Applicazione della Metodologia RAMCOP ORAT Runway Incursion. Italo Oddone Carlo Cacciabue

Transcription

1 Applicazione della Metodologia RAMCOP ORAT Runway Incursion Italo Oddone Carlo Cacciabue

2 Risk management Risk assessment Qualitative Analyses Bow tie Quantitative Analyses RAMCOP ORAT ET FT TESEO HEART THERP. 2

3 ADREP taxonomy Occurrence class Occurrence categories Events Descriptive factors Event phase Organization and persons Modifier Explanatory factors 3

4 Quantitative Analysis RAMCOP Risk Assessment Methodology for Company Operational Processes Cacciabue, P. C., Cassani, M., Licata, V., Oddone, I., and Ottomaniello, A. (2015). Int. Journal of Cognition Technology and Work (CTW), 17 (2), pp

5 RAMCOP 5

6 2. Available methods and reference Risk Matrix 2A Reliability assessment (probabilities evaluation) Deterministic assessment Risk Matrix Quantify severity and values If Severity occ = Negligible then disregard occur. from RA Define reference probabilities if p occ. p min then disregard occurrence from RA 6

7 2B Systems, processes and procedures involved Identify: Existing Causal Barriers Consequential Barriers Initiating Events (IE) Select methods to calculate probabilities of success/failure Identify existing data, information etc for fail. of componetns/tech. the selected methods Identify existing data, information etc for HRA selected methods 7

8 RAMCOP ORAT Overall Risk Assessment Table PHASE 1 1. Selection of Hazards to be assessed 2. Definition of Initiating Events & Threats 3. Evaluation of data, probabilities & uncertainties 4. Identification potential Consequences List of Hazards & Consequences to assess PHASE 2 For each Hazard: 1. Definition of all incident sequences 2. Identification of existing control measures & barriers 3. Evaluation of Consequences & associated Severities 4. Assessment of Risk and acceptabilty vs Risk Matrix Hazards to be further contained PHASE 3 For each Hazard to be further contained: 1. Consider additional safeguards & barriers 2. Evaluation of data, probabilities & uncertainties 3. Re-evaluation of Consequences 4. Re-assessment of Risk acceptability post mitigation All hazards contained 8

9 Case Study Risk Assessment of Airport Runway Change

10 Mov/Y: Primary Runway 8R/26L Risk Assessment of Airport Runway Change Mov Day Mov Week Mov Month Mov Year RISK MATRIX 5.479E E E E+05 Probability Level P5 Frequent p > 2.600E-04 P4 Reasonably probable 6.000E-05 < p 2.600E-04 P3 Remote 5.000E-06 < p 6.000E-05 P2 Extremely Remote 5.000E-08 < p 5.000E-06 P1 Extremely Improbable p < 5.000E-08 Severity Level S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 Negligeable Minor Major Hazerdous Catastrophic min1/week; max= always min= 1/month; max=1/week min= 1/y; max= 1/month min=1 /100 y; max= 1/y min 1/1000 y; max=1/100 y Hazard 1. Hazard 2. Hazard 3. Runway Incursion A/C; Veer-off; Runway Incursion ground means/vehicles; 10

11 THREAT P F I Low Med Barriers: P: Physical; F: Functional S: Symboblic; I: Immaterial Legenda CONSEQUENCE Undesired Operational State HAZARD Escalation Factor Hazard 3. Runway Incursion ground means/vehicles Bow - Tie Human Error Inadequate funct. of ground technology Crew ability S ATC comm. Guided routes S P Check by airport staff S S Inadequate managemnt of ground means runway incursion non aer. means P Near collision with object on ground ADREP Event Workload Training workers & engineers Bad weather Follow me check and intervention Aircraft collision with object/obstacle on ground - ADREP Event Inadeq. knowl. of procedures S Training Airport staff 11

12 RAMCOP ORAT HEART for HF World data. Description Existing control Phase 3 Threats Hazard Prob. Add. Mitigation Incident sequence Outcome Barriers UOS Severity description Probab. Risk reductionrequired (Post-Mitigation) Description and Prob. without Runway incursion 08R/26L Prob. Type non-aeronautical probabilitymeans Consequences of Type of barr. control Severity Probab. Risk Barriers Reduction Training of workers and engineers 0.05 Outcome (Pre-Mitigation) Actions & owners Monitoring & Review req. Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Th 1 = Threats Hazard Incident ATC sequence comm. Existing 0.3 control Outcome Add. Mitigation The Outcome current level of Actions The Safety & Monitoring Manager of & Exces. workers workload UOS description (Pre-Mitigation) required barriers (Post-Mitigation) and safeguards owners the Airport Review is the req. Description and Prob. without Prob. Type of Type of barr. Description Prob. Consequences Barriers Severity Probab. Risk Severity for Venice Probab. airport Risk does person responsible for probability control reduction Barriers Reduction Th 1 = The current level of The Safety Manager of HF Method adopted: HEART Hazard 3. Runway not strictly requires the monitoring the proper Exces. workers workload Pilot 0.3 barriers and safeguards the Airport is the GTU Error 1 = 9E-2 ( ) incursion 08R/26L nonaeronautical means extra barriers. procedures and specific implementation of implementation of ATC comm. 0.3 for... airport does person responsible for teamwork not strictly requires the monitoring the proper HF EPC Method : adopted: 13, 15, HEART 20, 21 Hazard 3. Runway implementation of implementation of GTU Error 1 = 9E-2 ( ) incursion 08R/26L nonaeronautical means extra safety barriers. measures. procedures and specific Effect: 0.05, 0.3, 0.3, 0.05 Pilot 0.3 EPC : 13, 15, 20, 21 safety measures. teamwork However, the overall Effect: 0.05, 0.3, 0.3, 0.05 However, the overall risk evaluated for the HEP HEP - 1: : E (0.145 E ) ( ) risk evaluated for the 2.57E-03 consequences of a consequences of a possible runway Aircraft collision GTU Error 2 = 3E-3 ( ) Aircraft collision incursion is very close EPC GTU : 4, 15, Error 21, 31 2 = 3E-3 ( ) with possible runway to the limit of Effect: 0.2, 0.05, 0.3, 0.3 p UOS = 2.57E-3 object/obstacle on Ground 0.1 acceptability. EPC : 4, 15, 21, 31 with incursion is very close 2.57E-03 ground Ground marking Catast. 1.16E-08 2 Follow-me 0.01 Catast. 1.16E HEP Effect: - 2: , E-02 (3.15E , - 0.3, 2.76E-2) 0.3 p object/obstacle on Consequently it is UOS = 2.57E-3 to the limit of ADREP Event strongly advised to 2.57E-03 marking ground Catast. 1.16E-08 2 acceptability implement a further Checks of 0.01 barrier based on the use HEP - 2: 1.18 E-02 (3.15E E-2) Follow-me 0.01 Catast. 1.16E-10 2 Airport staff of Follow-me to guide ADREP Event Consequently it is and support the 2.57E-03 movement on the strongly advised to ground of means and technologies. Training of implement a further Checks of workers 0.01 and barrier based on the use Airport staff engineers 0.05 of Follow-me to guide and support the movement on the ground of means and technologies. 12

13 HEART HE Probability of runway incursion p 1 = Probability of positioning non-aeronautical material / technologies on sensible areas GTU EPC Multiplier Assessed prop. of Effect Assessed Effect p 2 = Probability of failing to detect non-aeronautical material / technologies on sensible areas Assessed Assessed HEP GTU EPC Multiplier prop. of Effect Effect 9.00E E E E E E E E-02 HEP P HE = p 1 * p 2 5th perc. boundary 95th perc. boundary P HE = 2.57E E E-03 13

14 Means to reduce all Hazards Risk Informed Decision Making - RIDM Generic format of RIDM table Pre-mitigation Post-mitigation Hazard Severity Barrier Like. Risk level Barrier Severity Lakelihood Risk level H1-4/5 Existing Barriers p H1 RED B2 p H1,B2 RED 10 Cost K$ B3 p H1,B3 YELLOW 30 B2, B3 p H1,B2,B3 YELLOW 40 B4 p H1,B4 YELLOW 50 B2, B3, B4 p H1,B2,B3,B4 GREEN 90 B3, B4 p H1,B3,B4 YELLOW H2 Catastr. - 5/5 Existing Barriers p H2 RED B5 Catastr. p H2,B6 YELLOW 100 B6 Catastr. p H2,B6 YELLOW 70 B4 Catastr. p H2,B4 YELLOW 50 B6, B4 Very p H2,B4,B6 GREEN H3 Major Existing Barriers p H3 YELLOW B5 Major p H3,B5 GREEN 100 B3, B2 Major p H3,B3 YELLOW 40 B6, B4 Major p H3,B4,B6 GREEN Barriers efficiency for RIDM ϕ of barriers K$ H1 H2 H3 Barrires Cost Barrier N. of app. Cost Cost/ Benefit B2, B3, B4 90 YELLOW YELLOW YELLOW B B2, B3, B6 110 YELLOW YELLOW YELLOW B B5, B3 130 YELLOW YELLOW GREEN B B4, B6 150 YELLOW GREEN GREEN B B2, B3, B4, B6 160 GREEN GREEN GREEN B

15 Thank you for your attention 15