understand the potential benefits and problems with legal trade. The author dismiss the possibility that decision in one range state can impact other range states rather than offer a proper basis on which this important question can be addressed. The impact of legal sales on the status of the species are critical considerations in the legal trade. These impacts potentially include (i) reducing demand and illegal trade through saturation (which does not appear to have happened with the current volume and structure of one off sales), (ii) providing cover for illegal trade (as appears to be happening in domestic markets in China, and (iii), probably most importantly, the authors do not discuss or identify the issues surrounding the demand side of the legal trade. A first step should be to understand the magnitude of the demand. Can current and projected future demand be met by ivory harvesting of any kind in Africa? How will legal trade affect perceptions of the ivory trade as a socially acceptable commodity and how might this feed back into demand? The complexity of the illegal trade in ivory and difficulty in regulating it largely have been ignored in favor of the, thus far, unsupported assumption that a legal trade would somehow reduce the illegal trade and eventually cause its eradication. The authors have highlighted some of the intractable issues. But in order for this document to provide an adequate examination of the decision making mechanisms for trade in ivory, a broader and clearer discussion of these issues and an attempt to highlight the critical areas where our lack of understanding needs to be addressed is required. Some specific comments: The study is not to determine whether there should or should not be international trade in ivory, which is a separate and distinct matter for the Parties. This is a technically-focused study on a Adecision-making mechanism for a process of trade in ivory under the auspices of the Conference of the Parties@ that can be utilised by the Parties should they decide to enable future international trade in ivory under the Convention. As a technically-focused study, the demographic modeling should be up the current standards of the scientific community. This modeling component was criticized heavily in the first version and it the authors removed the model and make reference to its results rather than address the criticisms. There is no means in the current version to review the model used to derive the unsupported statements about harvesting levels. An adequate modeling approach that is up to the standards of current scientific work in this area is critical to achieve the following principle list on page 2: "That any legal trade will be sustainable and contribute positively to the conservation of elephants as envisaged in the African elephant range states= African Elephant Management Plan. If a legal trade does

15 not meet this objective, it should be stopped." It is important broader assumptions are demonstrated or supported by current data on trade and illegal killing. The following statement is not supported by historic legal ivory trade, though trade in other species can serve as an example of how this may work. As a result, the current wording and particularly the second sentence is conjecture: "That it is possible to establish a trade in ivory that minimises corrupt practices and the laundering of illegal ivory. By creating conditions that are advantageous for a legal trade, ultimately the illegal killing of elephants will be reduced." While the following statement is vague, there are many countries that have experienced declines after heavy investments and we have experienced different levels of threat between different populations within the same countries (i.e. with concurrent good protection of some populations and heavy impacts on others). The links between the drivers of illegal ivory trade and poaching are far from resolved. The authors should acknowledge our rudimentary understanding of the interactions and feedbacks driving illegal killing rather than draw conclusions based on conjecture: "That the failure to protect and conserve elephants in many countries in Africa is not primarily because other countries have traded in ivory but because they have not invested sufficiently in protecting their elephants and have not provided incentives for their conservation." The following seems to be the more pertinent and critical component of what is driving today's illegal trade: Secure legal processing and marketing procedures in countries importing ivory in order to minimise, if not eradicate, the laundering of illegal ivory." Currently China is a CITES designated importer, yet it has failed to regulate illegal markets. Despite this failure and non compliance, it remains a designated importer. This indicates this critical component is already not functioning adequately: Pg. 6: "Recent studies of the ivory carving industry in China (EIA 2011, Martin & Vigne 2011a) have revealed that the legal provisions and controls, on which their status as a buyer of ivory is based, are not being fully implemented. Large quantities of illegal ivory are clearly entering their ivory carving industries. Once again the implementation of CITES resolutions at a national level by a member state has fallen short of expectations. At CoP 15 in Doha (Qatar) in 2010, further revisions of Resolution Conf took place resulting in Resolution Conf (Rev. CoP15)."