QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT (QRA) REPORT

Transcription

1 REPORT NO.:GCI/V/RMS/G0164/2015- REPORT NO.:GCI/V/RMS/049/ /AS/QRA/R00/ /AB/QRA/R00/ QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT (QRA) REPORT Prepare For M/s. CHALLA CHLORIDE PVT. LTD. MAHARASHTRA, INDIA Conucte & Prepare By GREEN CIRCLE INC. Integrate HSEQR Consulting Engineers, Scientists & Trainers An ISO: 9001, NABL/ISO: 17025, ISO14001, OHSAS: Certifie Organization & GPCB approve Environment Auitor Scheule II CORPORATE OFFICE: Green Empire (Anupushpam), Besie Canara Bank, Nr. Yash Complex, Above Axis Bank, Gotri Main Roa, VADODARA , (Gujarat), Inia ALSO AT NEW DELHI MUMBAI PUNE BANGALORE HYDERABAD OMAN AUSTRALIA QATAR AFRICA UAE Green Circle Inc. Page 0 of 60

2 M/s. Challa Chlorie Pvt. Lt. REPORT NO.:GCI/V/RMS/049/ /AS/QRA/R00/1253 QUALITY CONTROL SHEET Rev. Date Reason History Prepare By Reviewe By Approve By 00 18/03/2016 QRA AS AC PPJ AS: AC: PPJ: Ms. Ankita Shah Mr. Aliasgar Challawala Mr. Praeep Joshi Prepare by Ms. Ankita Shah, Executive, RMS Signature& Date Reviewe by Mr. Aliasgar Challawala, Asst. Manager, EHS & Projects Signature& Date Approve by Mr. Praeep Joshi, Group Presient & CEO Signature& Date Release by Mr. Nachiket Joshi, Group CFO Signature& Date Green Circle Inc. Page 1 of 60

3 M/s. Challa Chlorie Pvt. Lt. REPORT NO.:GCI/V/RMS/049/ /AS/QRA/R00/1253 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT We express our sincere thanks to management & employees of M/s. Challa Chlorie for their co-operation & unstinte help without which the QRA (Quantitative Risk Assessment) coul not have been possible. The courtesy extene to our team is highly appreciate. For: GREEN CIRCLE, INC. AUTHORISED SIGNATORY DISCLAIMER The consulting services conucte by Green Circle, INC. (The Company ) were performe using generally accepte guielines, stanars, an/or practices, which the Company consiers reliable. Although the Company performe its consulting services pursuant to reliable an generally accepte practices in the inustry, the Company oes not guarantee or provie any representations or warranties with respect to Client s use, interpretation or application of the finings, conclusions, an/or suggestions of the consulting services provie by the Company. Moreover, the finings, conclusions, an the suggestions resulting from the consulting service are base upon certain assumptions, information, ocuments, an proceures provie by the Customer. AS SUCH, IN NO EVENT AND UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCE SHALL THE COMPANY BE LIABLE FOR SPECIAL, INDIRECT, PUNITIVE OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OF ANY NATURE WHATSOEVER, INCLUDING WITHOUT LIMITATION, ANY LOST REVENUE OR PROFITS OF THE CUSTOMER OR ITS CUSTOMERS, AGENTS AND DISTRIBUTORS, RESULTING FROM, ARISING OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH, THE SERVICES PROVIDED BY THE COMPANY. The Customer agrees that the Company shall have no liability for amages, which may result from Client s use, interpretation or application of the consulting services provie by the Company. Client s logo has been use for report purpose only. Green Circle Inc. Page 2 of 60

4 M/s. Challa Chlorie Pvt. Lt. REPORT NO.:GCI/V/RMS/049/ /AS/QRA/R00/1253 ABBREVIATIONS API BLEVE DALR B ELR FO GO HCRD KW LEL LFL LPG MCLS MSDS QRA UEL UFL VCE American Petroleum Institute Boiling Liqui Expaning Vapor Explosion Dry Aiabatic Lapse Rate Decibel Environmental Lapse Rate Fuel oil Gas Oil Database for Hyrocarbon Contaminate Release Kilo Watt Lower Explosive Limit Lower Flammable Limit Liquefie Petroleum Gas Maximum Creible Loss Scenario Material Safety Data Sheet Upper Explosive Limit Upper Flammable Limit Vapor Clou Explosion Green Circle Inc. Page 3 of 60

5 M/s. Challa Chlorie Pvt. Lt. REPORT NO.:GCI/V/RMS/049/ /AS/QRA/R00/1253 INDEX 1. PROJECT DESCRIPTION SCOPE OF THE STUDY EXCECUTIVE SUMMARY LIST & DETAILS OF MATERIALS & TANKS OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY USE OF QRA RESULTS SOFTWARE USED METHODOLOGY ADOPTED FOR QRA HAZARDS & DAMAGE CRITERIA OF MATERIALS CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS RESULTS CONCLUSION RECOMMENDATIONS & MITIGATION MEASURES CASE STUDIES REFERENCES Green Circle Inc. Page 4 of 60

6 M/s. Challa Chlorie Pvt. Lt. REPORT NO.:GCI/V/RMS/049/ /AS/QRA/R00/ PROJECT DESCRIPTION M/s. Challa Chlorie Pvt. Lt. propose project is name as - Bulk Drug & Intermeiates an Chemical Manufacturing Unit. The expecte cost of the propose project will be aroun Rs. 4.5 Crores. Out of which about Rs. 100 Lakhs woul be investe towars installation of Multiple Effect Evaporation System, Rs. 15 Lakhs woul be spent on Air Pollution Control (APC) Equipment in the form of Bag Filter an Stack, Rs. 5 Lakhs towars the Green Belt Development Plan an Rs Lakhs woul be spent O & M of ETP an APC as well as EMP. annually towars 2. SCOPE OF THE STUDY This QRA stuy is to be conucte for the following facility: Acetic aci tank Acetone tank Acetyl Chlorie rum Ammonia tonner Chlorine tonner Ethylene Dichlorie rum Isopropyl Alcohol rum Methanol tank N-hexane rum Toluene rum Green Circle Inc. Page 5 of 60

7 M/s. Challa Chlorie Pvt. Lt. REPORT NO.:GCI/V/RMS/049/ /AS/QRA/R00/ EXCECUTIVE SUMMARY M/s. Challa Chlorie Pvt. Lt. has engage the services of GREEN CIRCLE, INC, VADODARA, for carrying out Quantitative Risk Analysis stuy of their facility consisting of Acetic aci tanks, Acetone tank, Acetic aci tank, Acetyl Chlorie rum, Ammonia tonner, Chlorine tonner, Ethylene Dichlorie rum, Isopropyl Alcohol rum, Methanol tank, N-hexane rum, an Toluene rum. Green Circle, Inc. Lt. has the requisite software an specialist manpower resources for this purpose. The renowne PHAST software package of DNV has been use by Green Circle, Inc. Lt. for carrying out this stuy. QRA stuy for the sai facility has been carrie out base on the verification of information from the plant personnel. Base on the operations to be carrie out an hazarous storages at the tank farm, the Risk Analysis stuy analyses the affecte istances an the amage to PEAR (People, Environment, Assets an Reputation of the company) from the ientifie scenarios consiering the Maximum creible loss scenario (MCLS) & Worst case scenario. Maximum creible loss scenarios have been worke base on the inbuilt safety systems an protection measures to be provie for the operation of the facility & the Worst case scenario i.e. Catastrophic Rupture has been worke out base on failure of the inbuilt safety system. Following are the amage istances compute for specific scenarios an the recommenations base thereon Jet fire effect in Acetone ue to a leak scenario of 100 mm for the heat loa of 4.0 kw/m² is m at 1.5 F Conition. These amage istances are consierable but proper extinguishing system must be installe to counter if any incient occurs. Flash fire effect in Methanol ue to a catastrophic rupture scenario is m at 1.5 F Conition. Late Pool fire effect in Acetone ue to a catastrophic rupture scenario is m at 1.5 F Conition. The amage will exten beyon company premises hence; off site emergency plan shoul be activate. Maximum effect of explosion in Acetone tank ue to leak scenario at overpressure 0.02 bar an 1.5 F conition is up to m creating pain to the people expose an Green Circle Inc. Page 6 of 60

8 M/s. Challa Chlorie Pvt. Lt. REPORT NO.:GCI/V/RMS/049/ /AS/QRA/R00/1253 amage the nearby units. It is recommene that the fire fighting facilities shoul be provie as per OISD, NFPA guielines. The structural strength provie for builing is such that the above overpressure coul not affect the builings an nearby units. Also toughen glass shoul be provie in office areas to withstan the shock wave. In this Risk Assessment Stuy various assumptions for process conitions, equipment layout have been consiere to carry out consequence analysis ue to partial an full rupture scenarios. Fire extinguishers available at the manifol shoul be kept in proper conitions an fire hyrant lines an monitoring at the jetties shoul be maintaine properly. References Plot plant (Refer annexure) Green Circle Inc. Page 7 of 60

9 M/s. Challa Chlorie Pvt. Lt. REPORT NO.:GCI/V/RMS/049/ /AS/QRA/R00/ LIST & DETAILS OF MATERIALS & TANKS Table: 4.1 Physical Properties of Material Sr.. Chemical Name Flammability Flash Point ( C) LEL (%) UEL (%) Vapor Pressure, kpa Boiling point ( C) Physical state Auto Ignition temp ( C) 1. Acetic Aci Flammable (@ 20 o C) Liqui Acetone Highly Flammable (@ 20 o C) 45 Liqui Methanol Highly Flammable (@21.22 o C) Liqui Acetyl Chlorie Highly Flammable 4.44 t Availab le 5 18 (@7.5 o C) Liqui Ammonia t Available t Appli cable t Available Gas Chlorine t flammable t Avail able t Availab le t Avail able (@ 30 o C) Gas t Available 7. Ethylene Dichlorie Highly Flammable (@ 20 o C) 83.5 Liqui Iso Propyl Alcohol Flammable (@ 20 o C) Liqui N-Hexane Flammable (@ 20 o C) Liqui Toluene Highly Flammable (@18.39 o C) Liqui 480 Green Circle Inc. Page 8 of 60

10 REPORT NO.:GCI/V/RMS/ /AB/QRA/R00/1253 TANK DETAILS The following are the etail that has been use while conucting the consequence analysis. Chemical Store Storage Capacity of the tank (kl/m 3 ) Designe Capacity Actual Capacity. of tanks Storage Conitions P (bar) T ( C) Elevation Of the tank above groun (m) Material of Construction Tank Dimensions (mm/in.) ID H Acetic aci 20 KL 15 KL 1 Ambient Ambient Above the groun S.S Acetone 20 KL 15KL 2 Ambient Ambient Uner groun M.S Methanol 20 KL 15 KL 1 Ambient Ambient Above the groun M.S Chlorine 900 kgs 900 kgs 3 Ambient Ambient Above the groun M.S Ethylene ichlorie 200 liters 160 kgs 10 Ambient Ambient Above the groun HDPE Acetyl chlorie 200 liters 160 kgs 10 Ambient Ambient Above the groun HDPE N-hexane 200 liters 180 liters 10 Ambient Ambient Above the groun M.S Green Circle Inc. Page 9 of 60

11 REPORT NO.:GCI/V/RMS/ /AB/QRA/R00/1253 Toluene 200 liters 180 liters 10 Ambient Ambient Above the groun M.S Isopropyl Alcohol 200 liters 160 kgs 10 Ambient Ambient Above the groun HDPE Ammonia 50 kg 50 kg 4 Ambient Ambient Above the groun M.S Green Circle Inc. Page 10 of 60

12 REPORT NO.:GCI/V/RMS/G0164/ /AB/QRA/R00/ OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY The main objective for conucting this QRA (Quantitative Risk Analysis) Stuy is to etermine the potential risks an their consequences to the facility ue to storage an transferring of hazarous chemicals at various locations an other equipments. This is achieve by the following: Ientification of hazars that coul be realize from hazarous material. Ientify the potential failure scenarios that coul occur within the facility. To asses, the potential risks associate with ientifie hazars to which the plant an its personnel an community outsie may be subjecte. Consequence analysis of various hazars is carrie out to etermine the vulnerable zones for each probable accient scenario. Evaluate the process hazars emanating from the ientifie potential accient scenarios. Analyze the amage effects to the surrounings ue to such accients. Conclusion an Recommenations in orer to mitigate the hazar. Green Circle Inc. Page 11 of 60

13 6. USE OF QRA RESULTS The techniques use for risk preiction within the QRA have inherent uncertainties associate with them ue to the necessary simplifications require. In aition, QRA incorporates a certain amount of subjective engineering jugment an the results are object to levels of uncertainty. The results shoul be use as a tool to ai engineering jugment an, if use in this way, can provie valuable information uring the ecision making process. The QRA results are epenent on the assumptions mae in the calculations, which are clearly ocumente of this report. The results show the significant contributions to the overall risk an inicate where worthwhile gains may be achieve if further enhancement of safety is eeme necessary. 7. SOFTWARE USED PHAST has been use for consequence analysis inclue ischarge an ispersion calculations. Green Circle Inc. Page 12 of 60

14 8. METHODOLOGY ADOPTED FOR QRA The consequences of release toxic or flammable material are largely epenent on the prevailing weather conitions. Consequences of loss of containment can lea to hazarous situation in any inustry hanling potentially hazarous materials. Following factors govern the severity of consequence of the loss of containment. Intrinsic properties: flammability, toxicity an reactivity. Dispersive energy: pressure, temperature an state of matter. Quantity present Environmental factors: weather (win spee, win irection, atmospheric temperature &pressure). Consequence analysis an calculations are effectively performe by computer software using moels valiate over a number of applications. Consequence moeling is carrie out by PHAST of DNV Software, UK. PHAST uses the Unifie Dispersion Moel (UDM) capable of escribing a wie range of types of acciental releases. The Moel uses a particularly flexible form, allowing for sharp-ege profiles, which become more iffuse ownwin. PHAST contains ata for a large number of chemicals an allows efinition of mixtures of any of these chemicals in the require proportion. The calculations by PHAST involve following steps for each moele failure case: Run ischarge calculations base on physical conitions an leak size. Moel first stage of release (for each weather category). Determine vapor release rate by flashing of liqui an pool evaporation rate. Dispersion moeling taking into account weather conitions. In case of flammable release, calculate size of effect zone for fire an explosion. The hazarous materials consiere in this stuy are mostly flammable liquis Green Circle Inc. Page 13 of 60

15 Flow chart for consequence analysis is shown in the form of event tree for release of flammable liqui. Incient Release Impact Release Tanker Explosion or BLEVE Gas Liqui an / or Liquifie Gas Gas Vents Liqui Flashes to Vapor Pool Slowly Evaporates Flame Jet Forms (if ignite) Vapor Clou Travels Downwin (If not ignite) Pool Fire Occurs Vapor Plume Travels Downwin Vapor Clou Ignites - Explosion Vapor Clou Ignites Flash Fire Occurs Ignition- Toxic Vapor Exposure Liqui Rainout Plume Ignites, Explosion an / or Flashfire Ignition Toxic Vapor Exposure Pool Fire Occurs Fig. 1: Methoology aopte for the stuy METEOROLOGICAL CONDITION The consequences of release flammable material are largely epenent on the prevailing weather conitions. For the assessment of major scenarios involving release of flammable Green Circle Inc. Page 14 of 60

16 materials, the most important meteorological parameters are those that affect the atmospheric ispersion of the escaping material. The crucial variables are win irection, win spee, atmospheric stability an temperature. Rainfall oes not have any irect bearing on the results of the risk analysis; however, it can have beneficial effects on absorption / washout of release materials. Actual behavior of any release woul largely epen on prevailing weather conition at the time of release. We have use the meteorological ata of Challa Chlorie, Maharashtra for the present stuy. ATMOSPHERIC PARAMETERS The atmospheric parameters which are consiere while conucting this stuy is as uner: Atmospheric Temperature : 25 eg C Relative humiity : 60% WIND SPEED AND WIND DIRECTION The win spee an win irection ata which have been use for the stuy is summarize below: Average Win Spee : 1.5 m/s, 3 m/s an 5 m/s Stability Class : F an D Win Direction : All 360 eg. WEATHER CATEGORY One of the most important characteristics of atmosphere is its stability. Stability of atmosphere is its tenency to resist vertical motion or to suppress existing turbulence. This tenency irectly influences the ability of atmosphere to isperse pollutants emitte into it from the facilities. In most ispersion scenarios, the relevant atmospheric layer is that nearest to the groun, varying in thickness from a few meters to a few thousan meters. Turbulence inuce by buoyancy forces in the atmosphere is closely relate to the vertical temperature graient. Temperature normally ecreases with increasing height in the atmosphere. The rate at which the temperature of air ecreases with height is calle Environmental Lapse Rate (ELR). It will vary from time to time an from place to place. The atmosphere is sai to be stable, neutral or unstable accoring to ELR is less than, equal to or greater than Dry Aiabatic Lapse Rate (DALR), which is a constant value of 0.98 C/100 meters. Green Circle Inc. Page 15 of 60

17 Pasquill stability parameter, base on Pasquill Giffor categorization, is such a meteorological parameter, which escribes the stability of atmosphere, i.e., the egree of convective turbulence. Pasquill has efine six stability classes ranging from `A' (extremely unstable) to `F' (moerately stable). Win spees, intensity of solar raiation (aytime insulation) an nighttime sky cover have been ientifie as prime factors efining these stability categories. Table 8.1 Pasquill stability classes Stability class Definition Stability class Definition A Very Unstable D Neutral B Unstable E Slightly Stable C Slightly Unstable F Stable When the atmosphere is unstable an win spees are moerate or high or gusty, rapi ispersion of pollutants will occur. Uner these conitions, pollutant concentrations in air will be moerate or low an the material will be isperse rapily. When the atmosphere is stable an win spee is low, ispersion of material will be limite an pollutant concentration in air will be high. In general, worst ispersion conitions (i.e. contributing to greater hazar istances) occur uring low win spee an very stable weather conitions Green Circle Inc. Page 16 of 60

18 9. HAZARDS & DAMAGE CRITERIA OF MATERIALS DEFINITIONS: The release of flammable liqui can lea to ifferent types of fire or explosion scenarios. These epen on the material release, mechanism of release, temperature an pressure of the material an the point of ignition. Types of flammable effects are as follows. s associate with Flammable materials a. Pool fire: The release flammable material which is a liqui store below its normal boiling point, will collect in a pool. The geometry of the pool will be ictate by the surrounings. If the liqui is store uner pressure above its normal boiling point, then a fraction of the liqui will flash into vapor an the remaining portion will form a pool in the vicinity of the release point. Once sustaine combustion is achieve, liqui fires quickly reach steay state burning. The heat release rate is a function of the liqui surface area expose to air. An unconfine spill will ten to have thin fuel epth (typically less than 5 mm) which will result in slower burning rates. A confine spill is limite by the bounaries (e.g. a yke area) an the epth of the resulting pool is greater than that for an unconfine spill. b. Flash fire: It occurs when a vapor clou of flammable material burns. The clou is typically ignite on the ege an burns towars the release point. The uration of flash fire is very short (secons), but it may continue as jet fire if the release continues. The overpressures generate by the combustion are not consiere significant in terms of amage potential to persons, equipment or structures. The major hazar from flash fire is irect flame impingement. Typically, the burn zone is efine as the area the vapor clou covers out to half of the LFL. This efinition provies a conservative estimate, allowing for fluctuations in moeling. Even where the concentration may be above the UFL, turbulent inuce combustion mixes the material with air an results in flash fire. c. Jet Fire: Jet flames are characterize as high-pressure release of gas from limite openings (e.g. ue to small leak in a vessel or broken rain valve). Boiling liqui expaning vapor explosion (BLEVE) or fireball: A fireball is an intense spherical fire resulting from a suen release of Green Circle Inc. Page 17 of 60

19 pressurize liqui or gas that is immeiately ignite. The best known cause of a fireball is a boiling liqui expaning vapor explosion (BLEVE). Fireball uration is typically 5 20 secons.. Vapor clou explosion: When a large quantity of flammable vapor or gas is release, mixes with air to prouce sufficient mass in the flammable range an is ignite, the result is a vapor clou explosion (VCE). Without sufficient air mixing, a iffusion-controlle fireball may result without significant overpressures eveloping. The spee of flame propagation must accelerate as the vapor clou burns. Without this acceleration, only a flash fire will result. Vapour clou explosions (VCE) are one of the most serious hazars in chemical process inustries. When a large quantity of flammable gas or vapor is accientally release in to atmosphere it may form a vapour clou an if its ignition is elaye (5-10 min) coul prouce a vapour clou explosion. The amage effects of a vapour clou explosion are mostly ue to the overpressure that is create from the fast expansion of the combustion proucts. The overpressure is the most important causes of amage to people, equipment an facilities. UNCONFINED VAPOUR CLOUD EXPLOSION Definition: Type of explosion in a liquefie hyrocarbons or other flammable gas clou in a non-confine space (within an/or beyon the premises) FACTOR AFFECTING FORMATION OF VAPOUR CLOUD 1. Type of leake oil- Lesser the flash point of flammable liqui, more will be the generation of vapor clou 2. Rate of leakage:- More the rate more will be vapor formation 3. Win velocity- more vapor formation may result ue to heavy win but the clou will rift in the irection of the win 4. Type of enclosure:- A soli wall will hol more vapor as compare to a fence bounary 5. Type of nearby vegetation - More is vegetation near the leak site, more vapors will be trappe. More is the height of the plants; more will be the quantity of vapor trappe Green Circle Inc. Page 18 of 60

20 EFFECT OF UNCONFINED VAPOUR CLOUD EXPLOSION When the vapor clou is ignite, following may result:-. 1. Blast waves 2. Shock waves 3. Fire Ball 4. Multiple fires Above may causes huge loss of life an property an may also amage the onsite isaster mitigation resources making it an offsite emergency. MANAGEMENT OF VAPOUR CLOUD 1. Don t switch off or switch on any electrical or heat generating source like DG an Compressor 2. Any hot job insie or outsie the station premises shoul be immeiately stoppe 3. Declare station emergency an evacuate the station as per evacuation 4. Stay upwin 5. Try to close the valve by remote operation if leakage is from the valve otherwise isolate the oil supply to leak tank/piping/valve 6. If not possible to isolate the valve by remote, wear BA set an close the valve locally. Don t try to approach site without BA set otherwise asphyxiation will lea to collapse an eath 7. When the clous gets ignite causing an explosion, follow the management proceure VAPOR CLOUD FORMATION & ITS EFFECT: When a clou of flammable vapor burns, the combustion may give rise to an overpressure or it may not. If there is no overpressure, the event is a vapor clou fire, or flash fire: an if there is overpressure, it is vapor clou explosion. A vapor clou explosion is one of the most serious hazars in the process inustries. Vapor clou explosions o occasionally occur an they are generally very estructive. A feature of vapor clou is that it may rift some istance from the point where the leak has occurre an thus threaten a consierable area. Such types of vapor clou fin an ignition source an can create overpressure an blast effects which can cause severe amage at consierable istance from the source of leak. Green Circle Inc. Page 19 of 60

21 s Associate with Explosive Chemicals: DAMAGE CRITERIA: Damage estimates ue to thermal raiations an overpressure have been arrive at by taking in to consieration the publishe literature on the subject. The consequences can then be visualize by the superimposing the amage effects zones on the propose plan site an ientifying the elements within the project site as well as in the neighboring environment, which might be aversely affecte, shoul one or more hazars materialize in real life. THERMAL DAMAGE: The effect of thermal raiation on people is mainly a function of intensity of raiation an exposure time. The effect is expresse in terms of the probability of eath an ifferent egrees of burn. The following tables give the effect of various levels of heat flux. FATAL RADIATION EXPOSURE LEVELS Table 9.1: Fatal Raiation Exposure Level RADIATION LEVEL kw/m 2 FATALITY 1% 50% 99% EXPOSURE IN SECONDS Green Circle Inc. Page 20 of 60

22 Table 9.2: Fatal Raiation Exposure Level (Details) RADIATION KW/m2 DAMAGE TO EQUIPEMENT DAMAGE TO PEOPLE 1.2 Solar heat at noon 1.6 PVC insulate cables amage Minimum level of pain threshol *** Causes pain if uration is longer than 20 secs. But blistering is unlikely 6.4 *** Pain threshol reache after 8 secs. Secon egree burns after 20 secs Minimum energy to ignite woo with a flame; Melts plastic tubing. 1% lethality in one minute. First egree burns in 10 secs 16.0 *** Severe burns after 5 secs Minimum energy to ignite woo at ientifying long exposure without a flame. 100% lethality in 1 minute. Significant injury in 10 secs Severe amage to plant 100% lethality in 1 minute. 50% lethality in 20 secs. 1% lethality in 10 secs. Green Circle Inc. Page 21 of 60

23 OVERPRESSURE DAMAGE: Table 9. 3: Over Pressure Damage Criteria with Damage To People OVER PRESSURE (mbar) MECHANICAL DAMAGE TO EQUIPMENTS Heavy amage to plant & structure Repairable amage DAMAGE TO PEOPLE 1% eath from lung amage >50% earrum amage >50% serious wouns from flying objects >1% earrum amage >1% serious wouns from flying objects 30 Major glass amage Slight injury from flying glass 10 10% glass amage *** Table 9.4: Over Pressure Damage Criteria with Mechanical Damage To Equipments OVER PRESSURE Bar K Pa Mechanical amage to equipments Annoying noise (137 B if of low frequency Hz) Occasional breaking of large glass winows alreay uner strain Lou noise (143 B), sonic boom, glass failure Breakage of small winows uner strain Typical pressure for glass breakage Safe istance" (probability 0.95 of no serious amage below this value);projectile limit; some amage to house ceilings; 10% winow glass broken Limite minor structural amage Green Circle Inc. Page 22 of 60

24 Large an small winows usually shattere; occasional amage to winow frames Minor amage to house structures Partial emolition of houses, mae uninhabitable Corrugate asbestos shattere; corrugate steel or aluminum panels, fastenings fail, followe by buckling; woo panels (stanar housing)fastenings fail, panels blown in Steel frame of cla builing slightly istorte Partial collapse of walls an roofs of houses Concrete or ciner block walls, not reinforce, shattere Lower limit of serious structural amage % estruction of brickwork of houses Heavy machines (3000 lb) in inustrial builing suffere little amage; steel frame builing istorte an pulle away from founations Frameless, self-framing steel panel builing emolishe; rupture of oil tanks Claing of light inustrial builings rupture Wooen utility poles snappe; tall hyraulic press (40,000 lb) in builing slightly amage Nearly complete estruction of houses Loae, lighter weight (British) train wagons overturne Brick panels, 8 12 in. thick, not reinforce, fail by shearing or flexure Loae train boxcars completely emolishe Probable total estruction of builings; heavy machine tools (7,000 lb) move an baly amage, very heavy machine tools (12,000 lb) survive Green Circle Inc. Page 23 of 60

25 10. CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS INTRODUCTION The consequence analysis is carrie out to etermine the extent of sprea (ispersion) by acciental release which may lea to jet fire, pool fire, catastrophic ruptures resulting in generation of heat raiation, overpressures, explosions etc. In orer to form an opinion on potentially serious hazarous situations an their consequences, consequence analysis of potential failure scenarios are conucte. It is qualitative analysis of hazars ue to various failure scenarios. In consequence analysis, each failure case is consiere in isolation an amage effects preicte, without taking into account the seconary events or failures it may cause, leaing to a major isastrous situation. The results of consequence analysis are useful in eveloping Disaster Management Plan an in eveloping a sense of awareness among operating an maintenance personnel. It also gives the operating personnel an population living in its vicinity, an unerstaning of the hazar they are pose to. Event Outcomes Upon release of flammable / toxic gas & liquis, the hazars coul lea to various events which are governe by the type of release, release phase, ignition etc. PHAST has an inbuilt event tree for etermining the outcomes which are base on two types of releases namely continuous an instantaneous. Leaks are consiere to be continuous releases whereas, ruptures are consiere to be instantaneous releases. These types of releases are further classifie into those which have a potential for rain-out an those which o not. Whether the release woul leak to a rain-out or not epens upon roplet moeling which is the main cause of formation of pools. Fig 2, Fig 3, Fig 4 an Fig5 present the event trees utilize by PHAST to generate the event outcomes. Green Circle Inc. Page 24 of 60

26 Fig. 2: Event Tree for continuous release without rain-out (from PHAST) Fig.3: Event Tree for Instantaneous release without rain-out (from PHAST) Green Circle Inc. Page 25 of 60

27 Fig. 4: Event Tree for continuous release with rain-out (from PHAST) Green Circle Inc. Page 26 of 60

28 Fig.5: Event Tree for Instantaneous release with rain-out (from PHAST) Green Circle Inc. Page 27 of 60

29 EFFECTS OF RELEASE When hazarous material is release to atmosphere ue to any reason, a vapor clou is forme. Direct clou formation occurs when a gaseous or flashing liqui escapes to the atmosphere. Release of toxic compouns to atmosphere may usually lea to the following: 1. Spillage of liqui hyrocarbons will result in a pool of liqui, which will evaporate taking heat from the surface, forming a flammable atmosphere above it. Ignition of this pool will result in pool fire causing thermal raiation hazars. 2. A fireball or BLEVE (Boiling Liqui expaning Vapor Explosion) occurs when a vessel containing a highly volatile liqui (e.g. LPG, Propylene etc) fails an the release large mass of vapor clou gets ignite immeiately. It has amage potential ue to high intensity of raiation an generation of the overpressure waves, causing large scale amage to nearby equipment an structures. 3. Catastrophic failure of tanks/ pressurize vessels, rotary equipment an valves etc. can result in equipment fragments flying an hitting other equipment of the plant. 4. Release of toxic compouns results in the toxic vapour clou traveling over long istances, affecting a large area, before it gets sufficiently ilute to harmless concentration in the atmosphere. 5. The material is in two phases insie the containment - liqui & vapor. Depening on the location of the leak liqui or vapor will be release from the containment. If vapor is release a vapor clou will form by the mixing of the vapor an air. The size of the vapor clou will epen on the rate of release, win spee; win irection & atmospheric stability will etermine the ispersion an movement of the vapor clou. 6. If liqui is release there will be some flashing as the boiling point of liqui is below the Ambient temperature. The vapor forme by immeiate flashing will behave as vapors release. The liqui will fall on the groun forming a pool. There will be vaporization from the pool ue to the heat gaine from the atmosphere & groun. 7. There will be ispersion an movement of vapor clou forme by evaporation of liqui. The behavior of material release by loss of containment epens on the following factors: 1. Physical properties of the material 2. Conitions of material in containment (pressure an temperature) 3. Phase of material release (liqui or gas) 4. Inventory of material release 5. Weather parameters (temperature, humiity, win spee, atmospheric stability) 6. Material with boiling point below Ambient conition. Green Circle Inc. Page 28 of 60

30 11. CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS RESULTS We have consiere below QRA results. The Consequence result tables along with their graphs an maps are shown in the report ahea. te: Since Acetic Aci (FP=39-40 O C ) is not available in the software library hence N-Butyl Acrylate (FP=38.85 O C) is use. Acetic Aci Tank Table 11.1: Damage Distances Scenario etails Weather Category Catastrophic Rupture (m) 100 mm leak (m) 25 mm leak (m) 1.5 F 3 D 1.5 F 1.5 F 3 D 5 D 1.5 F 3 D 5 D Flash Fire Envelope Furthest Extent (ppm) Raiatio n Intensity ( kw/m 2 ) Raiatio n Intensity ( kw/m 2 ) Overpres sure ( bar) Thermal Damage Distance by Late Pool Fire t reach e t reach e t reach e t reach e t reach e t reach e Thermal Damage Distance by Jet Fire t React e t react e 3.43 Maximum Distance at Overpressure Level (m) t reach e t Reac he t Reac he t Reac he t reach e t Reac he t Reac he t Reac he t reach e t Reac he t Reac he t Reac he Green Circle Inc. Page 29 of 60

31 Scenario etails Weather Category Catastrophic Rupture (m) 100 mm leak (m) 25 mm leak (m) 1.5 F 3 D 1.5 F 1.5 F 3 D 5 D 1.5 F 3 D 5 D Acetone Tank Scenario etails Catastrophic Rupture (m) Table 11.2: Damage Distances 100 mm leak (m) 25 mm leak (m) Weather Category 1.5 F 3 D 1.5 F 1.5 F 3 D 5 D 1.5 F 3 D 5 D Furthest Extent (ppm) Raiation Intensity ( kw/m 2 ) Raiation Intensity ( kw/m 2 ) Overpress ure ( bar) Flash Fire Envelope Thermal Damage Distance by Late Pool Fire haza r haza r haza r Thermal Damage Distance by Jet Fire haza r haza r haza r haza r haza r haza r t Reach e Maximum Distance at Overpressure Level (m) t Reach e t Reach e Green Circle Inc. Page 30 of 60

32 Methanol Tanker Scenario etails Weather Category Furthest Extent (ppm) Raiation Intensity ( kw/m 2 ) Raiation Intensity ( kw/m 2 ) Overpres sure ( bar) Catastrophic Rupture (m) Table 11.3: Damage Distances 100 mm leak (m) 25 mm leak (m) 1.5 F 3 D 1.5 F 1.5 F 3 D 5 D 1.5 F 3 D 5 D Haza r Haza r Haza r Flash Fire Envelope Thermal Damage Distance by Late Pool Fire Thermal Damage Distance by Jet Fire Haza r Haza r Haza r Haza r Haza r Haza r t Reach e t Reach e t Reach e t Reach e Maximum Distance at Overpressure Level (m) t Reach e t Reach e t Reach e t Reach e t Reach e t Reach e t Reach e t Reach e t Reach e t Reach e t Reach e t Reach e Green Circle Inc. Page 31 of 60

33 te: Since Acetyl Chlorie (FP=4.4 O C ) Toluene (FP=4 O C) is use. is not available in the software library hence Acetyl Chlorie Drum Table 11.4: Damage Distances Scenario etails 16 mm leak (m) Weather Category 1.5 F 3 D 5 D Flash Fire Envelope Furthest Extent (ppm) Thermal Damage Distance by Late Pool Fire Raiation Intensity ( kw/m 2 ) Raiation Intensity ( kw/m 2 ) Thermal Damage Distance by Jet Fire t Reache t Reache t Reache t Reache Maximum Distance at Overpressure Level (m) t Reache t Reache Overpressure ( bar) Green Circle Inc. Page 32 of 60

34 Ammonia Cyliners Table 11.5: Damage Distances Scenario etails Catastrophic Rupture (m) 22 mm leak (m) Weather Category 1.5 F 3 D 5 D 1.5 F 3 D 5 D Flash Fire Envelope Furthest Extent (ppm) Raiation Intensity ( kw/m 2 ) Raiation Intensity ( kw/m 2 ) Raiation Intensity ( kw/m 2 ) Overpressure ( bar) Thermal Damage Distance by Late Pool Fire Thermal Damage Distance by Jet Fire t Reache Thermal Damage Distance by Fireball Ellipse t Reache t Reache t Reache t Reache t Reache t Reache Maximum Distance at Overpressure Level (m) t Reache t Reache Green Circle Inc. Page 33 of 60

35 te: Since Ethylene Dichlorie (FP=12.8 O C ) is not available in the software library hence Ethanol (FP=12.85 O C) is use. Ethylene Dichlorie Drum Table 11.6: Damage Distances Scenario etails 16 mm leak (m) Weather Category 1.5 F 3 D 5 D Flash Fire Envelope Furthest Extent (ppm) Thermal Damage Distance by Late Pool Fire Raiation Intensity ( kw/m 2 ) Raiation Intensity ( kw/m 2 ) Thermal Damage Distance by Jet Fire t Reache t Reache t Reache t Reache t Reache t Reache Maximum Distance at Overpressure Level (m) t Reache t Reache t Reache Overpressure ( bar) Green Circle Inc. Page 34 of 60

36 Isopropyl Alcohol Drum Table 11.7: Damage Distances Scenario etails 16 mm leak (m) Weather Category 1.5 F 3 D 5 D Flash Fire Envelope Furthest Extent (ppm) Thermal Damage Distance by Late Pool Fire Raiation Intensity ( kw/m 2 ) Raiation Intensity ( kw/m 2 ) Thermal Damage Distance by Jet Fire t Reache t Reache t Reache 1.43 t Reache t Reache t Reache Maximum Distance at Overpressure Level (m) t Reache t Reache Overpressure ( bar) Green Circle Inc. Page 35 of 60

37 N-Hexane Barrel Table 11.8: Damage Distances Scenario etails 15 mm leak (m) Weather Category 1.5 F 3 D 5 D Flash Fire Envelope Furthest Extent (ppm) Thermal Damage Distance by Late Pool Fire Raiation Intensity ( kw/m 2 ) Raiation Intensity ( kw/m 2 ) Thermal Damage Distance by Jet Fire t Reache t Reache Maximum Distance at Overpressure Level (m) t Reache Overpressure ( bar) Green Circle Inc. Page 36 of 60

38 Toluene Barrel Table 11.9: Damage Distances Scenario etails 15 mm leak (m) Weather Category 1.5 F 3 D 5 D Flash Fire Envelope Furthest Extent (ppm) Thermal Damage Distance by Late Pool Fire Raiation Intensity ( kw/m 2 ) Raiation Intensity ( kw/m 2 ) Thermal Damage Distance by Jet Fire t Reache t Reache t Reache t Reache Maximum Distance at Overpressure Level (m) t Reache t Reache Overpressure ( bar) Green Circle Inc. Page 37 of 60

39 Chlorine Tonner Table 11.10: Damage Distances Scenario etails Catastrophic Rupture (m) 35 mm leak (m) Weather Category 1.5 F 3 D 5 D 1.5 F 3 D 5 D Distance to Concentration Results Concentration (ppm) Average Timing Distance (m) User Conc. (10) 1800 s Consequences Maps & Graphs Fig.11.1 Flash fire of Acetic Aci by leak scenario (at 100 mm) Fig.11.2 Flash fire of Acetic Aci by Catastrophic rupture Green Circle Inc. Page 38 of 60

40 Fig Graph of total istance covere by flash fire Fig Late Pool fire of Acetic Aci by Leak Scenario Fig Jet Fire of Acetic Aci by Leak Scenario Green Circle Inc. Page 39 of 60

41 Fig Worst Case of Acetic Aci by Leak Scenario Fig Late Pool Fire of Acetic Aci by Leak Scenario (25 mm) Fig Flash Fire of Acetone by Catastrophic rupture Green Circle Inc. Page 40 of 60

42 Fig Graph of total istance covere by flash fire Fig Late Pool Fire of Acetone by Catastrophic rupture Fig Jet Fire of Acetone by Leak Scenario Green Circle Inc. Page 41 of 60

43 Fig Pool Fire of Acetone by Leak Scenario Fig Worst case of Acetone by Leak Scenario Fig Flash Fire of Methanol by Catastrophic Rupture Green Circle Inc. Page 42 of 60

44 Fig Graph of total istance covere by flash fire Fig Late Pool Fire of Methanol by Catastrophic Rupture Fig Jet Fire of Methanol by Leak Scenario Green Circle Inc. Page 43 of 60

45 Fig Pool Fire of Methanol by Leak Scenario Fig Worst Case Raii of Methanol by Catastrophic rupture Fig Flash Fire of Ethylene Dichlorie by Catastrophic rupture Green Circle Inc. Page 44 of 60

46 Fig Flash Fire of Ethylene Dichlorie by Leak Scenario Fig Graph of total istance covere by flash fire Fig Late Pool Fire of Ethylene Dichlorie by Leak Scenario Green Circle Inc. Page 45 of 60

47 Fig Worst case raii of Ethylene Dichlorie by Leak Scenario Fig Pool Fire of Ethylene Dichlorie by Leak Scenario Fig Flash Fire of Acetyl chlorie by Catastrophic Rupture Green Circle Inc. Page 46 of 60

48 Fig Graph of total istance covere by flash fire Fig Jet Fire of Toluene by Leak Scenario Fig Late Pool Fire of Toluene by Leak Scenario Green Circle Inc. Page 47 of 60

49 Fig Pool Fire of Toluene by Leak Scenario Fig Flash Fire of N-Hexane by Catastrophic rupture Fig Graph of total istance covere by flash fire Green Circle Inc. Page 48 of 60

50 Fig Late Pool Fire of N-Hexane by Catastrophic rupture Fig Jet Fire of N-Hexane by Catastrophic rupture Fig Late Pool Fire of N-Hexane by Leak Scenario Green Circle Inc. Page 49 of 60

51 Fig Pool Fire of N-Hexane by Leak Scenario Fig Flash Fire of Toluene by Catastrophic Rupture Fig Graph of total istance covere by flash fire Green Circle Inc. Page 50 of 60

52 Fig Jet Fire of Toluene by Leak Scenario Fig Late Pool Fire of Toluene by Leak Scenario Fig Pool Fire of Toluene by Leak Scenario Green Circle Inc. Page 51 of 60

53 Fig Worst case of Toluene by Leak Scenario Fig Worst case of Toluene by Leak Scenario Fig Pool Fire of Isopropyl Alcohol by Leak Scenario Green Circle Inc. Page 52 of 60

54 Fig Worst case raii of Isopropyl Alcohol by Leak Scenario Fig Flash Fire of Ammonia by Catastrophic Rupture Green Circle Inc. Page 53 of 60

55 Fig Total istance covere by Ammonia tank by Catastrophic Rupture Fig maximum Concentration of Chlorine by Catastrophic Rupture Fig Graph of total istance covere by Catastrophic Rupture Green Circle Inc. Page 54 of 60

56 Fig Maximum Concentration Footprint of Chlorine by Leak Scenario Fig Maximum Concentration Footprint graph of Chlorine by Leak Scenario Green Circle Inc. Page 55 of 60

57 12. CONCLUSION We have consiere all possible scenarios for this project. We have foun that major facility amage because of leak (100 mm). This will amage aroun facilities, associate assembly. It will major effect to Economic Property, Public & Environmental. But for controlling that effect, Challa Chlorie shoul use Active, Passive & Process safe guars an Fire Fighting System. The Interlocking an tripping arrangements (Auto & Manual) to all critical equipments will reuce the chance of Leakage an spillage hence it will keep the employees & workers of the plant safe. M/s. Challa Chlorie has been using fire fighting system, Smoke etection system, HC & O2 Detectors (Portable Gas Detectors) system, etc for control or minimize of reuce major hazar. The organization shoul take timely corrective actions an is prepare for proviing require resources to ensure appropriate corrective an preventive actions. To analyse the effect of leakages from tank hole of pipelines have been consiere. The chances of occurrence of full bore failure are comparatively least case but we consiere worst case for major fatality analysis. As per analysis major hazar will happen because of the thermal raiation level of 4 kw/m 2 from the point of release. The raiation hazar ue to other intensity raiations that is kw/m 2, 37.5 kw/m 2 also consiere. During explosion of Acetone, major hazar locate as within meters are from the location of release. Green Circle Inc. Page 56 of 60

58 13. RECOMMENDATIONS & MITIGATION MEASURES 1. Containers of chlorine shall be use on a first-in-first-out basis. 2. Water may not be use on Chlorine leaks because accelerate corrosion, resulting from the formation of hyrochloric aci when water is present, may quickly make the leak worse. Water spray or fog may, however, be use to help suppress the size of a chlorine clou near the leak. 3. Ignition source shoul be prohibite. 4. Tanks shoul be coate with appropriate paints (e.g. epoxy paints) to reuce the chances of corrosion an leakages. 5. Valve maintenance shoul be performe on monthly basis to ensure effective operability an a ranom surprise inspection of the same shoul be one. 6. Health testing of the pipeline, tank, rum or tonner shoul be performe. 7. Preventive maintenance inspection scheule for pumps shall be observe as per equipment manual. 8. Fire prevention an coe enforcement is one of the major areas of responsibility for the fire service. 9. Earthing an boning shoul be provie for each tank farm & warehouse. 10. Fires extinguishers are present at all the tank farm an warehouse. Following fire fighting facilities can be use to tackle the fire: Fire hyrant an monitor nozzle installation Water fog an sprinkler system Mobile Firefighting equipment Tank eluge valve base water sprinkler system Perioical mock rills shoul be conucte. 11. Emergency shut-own proceure to be strictly followe. 12. Goo safety management, strict aherence to safety management proceures an competency assurance will reuce the risk. Green Circle Inc. Page 57 of 60

59 14. CASE STUDIES March 1967: The Torrey Canyon supertanker was shipwrecke off the west coast of Cornwall, Englan, causing an environmental isaster. This was the first major oil spill at sea March 16, 1978: The Amoco Caiz, a VLCC owne by the company Amoco (now merge with BP) sank near the northwest coast of France, resulting in the spilling of 68,684,000 US gallons of crue oil (1,635,000 barrels). This is the largest oil spill from an oil tanker in history. March 24, 1989: Exxon Valez oil spill. The Exxon Valez, an oil tanker boun for Long Beach, California, hit Prince William Soun's Bligh Reef, umping an estimate minimum 10.8 million US gallons (40.9 million litres, or 250,000 barrels) of crue oil into the sea. It is consiere to be one of the most evastating human-cause environmental isasters ever to occur. July 6, 2013: Lac-Mégantic, Quebec Canaa. Lac-Mégantic erailment. Fortyseven people were kille when there was a erailment of an oil shipment train. The oil shipment caught fire an exploe, estroying more than thirty builings. It was the fourth-ealiest rail accient in Canaian history April 20, 2010: Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. Eleven oil platform workers ie in an explosion an fire that resulte in a massive oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, consiere the largest offshore spill in US history 15. REFERENCES 1. -M.J Borysiewiez, M.A. Borysiewiez, L.Garanty, A. Kozubal 2. Guieline for QRA from the- PURPLE BOOK 3. Worl Bank Technical papers relating to Techniques for assessing Inustrial s. 4. Major Control by ILO. 5. Risk Management Program guielines by EPA (US) 6. Worl Bank Technical Paper no. 55 Technical lt. For assessing hazars A Manual. 7. PHAST Software-By DNV Green Circle Inc. Page 58 of 60

60 Annexure Green Circle Inc. Page 59 of 60