JTF GTMO Detainee Assessment

Transcription

1 s E c R E T // NOFORN r DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA APO AE March 2006 MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southern Command, 3511 NW 9lst Avenue, Miami, FL (S//NF) Personal Information: JTF GTMO Detainee Assessment o JDIMSAIDRC Reference Name: Abdul Rahman Mohammed Hussain Khowlan o Aliases and Current/True Name: Abd Al Rahman Muhammad Husayn Al Khawlan. Idris Al Habeeb. Maserat Al Ta'aefean. Adris Al Ta'ifi. Abu Daries Al Taifi. Omar. Abdul Rahman Idris. Aboudi o Place of Birth: Taif. Saudi Arabia (SA) o Date of Birth: Citizenship: Saudi Arabia o Internment Serial Number (ISN): US9SA DP 2. (FOUO) Health: Detainee is in good health. He has chronic eczema He is a former hunger striker. He has a history of chronic right shoulder pain. He had a left anterior cruciate ligamentear in August (S//NF) JTF GTMO Assessment: a. (S) Recommendation: JTF GTMO recommends this detainee for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD). JTF GTMO previously assessed detainee as Retain in DoD Control (DoD) on25 July CLASSIFIED BY: MULTIPLE SOURCES REASON: E.O SECTION 1.5(C) DECLASSIFY ON: I S E C R E T //NOFORN I I 2O3IO33I

2 S E C R E T // NOFORN I I 2O3IO33I b. (S//NF) Executive Summary: Detainee is assessed to be a member of Al-Qaida. He traveled to Afghanistan (AF) to participate in jihadist training and fled to the Tora Bora Mountains after 11 September Detainee has admitted associations to and knowledge of known Al-Qaida operatives. He admitted prior knowledge of a plot that ultimately became the I I September attacks. It is assessed this detainee is a MEDIUM risk, as he may pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies. JTF GTMO determined this detainee is of MEDIUM intelligence value. 4. (S//NF) Detainee's Account of Events: The following section is based, unless otherwise indicated, on detainee's own account. These statements are included without consideration of veracity, accuracy, or reliability. a. (S/NF) Prior History: Detainee dropped out of high school in 1990 and worked parttime at a family convenience store until 2001.' In approximately 1991, a mutual friend introduced detainee to Hani Hanjour. The two became very close friends and spent considerable time together.' In the mid to late 1990s, detainee and a friend, Abdul {arim, traveled to the United Arab Emirates for one month where they stayed in a mosque.' Several years later, detainee decided he wanted to get married, but felt his excessive weight would pose a problem. During a visit with his older brother in Jeddah, SA, detainee saw a poster declaring a fatwa supporting training for jihad as a religious duty. He also met a man named Abu Muith (variant: Muadh, Muaz) who sold dates near his brother's house.4 b. (S/NF) Recruitment and Travel: In summer 2001, detainee had a conversation with Abu Muath regarding his desire to marry, his weight concem, and the fatwa supporting jihadist training. Abu Muath suggestedetainee travel to Afgharistan for two months of training to fulfill the religious obligation. The physical training regimen would also afford him an opportunity to lose weight. Detainee agreed, and surrendered his passporto Abu Muath. Abu Muath returned the passport with paid airline tickets for detainee's travel to Kandahar, AF, as well as 3,000 Saudiniyals (approximately $799 USD).t D.taine" departed Saudi Arabia in July 2001,o traveling to Karachi, Pakistan (PK) via Qatar. When detainee ' JUN-2003 ' IIR ; Also discussed in 0003 I 5 sir 07-JLrN Analyst Note: Detainee has also hinted at prior travel to Canada, though he has never explicitly admitted it. See 0005 l 3 str 03-AUG o JUN-2003; Employment referenced in TD t 0005t JUN-2003; Reasons for going to AF also referenced in IIR and MFR 15- M/+Y-2002; Money referenced in IIR OOO5I3 INITAL SCREENING 28-JAN S E C R E T //NOFORN I / 2O3IO33I

3 S E C R E T //NOFORN I I 2O3IO33I arrived in Karachi. he went to the Al Mustafa Hotel and called Abu Muath as instructed. Abu Muath told detainee to go to the rooftop of the hotel and await an unidentified man. On the rooftop, the unidentified man met detainee and then took him to a local guesthouse. Detainee was at the guesthouse for a week when the unidentified man purchased tickets for them to Quetta, PK. Detainee's ticket was in the name of Omar. A man named Muhammad Rahim aka Rakhim Khan met the pair at the Quetta airport. Rahim took detainee to an unidentified guesthouse in Quetta, where they stayed for less than a week.7 Detainee and five others then traveled to an unknown location near the Afghanistan/Pakistan border. The group drove motorcycles over the border and to an Afghan restaurant. The group boarded a bus and traveled to Al Ansar Guesthouse in Kandahar.o Detainee stayed at Al Ansar approximately ten to fourteen days waiting for enough recruits to gather before being taken to Al Farouq.' During this time frame (approximately late July 2001) Usama Bin Laden (UBL) visited the guesthouse and encouraged the trainees to continue the jihad. Detainee shook UBL's hand during this visit.r0 c. (S//NF) Training and Activities: Detainee traveled to Al Farouq with approximately fourteen other individuals. Detainee remained at the camp approximately one and a half months, receiving training on the AK-47, the PK machine gun, the automatic grenade launcher, the rocket prop"ll"d grenade and an unidentified light anti-tank *eapon.tt O.t approximately l3 September 2001, UBL came to the camp and gave a speech to the trainees. On approximately 15 September 2001, detainee and approximately forty-nine others were ordered to leave the camp. They traveled to Kabul, AF and then on to Jalalabad, AF, where they stayed in the Nejma Al-Jihad Guesthouse (variant: Najim Al-Jihad). After approximately two weeks, the group went to a crop field / forest at the base of the Tora Bora Mountains. The group remained in this location for three weeks under the leadership of Mahjin.r2 5. (S//NF) Gapture Information: a. (S/AfD In the month of Ramadan,r3 the group traveled to the top of the Tora Bora Mountains. There, they were subjected to constant attack from coalition air strikes. Leaders in the area told the group that they could have their passports back and leave Afghanistan t IIR ; Travel path referenced in TD t IIR ; Also referenced in IIR and HANDNOTE 10-APR-2002 n IIR '1302 'o IIR tt IIR ; Training at Al Farouq referenced in TD t' HANDNOTE 04-MAR-2002; UBL's visit to Al Farouq also referenced in IIR ; travel to Tora Bora referenced in TD-314/ Analyst Note: Ramadan began on 17 November 200 I. 3 S E C R E T //NOFORN I / 2O3IO33I

4 S E C R E T //NOFORN / I 2O3IO33I when the bombing ended. Eventually a large group, including detainee, traveled back down the mountain and surrendered to unidentified Afghanis.'" Detainee was captured on 10 December 2001 and was transferred to a Northern Alliance prison in Kabul where he claims to have spent one month.15 US forces initially screenedetainee on 28 January 2002.\6 b. (S) Property Held: o I - Small black book with gold trims; Arabic writing o Initial screening documentshow detainee had $2,000 USD when captured." c. (S) Transferred to JTF GTMO: 5 }i4ay 2002 d. (S//NF) Reasons for Transfer to JTF GTMO: To provide information on the following: o UBL visits to Al Farouq and Al Ansar Guesthouse o Al Farouq and Al Ansar Guesthouse o Al-Qaida / Taliban recruiter and travel facilitator Abu Muath o Abu Mahajin (Star the Jihad) Guesthouse in Jalalabad 6. (S/NF) Evaluation Of Detainee's Account: After admitting several key associations, detainee abruptly changed his claimed motive and purpose for traveling to Afghanistan from jihadist training to fulfilt a re_ligious obligation to one of an artifact thief in search of the clothing of the Prophet Mohammed.l8 Through this dubious account of his activities, detainee only lends more credence to his original timeline rather than drawing it into question. His admissions follow afairly consistent pattern but his cursory comments do not plovide much insight to detainee's actual placement and association to terrorist activities. 7. (S//NF) Detainee Threat: a. (S) Assessment: It is assessed the detainee poses a MEDIUM risk, as he may pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies. 'o ooo5t3 HANDNOTE o4-mar-2002 " 0005r3 INITAL ScREENING 28-JAN-2002, HANDNoTE t8-apr-2002 'u INITIAL ScREENING 28-JAN INITAL SCREENING 28-JAN-2002, Analyst Note: The money detainee claims he was captured with does not reside in JTF GMTO custody.r SIR l7-nov-2003, SIR 02-MAR-2004, SIR l5-apr S E C R E T //NOFORN I / 2O3IO33I

5 S E C R E T / /NOFORN I / 2O3IO33I b. (S/NF) Reasons for Continued Detention: Detainee is assessed to be a member of Al-Qaida. He admitted traveling to Afghanistan to participate in jihadist training, resided in Al-Qaida guesthouses, and fled to the Tora Bora Mountains. Detainee admitted associations to and knowledge of known Al-Qaida operatives. His name appears on Al-Qaida associated documents and assessed Al-Qaida members have identified him.. (S/A{F) Detainee has admitted associations to and knowledge of known Al-Qaida operatives. o (S/AfD When shown pictures of the 11 September 2001 hijackers, detainee identifi ed four individuals :. (S/A{F) Detainee identified a photo of Hani Hanjour.re The two had been friends since they were teenagers. Detainee stated in a letter to his interrogator on 2May 2005,that he had "a very strong relationship with the beloved brother and dear friend Hani Hanjour Al-Tawirqi who used the name Arwa. He was the pilot of the plane that headed to the Pentagon and he was a skilled pilot."20 During a 7 June 2005 intenogation, detainee stated that he knew about the mission to which had been assigned Hanjour prior to 11 Septemb et a (S/AfD Detainee stated one of the most influential factors in the transformation of Hanjour into a jihadist was his viewing of propaganda videos about the suffering of Muslims in the world. Detainee showed Hanjour some of these videos.22. (S/AIF) Detainee identified a photo of l1 September 2001 highjacker Nawaf Al Hamzi and also referred to him as Sinan. Detainee stated the man in the picture was Nawaf and explained that Nawaf visited UBL and requested his Q.{awaf s) brother conduct the attack with him. Detainee stated this was how UBL selected Salem Al Hamzi to participate in the attack.23. (S/AJF) When shown Salem Al Hamzi's picturel detainee identified the man in the picture as Salem.". (S/A{F) When detainee saw Muhammad Atta's picture, he referred to him as "Abu Atta."25 o (S/A{F) When asked whether he knew senior Al-Qaida operative Abu Faraj Al- Libi, detainee responded, "Who did not know him?" The interrogator noted that this 'n ooo5 r 3 sir o5-jul-2005 'o IIR ; letter statement written in: GUAN-2005-T02213 " sir 07-JLrN-2005; IIR " IIR ; also referenced in SIR 2l-JUN-2005 " ooo5l3 sir o5-jul-2005 'o ooo513 sir 05-JUL t ooo5l3 sir o5-jul S E C RE T //NOFORN I / 2O3IO33I

6 S E C R E T //NOFORN I I 2O3IO33I was stated with a tone that indicated, "of course he knew Al-Libi;" however, despite attempts, detainee did not explicitly state a relationship.26 o (S/NF) While watching an 11 September 2001 documentary video, detainee saw a picture of senior Al-Qaida operative Khalid Sheikh Muhammed (KSM). While detainee recognized KSM and described him as a man who had "served Islam and Muslims," deiainee would not explicitly state he knew KSM.27 o (S/A{F) Detainee stated that he could provide valuable information on two individuals involved in the USS Cole bombing: a Saudi named Hassan (variant: Hasan) who was bom in Taif and who attended secondary school with detainee, and a Yemeni named Nibras whom the detainee had never met.28. (S/AIF) According to senior Al-Qaida operative Abd Al Rahim Al Nashiri aka Mullah Bilil aka Bilal, Hassan and Nibras were selected for the USS Cole operation because Hassan knew the area and Nibras could operate the boat. According to the reporting agency, Hassan and Nibras are Hassan Al-Khamiri and Ibrahim Al-Thawr aka Nibras, respectively.2e o (S/A{F) Detainee stated that he met Al-Qaida facilitator Ahmad Ibrahim Abu Hasana aka Abu Mu'az Al-Jiddawi aka Abu Muath.3o Abu Muath encouraged detainee to undergo paramilitary training in Afghanistan, and assisted in his travel and financing. Abu Muath instructed detainee to contact him upon arrival in Karachi 1 for further instructions.3. (S/AIF) Abu Mu'az Al-Jiddawi stated that as of late 2000, he arranged travel to Afghanistan for Al-Qaida members and had them deliver items to senior Karachi-based Al-Qaida facilitator Abdu Ali Al-Haji Sharqawi, ISN PK9YM DP (YM-1457), or to one of his assistants who were responsible for meeting the mujahideen in Pakistan.32 o (S/AfF) YM-1457 was a well-known Al-Qaida facilitator who facilitated the travel of many jihadists into and out of Afghdtristan, following the US led attacks against the Taliban and Al-Qaida assoiiated forces in Afghanistan.33 o (S/AID A man named Muhammad Rahim aka Rakhim Khan met detainee at the airport in Quetta and took him to an unidentified safe house in Quetta.3o This individual is possibly the same Muhammad Rahim whom senior Al-Qaida operative tu ooo5 r 3 sir o5-jul-2005 " ooo513 sir o5-jul-2005 " ooo5l3 sir 05-JUL n ro4ru to to-3141q " IIR ; Also referenced in 0005I JUN-2003 " TD " IIR 6034 oo59 05, IIR 6034 oo98 05 'oiir S E C R E T // NOFORN I I 2O3IO33I

7 s E c R E T //NOFORN I Abu Zubaydah identified as UBL's close Afghan associate who ran a guesthouse in Quetta in 2001." o (S/NF) When detainee fled to the base of the Tora Bora Mountains, he resided in ar: areaunder the leadership of Abu Mahjin (variant: Mohjen) for three weeks.'o Assessed Al-Qaida member Hamud Dakhil Hamud, ISN US9SA DP (SA- 230), claimed to have met an individual named Abu Mahjin upon arriving in Tora Bora. SA-230 corroborated that Abu Mahjin was in charge of the Tora Bora area, and he heard that Abu Mahjin was later killed by a coalition air strike.'' o (S/AIF) Known and assessed Al-Qaida operatives have identified detainee. o (S/NF) Admitted Al-Qaida member Mohammed Rafil Arkan, ISN US9IZ DP (IZ-653), stated that detainee was brought from Tora Bora to the Northern Alliance prison in Kabul.38 o (S/AIF) Assessed Al-Qaida operative Ranam Abdul Rahman Ghanim Al Harbi, ISN US9SA DP (SA-516), stated that detainee was in a jail in Jalalabad with him, Abdul Bin Mohammed Abis Ourgy, ISN US9TS DP, Amin Allah Amin, ISN US9PK DP, Sultan Al Anzi 'Sari, ISN US9SA DP, Salman Yehah Kasa Hassan, ISN US9YM DP, and Abdul Rahim, ISN US9KZ DP.3e lanalyst Note: Detainee provided no information indicating detention while in Jalalabad, and has provided no information about any of these individuals.) o (S//lt{F) Detainee admitted traveling to Afghanistan for jihad training to fulfill a religious obligation.ao He further admitted to training at Al Farouq.ar o (S/A{F) Detainee participated in training with men named Hamza, Musab, Aasum, Yaser, Abdullah Adullah Al-Thani, Suliman, Abd Al Rahman, and Ahmad.a2 (Analyst Note: The commonality of these names makes it difficult to assess specifically with whom detainee trained; however, Abdullah Al-Thani is probably assessed Al-Qaida member Abdullah T Al Anzy, ISN US9SA DP (SA-514), who traveled to Afghanistan to attend training at Al Farouq in late summer / early fall ) tt TD 'u ooo5l3 HANDNoTE o4-mar-2002 " IIR6 o34o27o02 tt IIR 'n IIR oo JUN-2003; Reasons for going to AF also referenced in IIR and MFR 15- MAY-2002 o'iir o'rrr o' ooo5l4 sir o7-ocr S E C R E T //NOFORN I / 2O3IO33I

8 s E c R E T i /NOFORN I I r o (S/AfD Detainee trained under Juhayna aka Sabu Al-Lail, Abu Hamza, Mahajer, and Abu Hurayra.aa (Analyst Note: Juhayna is assessed to be Abu Juhayna who was a former trainer at Al Farouq and became the rear echelon commander of the Arab lines in Tora Bora.as Abu Hamzais assessed to be Abu HamzaAl Adani (variant: Al Adeni). According to assessed Al-Qaida member Ald Mohammad Al Hala, ISN USSSA DP (SA-438), HarnzaAl Adani provided weapons training at Al Farouq.a6 Mahajer is assessed to be Abd Al Rahman Al Muhajir. According to Al- Qaida explosives trainer Tariq Mahmood Ahmad, ISN US9EG DP (EG-535), in approximately July 2001, Abd,Al-Rahman Al-Muhajir provided him with explosives training at Al Farouq.*') o (S/AtlF) Detainee admitted to residing in Al-Qaida associated guest / safe houses. o (S/AfD While awaiting a large enough number of trainees to arrive in order to be transported to Al Farouq, detainee resided in Al Ansar Guesthouse in Kandahar. (Analyst Note: Jihadists used the Al Ansar aka Al Nebras Guesthouse as a stopping point en route to the front lines or Al-Farouq.) o (S/A{F) Detainee stated that after being instructed to depart Al Farouq, he traveled to Kabul and then on to Jalalabad, where he stayed for two weeks in the Nejma Al-Jihad Guesthouse (variant: Najim Al-Jihad).. (S/AIF) Al-Qaida member Omar Ahmed Khader, ISNUS9CA DP (CA-966), claimed he would regularly visit UBL's compound. in Jalalabad, called Nazim Jihad. CA-966 personally met UBL at the compound.*o According to UBL driver Salim Ahmed Salim Hamdan,ISN US9YM DP (YM-149), UBL's house in Jalalabad was called Nejm Al Jihad, the family house, and also the airport house because of its proximity to the airport. This house was UBL's preferred residence.ae (Analyst Note: Nejma Al-Jihad is a variation of both Nazim Jihad and Nejm Al Jihad.) o (S/A{F) Variations of detainee's name and alias appear on Al-Qaida associated documents. o (S/AfF) A variation of detainee's name, Abdul Rahman Mohammad Khawlat, was found in a document listing 324 Arabic names, aliases, and nationalities recovered from raids on safe houses associated with suspected Al-Qaida in Karachi, PK. Abdul Rahman Mohammad Khawlat was associated with the alias Abu Idrees Al Khawlay, the trust account numbers 220 and 106, and the statement "has possession of a Saudi passport and ticket." (Analyst Note: Such lists are indicative of an ooiir i302 nt IIR l3oo 03 ou IIR l8 o2(b) o7 IIR ot IIR oniir o S E C R E T // NOFORN I I 2O3IO33I

9 S E C R E T // NOFORN I I 2O3IO33I individual's residence within Al-Qaida, Taliban, and other extremist guesthouses, often for the purpose of training or coordination prior to travel to training, the front lines, or abroad. Trust accounts were simply storage compartments such as envelopes or folders that were used to secure the individual's personal valuables until completion of training or another activity.)s0 o (S/A{F) A variation of detainee's name, 'Abd Al Rahman Muhammad Al- Khulani, was found on a document entitled "Asra.doc" recovered on a hard drive associated with senior Al-Qaida operative Khalid Sheik Mohammed (KSM). 'Abd Al Rahman Muhammad Al-Khulani was associated with the alias Idris.sr c. (FOUO) Detainee's Gonduct: The detainee is assessed as a HIGH threat from a detention perspective. The detainee's overall behavior has been non-compliant and hostile to the guard force and staff. The detainee currently has 94 Reports of Disciplinary Infraction listed in DIMS, with the most recent occurring on 16 January 2006 when he was found to be in possession of a sniper screen hook. Other incidents for which the detainee has been disciplined includes possession of both weapon and non-weapon type contraband, failure to follow instructions/camp rules, assault, damage to property, inciting a disturbance, using provoking words and gestures with the guards, threatening the life of a guard, and cross block talking. The detainee has 20 Reports of Disciplinary Infraction for assault, with the most recent occurring on25 October 2005, when he threw his water bottle through the food tray slot in his cell and struck the block NCO in the abdomen. The detainee has also threatened guards and other Camp Delta staff on numerous occasions with misbehavior or assaults. On23 September 2004, he threatened to kill an interpreter. On 6 February 2005, the detainee was seen making cutting motions across his neck and was heard making references to 9ll1. After being told on 18 April 2005 that he was on comfort item loss, the detainee threatened to kill the guard who had informed him. One of the detainee's more violent threats was on 19 April 2005 when he told a civilian thai he was going to slash his throat and cut his head off. The detainee has also verbally harassed guards, to include the use of racist and sexist comments. The detainee also told the guard that Bin Laden will kill all Americans and that guards are terrorists. On 7 February 2003, detainee told a guard that Bin Laden is good and that 9/11 makes him happy. On 28 May 2003 the detainee claimed that he had killed four Marines before being captured. 8. (S//NF) Detainee Intelligence Value Assessment: a. (S) Assessment: JTF GTMO determined this detainee is of MEDIUM intelligence value. Detainee's most recent interrogation session occurred on23 February to TD-314/ , Analyst Note: Detainee is listed as 122 on this document. 51 TD-314/ S E C R E T // NOFORN I I 2O3IO33I

10 S E C R E T // NOFORN I I 2O3IO33I b. (S/NF) Placement and Access: Detainee traveled to Afghanistan in summer 2001 to attend training at Al Farouq. In the course of his travels, he interacted with an Al-Qaida facilitator, a close friend of UBL, and resided in Al-Qaida guesthouses. In August 200I, detainee participated in approximately one month of training at Al Farouq. In September 2001, detainee traveled to Najim Al-Jihad (UBL's prefened residence) before fleeing to the Tora Bora Mountains where he was captured in early December Subsequently, detainee was taken to a Northern Alliance prison in Kabul. His connection with Hani Hanjour appears to be that of a longtime friend rather than a co-conspirator in the 11 September 2001 attacks. No reporting indicates detainee served in a leadership or operational planning capacity. c. (S//NF) Intelligence Assessment: Detainee's presence in guesthouses and a training facility provide unremarkable intelligence value, as most individuals currently in custody can provide the same data-some with greater detail due to positional authority. Though it is unlikely detainee had access to critical strategic or tactical intelligence, his associations with numerous Al-Qaida operatives and his possible access to operational details prior to execution remains to be exploited fully. Through these connections, detainee may reveal elements of Al-Qaida attack planning and operative selection that may still be used today. d. (S//NF) Areas of Potential Exploitation: o Al-Qaida guesthouses and training facilities. Al-Qaida operatives and plots o Al-Qaida planning and operative selections 9. (S) EC Status: Detainee's enemy combatant status was reassdssed on 9 October 2004, and he remains an enemy combatant. Mra HARRY B. HARRI Rear Admiral, USN Commanding 10 S E C R E T //NOFORN / I 2O3IO33I