Terrorist & Violent Intruder Preparedness/Response Simplifying Your Response Based on A6acker Objec<ve Commonali<es.

Transcription

1 Terrorist & Violent Intruder Preparedness/Response Simplifying Your Response Based on A6acker Objec<ve Commonali<es

2 Vaughn Baker Co-Founder Strategos International 20+ years L.E. experience (SWAT, Investigations, etc.) Deputy Dir. of Trng. Surefire Institute Co-Founded Strategos International in June of 2002

3 Active Shooter & Intruder Response Solutions Strategos founded in 2002 as primarily L.E./MIL Tactical Training Company 2007 Recognized need to train civilians as they are true first responders & success vs. failure is most likely dependent on their proper response Trained over 60,000 school, healthcare, faith-based, workplace, L.E., military and government professionals in 15 countries Countries include U.S., Canada, Mexico, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Honduras, Colombia, Singapore, Japan, United Kingdom, France, Portugal, Germany, Italy, and Spain.

4 Solution Phases Training & consulting solutions Strategos provides fall into 3 categories that organizations should address: PREVENTION RESPONSE AFTER ACTION

5 COMMUNITY RESPONSE Philosophy Based on experience we determined in late 2009 that solutions presented should be a community response approach Defining Community - a group of people, and a feeling of fellowship with others, as a result of sharing common attitudes, interests, and goals.

6 COMMUNITY RESPONSE Philosophy These tragic events are community based events Attacker is from the community Victims are from the community Responders are from community SOLUTIONS must be community based!

7 COMMUNITY RESPONSE Philosophy (continued) Community Response should include: Professional First Responder as well as the TRUE FIRST RESPONDER Defining Traditional FIRST RESPONDER - A person, such as a police officer, firefighter, or EMT, trained in emergency response procedures and prepared to move quickly to the scene of an emergency in progress

8 COMMUNITY RESPONSE Philosophy (continued) Community Response should include: Professional First Responder as well as the TRUE FIRST RESPONDER Defining the TRUE FIRST RESPONDER Those persons already ON SCENE when the incident begins that have proper training, mindset and DESIRE to do WHAT is needed WHEN it is needed to de-escalate the event to those that they are responsible for

9 COMMUNITY RESPONSE Philosophy (continued) Community Response should include: Organization TRUE FIRST RESPONDER Personnel Professional First Responder Personnel (L.E., Fire, EMS, etc.) Community Groups (parents, employees, members) What is a threat When to report How to report Awareness/Indicators Roles & Obligations in Reporting & Response

10 What is the Value of TIME? SUCCESS vs. FAILURE is most likely going to be up to the people on scene; NOT professional first responders

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12 Active Shooter Statistics (2013 FBI Study) 160 Active Shooter Incidents from (14-15 per year avg.) 11.4 per year avg. 6.4 first 7 years increasing to 16.4 avg. last 7 years 69% ending in 5 min. or less / 14% ending in 2 min. or less 56% ended on shooters initiative stopped or committed suicide 15.6% fled the scene prior to police arrival 21 incidents unarmed citizens restrained shooter 5 incidents armed, non-le personnel exchanged gunfire with attacker

13 Active Shooter Statistics (2013 FBI Study) 2 incidents armed, off-duty LE engaged the shooters resulting in attackers death 10.6% (17) Attacker committed suicide after arrival of L.E. 28% (45) police and attacker exchange gunfire Attack Locations 45.6% - Commerce/Workplace Open to public 24.4% - Education/Academic 10% - Government Facilities 9.4% - Open Space 4.4% - Residencdes 3.8% - Faith Based 2.5% - Healthcare

14 Active Shooter Statistics (2013 FBI Study) 160 Active Shooter Incidents from (14-15 per year avg.) 97.3% Male 6 of the incidents were female attackers All but 2 incidents involved a single attacker Highest Casualty Counts Aurora, CO Movie Theater 70 casualties - 12 killed, 58 wounded Virginia Tech 49 Casualties 32 killed, 17 wounded Ft. Hood Casualties 13 killed, 32 wounded Sandy Hook 29 Casualties 27 killed, 2 wounded

15 Terrorism - Domestic/International FBI Definition (1) Involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that violate federal or state law; (2) Appear to be intended to in<midate or coerce a civilian popula<on Active Shooter DHS Definition "an individual ac+vely engaged in killing or a2emp+ng to kill people in a confined and populated area; in most cases, ac6ve shooters use firearm[s] and there is no pa2ern or method to their selec+on of vic+ms. Recent trend towards shooter becoming mobile and not in one specific confined area Navy Yard Shooter, Univ. of California- Santa Barbara Shooter,

16 Overview of Terrorism Incidents 2008 MUMBAI ATTACKS 12 coordinated shooting & bombing attacks lasting 4 days 164 killed, 308 wounded 10 well trained terrorists conducted attack Attacks were committed by 2 or 3 attackers

17 Overview of Terrorism Incidents 2013 Kenya Westgate Mall Attacks 67 killed, 175 wounded 4 trained terrorists conducted attack w/ AK 47 s and explosives Siege last 48 hours

18 Overview of Terrorism Incidents 2015 Charlie Hebdo Attack 12 killed, 11 wounded in initial attack 5 others killed and 11 more wounded in related attacks in following 72 hours 2 trained terrorists conducted attack w/ rifles, explosives & RPG forced coerced access/entry

19 Attacker Objective Commonalities Target Selection Victim Specific Motivation However do engage targets of opportunity as well Target Accessibility Victim Types at Location Shock the Conscious (kids, foreigners, etc.) Location naturally confines victims & delays LE response (Oslo Norway)

20 Attacker Objective Commonalities God Complex Active Shooter - VA Tech, UC Santa Barbara, Columbine Terrorist Hand of God Actions Pre-Planning Terrorists Dry Run Probing Active Shooters Kill lists, IED testing, Mass casualties in compressed time frames

21 Attacker Objective Commonalities Social Media Communication Prior to the Act Veiled communication Death Acceptance Active Shooter - DOES NOT plan escape strategy Terrorist Considers death martyrdom

22 Attacker Objective Commonalities Set the New Record Body County Type of Death Who is targeted shocks the conscious Media Hungry Active Shooter - Wants to be remembered Columbine Basement Tapes, VA Tech NBC Video Manifesto, UC Santa Barbara You Tube Posting Terrorist Utilizes social media and and video sent to media outlets to claim responsibility & justify actions as well as recruiting tool

23 Attacker Objective Commonalities Access Denial Strategies Cause Attacker to Move On Why? Generally DO NOT Take Hostages No empathy for victims Generally kill up close Want to share personal space of victim at time of death

24 Other Commonalities ACTIVE SHOOTER & Terrorist Not motivated by revenge alone because many times the act is random in nature and not damage to persons for damage done to them or as simply acting out on their perceived ideology Does not seek retribution on specific wrong or people who have done him wrong Instead SEEKS: 1. Destruction of ANY and ALL 2. Notoriety 3. Infamy through slaughter 4. A moment in time vs. lifetime of moments

25 The PSYCHOLOGY of the ACTIVE SHOOTER A lot of research attempting to IDENTIFY the patterns of the ACTIVE Shooter Not a lot of research on the WHY they do what they do 1. Such a planned scale of violence 2. Apparent randomness of violence 3. The active killer s propensity of commit suicide as the escape strategy A lot of research attempting to identify the patterns of the ACTIVE SHOOTER

26 The PSYCHOLOGY of the ACTIVE SHOOTER Active Shooter s WORLDVIEW 1. VICTIM 2. VICTIMIZER Seeks to transition from VICTIM to the VICTIMIZER category Cultural forces lead the Active Killer to believe that mass murder is a path to celebrity wanting to be remembered as a VICTIMIZER not a VICTIM Those acting like VICTIMS will be perceived and treated as such by the VICTIMIZER

27 RESPONSE Implications for FIRST RESPONDER Active Shooter DOES NOT negotiate.he VICTIMIZES Active Shooter DOES NOT lie in wait to battle law enforcement- Only one LEO has been killed responding to Active Shooter incidents and very few have been injured Even when UNARMED citizens resist and FIGHT BACK the Active Shooter frequently retreats and crumbles Active Shooter incidents have primarily been aborted by a single courageous actor 1. 50% UNARMED citizens 2. 25% armed citizens 3. Remainder have been Law Enforcement

28 RESPONSE Implications for TRUE FIRST RESPONDER So WHY FIGHT BACK?!! Active Killer perceives his life as a VICTIM in a world of VICTIMIZERS and desires metamorphosis. Swift, aggressive action y first responders exploit this lifetime of conditioned VICTIM-like response In his brief role as VICTIMIZER he will attack mercilessly those acting like VICTIMS but those who adopt a posture and action of an aggressor they become the act of who is has always perceived as the VICTIMIZER

29 Attacker Background, Goals & Objectives Long List of Personal Failures (Who do they blame?) NOT Highly Trained (Amateur) BUT Heavily Armed! Generally does not take hostages Close Range & Multiple Shots to each Victim PRE-OCCUPIED with setting the record

30 Lockdown Principles for Public Places Overview & Functions of a Lockdown Purpose - To PREVENT attacker from obtaining ACCESS either to interior of building or room/office/area where you may reside Functions of a Lockdown Removing persons from the threat; Isolating the dangerous situation from much of the building/area; Allowing for an accurate accounting of persons within rooms; & Depending on the situation, facilitating an organized evacuation away from the dangerous area.

31 Lockdown Principles for Public Places 2 Types of Lockdowns Threat OUTSIDE the building - Examples would be fugitive in geographic area on run from law enforcement, violent crime with criminal at large in geographic area of building, etc. Threat INSIDE the building - Examples would be unauthorized access by intruder with unknown intentions, active shooter with known intentions Notification of one of the above types of lockdowns should be clear and quickly understood by students, employees, congregations members, visitors & staff

32 Lockdown Principles for Public Places Threat OUTSIDE Lockdown Procedures 1. Leaders, supervisors or ANYONE that has been trained make announcement such as threat outside lockdown or perimeter lockdown, etc. 2. Designated personnel or those closest LOCK exterior doors 3. Clear hallways, restrooms, & other areas that can t be secured 4. Secure & cover room or office windows a. Move all persons away from windows 5. Account for all persons within room/office a. Leaders should prepare a list of missing and extra persons in the room 6. Control all movement, but continue activities. 7. Once threat has subsided, the building leadership announces ALL CLEAR CODE over the PA system.

33 Lockdown Principles for Public Places Threat OUTSIDE Lockdown Procedures (continued) Considerations Special attention should be paid to activities that are outside of the building, such as playgrounds, ball fields, outside activities Persons must be able to hear the lockdown announcement. Make sure your exterior PA systems are installed & working properly. An alternate lockdown location must be identified. This location can be indoors or outdoors. (IF person(s) can be safely hidden)

34 Lockdown Principles for Public Places Threat INSIDE Intruder Lockdown Procedures 1. Building leadership orders and announces Threat Inside Lockdown or Emergency Lockdown over PA system. 2. Immediately direct students, staff, visitors, congregation members, etc. to the nearest room or secured space. 3. Activities or person(s) that are outside of the building SHOULD NOT enter the building. 4. Move outside person(s) to the primary evacuation site 5. Lock room/office doors 6. Layer & Reinforce Lockdown in Rooms 6. DO NOT lock exterior doors 7. Move people away from the windows and doors. Keep all persons sitting or kneeling on the floor (good posture), & turn off the lights/ cover windows/ viewable openings. 8. Take attendance of persons in each room. 1. Supervisor or Leadership prepares a list of missing or extra persons

35 Lockdown Principles for Public Places Threat INSIDE Intruder Lockdown Procedures (continued) 9. DO NOT respond to anyone at the door until all clear CODE is announced. 10. Keep out of sight 11. Be prepared to ignore any fire alarm activation, as the building SHOULD NOT not be evacuated using this method. 12. When or if students are moved out of the classroom, assist them in moving as quietly & quickly as possible. 13. When the threat is over/the intruder has left the building, building leadership. announces ALL CLEAR CODE over PA system. ***NOTE - Please note that some threats, such as a confirmed fire, intruder within a room, may override lockdown procedures. Also, lockdowns may be initiated in non-threatening circumstances to keep people away from areas where there may be a medical emergency or other disturbance.***

36 Lockdown Principles for Public Places If & When Lockdown Procedures Fail Any effective plan or strategy should include contingency planning for failure CORRECTLY & IMMEDIATELY implementing a lockdown should be the first response Recognize that implementing a lockdown is meant to PREVENT the intruder from having access to rooms & victims Everything discussed up to this point includes: - Threat Recognition, Threat Assessment, Access Control, Lockdown Implementation, Law Enforcement Response The above DOES NOT include what to do IF the shooter or intruder makes it into the room or area that YOU ARE IN! Hiding under desks/tables or behind objects once the shooter is in the area you are in has proven unsuccessful repeatedly

37 Lockdown Principles for Public Places If & When Lockdown Procedures Fail (continued) Consideration, Discussion, Education & applicable implementation should also include a 3 OUT Approach - LOCK OUT - Lock the shooter (or potential shooter) out of the building or out of the classroom. Lockdown - GET OUT - If the shooter is in your area attempt ESCAPE. If rooms, offices or areas are on 1st or 2nd floor escape through exterior window could be an option. - TAKE OUT - If the shooter is in your area and you cannot run FIGHT! Simply taking a position under a desk in the fetal position will do NOTHING to prevent you from being a victim.

38 What "3 OUT" Decision Making IS NOT!

39 REMEMBER! IMMEDIATE or an INDIRECT THREAT + LOCATION = PROPER RESPONSE! If threat is an indirect threat and not seen LOCK OUT; or GET OUT to LOCK OUT is usually best option

40 CORRECT "3 OUT" Decision Making Model Direct Contact in area that cannot be "locked out" immediately Immediate threat in area where GET OUT success In area that cannot be secured is not possible or probable Moving towards Indirect immediate Contact or area other that Stimulus can be AND "locked out" quickly OR LOCK OUT has failed or is failing! out and away In an from area building that can where be locked immediate out quickly exit is possible Improvised objects utilized as weapons, directing others LOCK, LAYER and REINFORCE lock out (teenagers or older) in directed group response

41 Why Fight Back? Good Guys Finish Last? NO!.... UNPREPARED Good Guys Finish LAST! Survival vs. Prevailing Figh6ng Back If you are going to get BEAT... Get BEAT doing SOMETHING not BEAT doing NOTHING!

42 Lockdown Principles for Public Places If & When Lockdown Procedures Fail (continued) The Take OUT approach should be considered a last resort option and it is unrealistic to assume that people will not be seriously hurt or killed as a result. It is FAR MORE unrealistic to think that hiding under desks or behind objects will save any lives at all however. YES!, fighting is an option; but it should be your LAST option SO prepare mentally for this option and obtain training for teachers, administrators & staff appropriately. It IS NOT recommended that training be implemented for students on this option as it could lead to inappropriate or VERY untimely implementation of that LAST RESORT option.

43 Lockdown Principles for Public Places If & When Lockdown Procedures Fail (continued) 3-OUT Questions to Ask Yourself for the following areas: Your assigned room, area or office Common Areas such as cafeterias, auditoriums, lobbies, gymnasiums, meeting areas, etc. How could I LOCK OUT from this area? How could I GET OUT from this area? How can I TAKE OUT from this area?

44 LOCKING OUT Using Magnets

45 LOCKING OUT - Bridging

46 LOCKING OUT Using Chair Legs

47 LOCKING OUT Tying Off Doors

48 LOCKING OUT Tying Off Closers

49 LOCKING OUT Tying Off to Tables

50 LOCKING OUT Anchoring

51 Questions About Training or Consulting?

52 Terrorist & Violent Intruder Preparedness/Response Simplifying Your Response Based on A6acker Objec<ve Commonali<es