JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment

Transcription

1 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE HEADQUARTERS, JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO U.S. NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA APO AE May 2008 MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southern Command, 3511 NW 9lst Avenue, Miami, FL (S//NF) Personal Information: JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment JDIMS/NDRC Reference Name: Abdul Shalabi Current/True Name and Aliases: Abd al-rahman Shalbi Isa Uwaydah, Abdul Haq Rahman, Saqr al-madani, Mahmud Abd Aziz al-mujahid Place of Birth: Medina, Saudi Arabia (SA) Date of Birth: 4 December 1975 Citizenship: Saudi Arabia Internment Serial Number (ISN): US9SA DP 2. (U//FOUO) Health: Detainee is in good health. 3. (U) JTF-GTMO Assessment: a. (S) Recommendation: JTF-GTMO recommends this detainee for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD). JTF-GTMO previously recommended detainee for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) on 26 October b. (S//NF) Executive Summary: Detainee is a member of al-qaida and a long-term bodyguard for Usama Bin Laden (UBL), serving in that position beginning in Detainee received specialized close combat training for his role as a suicide operative in an aborted component of the 11 September 2001 al-qaida attacks. Detainee participated in hostilities against US and Coalition forces and was captured with a group referred to as the Dirty 30, which included UBL bodyguards and an assessed 20th 11 September 2001 hijacker. Detainee received basic militant and advanced training at al-qaida associated training camps. CLASSIFIED BY: MULTIPLE SOURCES REASON: E.O , AS AMENDED, SECTION 1.4(C) DECLASSIFY ON:

2 Detainee also has familial ties to UBL and has demonstrated his hatred for Americans at JTF- GTMO and will likely reestablish ties to al-qaida and other extremist elements if released. [ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ABOUT THIS DETAINEE IS AVAILABLE IN AN SCI SUPPLEMENT.] JTF-GTMO determined this detainee to be: A HIGH risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests, and allies A HIGH threat from a detention perspective Of HIGH intelligence value c. (S//NF) Summary of Changes: The following outlines changes to detainee s assessment since the last JTF-GTMO recommendation. (Changes in this assessment will be annotated by next to the footnote. Updated detainee s capture information Updated detainee s role in the Southeast Asia attack 4. (U) Detainee s Account of Events: The following section is based, unless otherwise indicated, on detainee s own account. These statements are included without consideration of veracity, accuracy, or reliability. a. (S//NF) Prior History: Detainee completed high school and attended college from at the Imam Mullammad Bin Abd al-wahaab Alia al-dawa University in Medina where he studied Islamic law but did not earn a degree. Detainee comes from a wealthy and well-educated family. 1 b. (S//NF) Recruitment and Travel: Detainee s college instructor encouraged him to go to Afghanistan (AF) to teach Islam. Detainee had never traveled outside of Saudi Arabia until he left Medina for Afghanistan. Detainee departed Saudi Arabia and traveled to Khowst, AF via a route that took him through Bahrain, Karachi, Pakistan (PK), Peshawar, PK and Jalalabad, AF. 2 c. (S//NF) Training and Activities: Upon arrival in Khowst, detainee went to the market and met an Egyptian named Abu Sulayman who took him to the Kabir Mosque and introduced him to the imam, Qari Seib. Qari Seib offered detainee a room near the mosque. Detainee traveled to the mosque on a daily basis and taught the Koran to Afghan children. After spending a year in Afghanistan, detainee traveled to Kabul, AF to phone his family and three days later, returned to Khowst. Prior to his trip to Kabul, detainee's nephew, Sultan MAR MAR

3 Ahmad al-dardir Musa Uwaydha, ISN US9SA DP (SA-059, transferred), arrived from a nearby village, where he was also teaching Islam. Around December 2001, approximately two years after arriving in Afghanistan, detainee decided to return to Saudi Arabia. Detainee and his nephew departed on foot for Pakistan with a guide, meeting and joining another group of approximately 20 Arabs traveling to Pakistan. Detainee departed Khowst with a $100 US bill and his passport, which he lost during the walk (U) Capture Information: (S//NF) Detainee was captured by Pakistani forces on 15 December 2001 while attempting to cross the Afghanistan-Pakistan border near Parachinar, PK after fleeing from UBL s Tora Bora Mountain Complex. Detainee was captured with a group of 31 other Arab al-qaida fighters referred to by US intelligence reporting as the Dirty 30, most of who are assessed to be UBL bodyguards and other members of UBL s security detail. 4 Pakistani authorities transferred the group to a prison facility in Peshawar where they were held for 15 days. 5 On 26 December 2001, Pakistani authorities transferred detainee from Peshawar to US custody at the Kandahar Detention Facility, AF. 6 a. (S) Property Held: Miscellaneous personal items to include an analog watch, a compass, prayer beads and a piece of brown and white cloth b. (S) Transferred to JTF-GTMO: 11 January 2002 c. (S//NF) Reasons for Transfer to JTF-GTMO: To provide information on the following: Pakistani border guard procedures with regard to escaping al-qaida and Taliban fighters Assessed bodyguard for UBL Specific information concerning activities and movements of al-qaida members in Karachi, Kandahar, and Kabul MAR-2002, KB 01-FEB-2002, Analyst Note: In IIR , SA-059 confirmed detainee was his uncle. A variant of Sulayman is Suliman. 4 Bodyguard Profile INTSUM 23-OCT-2006, IIR , IIR , TD-314/ MAR-2002, MAY-2002, IIR , MFR 10-APR-2002, IIR TD-314/

4 Provide specific information concerning Khaldan Camp including information on training, facilities, logistics and individuals involved 6. (S//NF) Evaluation of Detainee s Account: Detainee s reporting is not credible. According to Muhammad Yahya Muhsin al-zaylai, ISN US9SA DP (SA-055, transferred), the Pakistani warden of the prison where the Dirty 30 were first held instructed the group to say they were in Afghanistan to teach the Koran and to study religion when they are interrogated by US forces. 7 Majid Mahmud Abdu Ahmad, ISN US9YM DP (YM-041), also reported the Koran-teaching cover story was false. 8 Numerous al-qaida members identified detainee as a member of al-qaida who also served as a bodyguard for UBL and was to participate in a suicide operation. Detainee will require a long-term, dedicated plan to solicit information of intelligence value. 7. (U) Detainee Threat: a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be a HIGH risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests, and allies. b. (S//NF) Reasons for Continued Detention: Detainee is a member of al-qaida and a former veteran UBL bodyguard. Detainee received specialized close combat training for his role as a suicide operative in an aborted component of the 11 September 2001 al-qaida attacks. Detainee participated in hostilities against US and Coalition forces and was captured with a group referred to as the Dirty 30, which included UBL bodyguards and an assessed 20th 11 September 2001 hijacker. Detainee received advanced training at multiple al-qaida camps and participated in armed hostilities against US and Coalition forces. Detainee also has familial ties to UBL and has demonstrated his hatred for Americans at JTF-GTMO and will likely reestablish ties to al-qaida and other extremist elements if released. (S//NF) Detainee is an al-qaida member and a veteran UBL bodyguard. (S//NF) Detainee appears in a January 2000 Tarnak Farm video in the company of other UBL bodyguards. 9 (S//NF) Al-Qaida operational planner Khalid Shaykh Muhammad, aka (KSM), aka (Mukhtar), ISN US9KU DP (KU-10024), photo-identified detainee as a UBL bodyguard in Afghanistan. 10 (S//NF) Senior al-qaida operational planner Walid Muhammad Salih Bin Attash, aka (Khallad), aka (Silver), ISN US9YM DP (YM-10014), reported detainee 7 IIR , IIR AUG JITFCT ANALYTICAL PRODUCT TRANSNATIONAL TOP TD-314/

5 was from Medina and went to Afghanistan at the end of 1998 where he joined UBL s security detail in (S//NF) Senior al-qaida facilitator Sharqawi Abdu Ali al-haji, aka (Riyadh the Facilitator), ISN PK9YM DP (YM-1457), photo-identified detainee as UBL bodyguard Saqr al-madani from Medina. YM-1457 stated detainee traveled to Afghanistan sometime in 1997 and became a UBL bodyguard after Detainee remained in that position between March 2000 and June Also, detainee was somewhat close to Abu Basir al-yemeni, UBL s personal secretary. 12 (S//NF) Al-Qaida operative Ahmad Khalfan Ghailani, aka (Haytham al-kini), ISN US9TZ DP (TZ-10012), photo-identified detainee as a UBL bodyguard. TZ met detainee in when they worked together as bodyguards for UBL. 13 Ghailani also stated he saw detainee in a group, along with Hamza al- Ghamdi and YM-10014, that accompanied UBL during a stay at the al-faruq Training Camp. 14 (S//NF) Ramzi Bin al-shibh, ISN US9YM DP (YM-10013), photoidentified detainee as a UBL bodyguard. 15 (S//NF) Sanad Ali Yislam al-kazimi, ISN US9YM-1453DP (YM-1453), a bodyguard who admitted swearing bayat (an oath) to UBL, photo-identified detainee as Saqr al-madani and first saw detainee when he went to obtain a position as a UBL bodyguard. YM-1453 claimed detainee was already a bodyguard in July or August YM-1453 also stated detainee was involved in an operation and that detainee was on a tape preparing for the operation. 16 (Analyst Note: YM-1453 s comments may be related to the 11 September 2001 Southeast Asia operation. No other information is available on the tape, but it is possible this is a reference to a martyrdom video tape, often created prior to a suicide operation.) (S//NF) YM stated detainee was ready to be a martyr in the Southeast Asian hijacking plan. 17 (S//NF) YM-1453 stated bodyguards functioned as though they were brainwashed due to their constant proximity to UBL. They were constantly exposed to UBL s message and beliefs. Bodyguards became little versions of UBL, similar to disciples. 18 (Analyst Note: This statement lends credence to the 11 TD-314/ IIR TD-314/ TD-314/ TD-314/ IIR , FM40 14-JUN TD-314/ TD-314/ , Analyst Note: According to reporting in IIR , being a security guard or personal bodyguard for UBL was a prestigious position, and bodyguards had closer contact with UBL than other support personnel. See also TD-314/ and Bodyguard Profile INTSUM 23-OCT

6 assessment that the operation noted in the above bullet was to be a martyrdom operation. It also indicates the continuing high threat detainee poses.) (S//NF) Salim Ahmad Salim Hamdan, ISN US9YM DP (YM-149), UBL s driver, knew detainee as Saqr, a UBL security guard. YM-149 saw detainee in Kabul and Jalalabad with UBL between October and November (S//NF) Ahmad Muhammad Haza al-darbi, ISN US9SA DP (SA-768), photo-identified detainee as a UBL bodyguard. Detainee was normally armed with an AK-47, two grenades and possibly a pistol. 20 (S//NF) Muhammad Mani Ahmad al-shalan al-qahtani, ISN US9SA DP (SA-063), the assessed 20th hijacker in the 11 September 2001 terrorist attack, identified detainee as a UBL bodyguard. SA-063 noted detainee was always at UBL s side. SA-063 saw detainee at UBL s house and the guesthouse in Kandahar. 21 (S//NF) Detainee was a designated suicide operative. Detainee trained for an aborted al-qaida operation in Southeast Asia to hijack US airliners and crash them into US military facilities in Asia in coordination with 11 September (S//NF) In 1999, detainee and several other al-qaida members were designated as suicide operatives in a plot to hijack US air carriers traveling across Southeast Asia and destroy them in midair. These attacks were originally intended to occur simultaneously with those in the US on 11 September UBL later canceled the operation due to the difficulty involved in synchronizing the attacks. 22 (S//NF) According to YM-10014, UBL planned to use Yemenis and Saudis who could not obtain a US visa for the Asian portion of the plot because they could easily travel to Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, Hong Kong, the Philippines, and South Korea. 23 YM stated each of the operatives selected for the operation, swore bayat to UBL. 24 (S//NF) YM reported two months before 11 September 2001, KU-10024, took several UBL bodyguards including detainee; Muhammad Ahmad Abdallah al- Ansi, ISN US9YM DP (YM-029); Abd al-malak Abd al-wahab al-rahbi, ISN US9YM DP (YM-037); and Zuhail Abdo Anam Said al-sharabi, ISN US9YM DP (YM-569) to Karachi to teach them English and American behaviors in preparation for the hijacking operation. 25 (S//NF) According to the Israeli Directorate of Military Intelligence, in 1999, after receiving permission from UBL, KU established a special training 19 IIR , SIR 05-MAR IIR IIR TD-314/ , TD-314/ , TD-314/ , TD-314/ , TD-314/ TD-314/ , TD-314/ TD-314/ TD-314/

7 program in Karachi to prepare for 11 September 2001 style terrorist attacks. Detainee is listed as one of the operatives taking part in this training. 26 (S//NF) YM-1457 corroborated detainee's placement in this group when he speculated detainee and two of his fellow trainees, YM-029 and YM-037, may have been at a special operational meeting with KU-10024, in Karachi. YM-1457 recounted meeting with detainee and YM-037 in a restaurant in Karachi in July Detainee and YM-037 were both clean shaven and told YM-1457 that they had a job to do at the al-qaida media center, which was operated by KU (S//NF) KU reported he sent detainee to Southeast Asia to support al- Qaida operative Riduan Bin Isomuddin s, aka (Hambali), ISN US9ID DP (ID ), Singapore program. 28 (S//NF) Detainee received advanced al-qaida training in addition to that already noted. (S//NF) TZ first saw detainee in 1998 at the Khowst al-faruq Training Camp. 29 TZ stated he believed detainee underwent guerilla warfare training at al-faruq. 30 (Analyst Note: In 1998, the Khowst al-faruq Training Camp was al- Qaida s basic training camp.) (S//NF) Detainee attended an elite commando course run by al-qaida operative Salah al-din Abd al-halim Zaydan aka (Sayf al-adl) at the Mes Aynak Training Camp in This course was offered to select trainees who had already received al-qaida s basic training. 31 (S//NF) YM remarked several proposed hijackers for the Southeast Asian portion of the 11 September 2001 operation attended the close combat course. 32 (The close combat course mentioned by YM is assessed to be the commando course detainee attended under al-adl.) (S//NF) YM-1457 reported detainee also received training at Khaldan Training Camp. 33 (S//NF) Detainee was in the company of UBL and his bodyguards in UBL s Tora Bora Mountain Complex and participated in hostilities against US and Coalition forces. (S//NF) YM and YM-1453 both reported that detainee was with UBL in the Tora Bora Mountain Complex IIR IIR , FM40 17-JUN TD-314/ , TD-314/ , TD-314/ TD-314/ TD-314/ TD-314/ TD-314/ , TD-314/ , TD-314/ IIR TD-314/ , FM40 14-JUN

8 (S//NF) Yasin Muhammad Salih Mazeeb Basardah, ISN US9YM DP (YM-252), stated he saw detainee, an al-qaida trained fighter and UBL bodyguard, in Tora Bora. Detainee and the other bodyguards were preparing for UBL s arrival. Their activities included preparing tunnels, setting up security and moving stockpiled food. YM-252 noted after UBL s arrival, detainee was with UBL at all times. 35 YM- 252 also stated detainee carried a 7.62mm PK machine gun in the mountains. 36 (S//NF) YM-252 stated if you were in Tora Bora, you were not innocent. You were there to fight. 37 (Analyst Note: Given detainee s position as a UBL bodyguard and the circumstances of detainee s capture, it is assessed that detainee was at UBL s Tora Bora Mountain Complex participating in hostilities there.) (S//NF) Detainee was captured after fleeing from hostilities at UBL s Tora Bora Mountain Complex along with the other members of the Dirty (S//NF) SA-063, who also traveled and was captured with the group, stated they were the first to leave UBL s Tora Bora Mountain Complex and traveled to Pakistan after UBL left them. 39 (S//NF) SA-768 photo-identified detainee and stated he fought on the front lines against the Northern Alliance with Arsalan. 40 (Analyst Note: Arsalan is assessed to be Muaz Hamza Ahmad al-alawi, aka (Arslan), ISN US9YM DP.) 41 (S//NF) SA-768 reported detainee was at al-faruq Training Camp when it was bombed by US and Coalition forces. Detainee was seriously wounded in the back and shoulder by shrapnel from the bombing, and later recuperated at a hospital in Khowst. 42 (Analyst note: The US bombed al-qaida camps in Afghanistan following the attacks on the US embassies in East Africa in 1998.) (S//NF) A small scar was observed on detainee's left arm that detainee explained he received in a car accident when he was 17. Detainee also has scars on his back and head he claims are from the same accident. 43 (Analyst Note: These are likely scars from the reported injuries sustained during US bombing of al-qaida camps in Afghanistan following the attacks on the US embassies in East Africa in 1998.) (S//NF) Detainee is related to two UBL bodyguards, one of whom is married to UBL s daughter. 35 IIR , Analyst Note: Detainee is identified as Abdul Shalabi, aka (Sakhr al-madane), in the report. 36 IIR SIR 31-DEC IIR , IIR , Bodyguard Profile INTSUM 23-OCT SIR 14-APR-2003, IIR IIR IIR IIR MAR

9 (S//NF) YM-1457 stated detainee is related to Aws al-madani, who was married to one of UBL s daughters and was a UBL bodyguard. 44 (S//NF) According to reporting from al-qaida operative Abd al-rahim Hussayn Muhammad al-nashiri, ISN US9SA DP (SA-10015), and YM- 1453, UBL s son-in-law Aws al-madani was one of five permanent members of UBL s security detail until al-madani was killed by US bombing in late (S//NF) YM-1457 stated detainee s nephew, SA-059, traveled to Afghanistan in 1998 and served as a UBL bodyguard. YM-1457 added that SA-059 was close to UBL. 46 TZ also identified SA-059 as detainee s nephew. 47 (S//NF) SA-059 confirmed detainee is his uncle. 48 (S//NF) DNA tests were performed on detainee and SA-059 to determine the likelihood of an uncle/nephew relationship. Based on autosomal DNA testing, the two are likely to be close biological relatives, and they both possess Y chromosome DNA that is consistent with a shared paternal lineage. 49 (S//NF) Detainee s alias was found on a letter recovered at the al-qaida Tarnak Farm Training Camp. Detainee was noted as a contact from whom the addressee of the letter should obtain $4,000 US. 50 (S//NF) Detainee is on the Saudi government watch list for terrorist-related activity. 51 (S//NF) On 15 January 2007, detainee said he is going to kill [people] in Iraq. Detainee also stated, Go to Iraq [and] I will kill you there. 52 (Analyst Note: Detainee s comments are assessed to be directed against the guard staff.) c. (S//NF) Detainee s Conduct: Detainee is assessed as a High threat from a detention perspective. His overall behavior has been mostly non-compliant and hostile to the guard force and staff. He currently has 95 Reports of Disciplinary Infraction listed in DIMS with the most recent occurring on 27 February 2008, when he was reported spitting on the guard force. Detainee has 11 Reports of Disciplinary Infraction for assault with the most recent occurring on 27 February 2008, when he was reported spitting on the guard force. Other incidents for which he has been disciplined include inciting and participating in mass disturbances, failure to follow guard instructions and camp rules, inappropriate use of bodily fluids, unauthorized communications, damage to government property, attempted assaults, 44 IIR TD-314/ , IIR IIR , IIR TD-314/ IIR IIR IIR TD-314/ INTREP 15-JAN :10:00 9

10 assaults, provoking words and gestures, and possession of food and non-weapon type contraband. On 7 August 2005, detainee was reported to be in possession of broken glass (shank). In 2007, detainee had a total of 17 Reports of Disciplinary Infraction and one so far in (U) Detainee Intelligence Value Assessment: a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be of HIGH intelligence value. Detainee s most recent interrogation session occurred on 19 October b. (S//NF) Placement and Access: Detainee received basic and advanced training at several al-qaida affiliated training camps and participated in a special course designed to train him for an attack that was to occur in coordination with the other 11 September 2001 attacks. Detainee is recognized as a former UBL bodyguard and fighter in Afghanistan. Detainee has ties to senior al-qaida leadership. Detainee was also identified as having been constantly with UBL in his Tora Bora Mountain Complex and Kandahar. c. (S//NF) Intelligence Assessment: As a member of al-qaida since at least 1999, detainee should be able to provide information on members with whom he associated to include senior personnel including those who remain at large. In particular, he may be able to provided information leading to the arrest of the remaining member of the cancelled Southeast Asia 11 September 2001 plot. Detainee can provide information on other JTF- GTMO detainees involved with al-qaida and with UBL in particular. Detainee is assessed to have abundant knowledge concerning high-level al-qaida members and other operations. Detainee was involved in special training and can probably provide profiling information to better aid the US in recognizing al-qaida members. d. (S//NF) Areas of Potential Exploitation: Information on Yusif Dakhil network Al-Qaida training camps and courses, members, missions and logistics, including UBL's security detail members, duties and communications Operational planning and support to al-qaida and senior operatives regarding 11 September 2001 attacks Other extremists and radical Islamists affiliated with al-qaida and its global terrorist network Global terrorist network and operatives Members (to include fellow JTF-GTMO detainees) affiliated with fighting in Tora Bora Saudi Arabia stability 10

11 S E C R E T //NOFORN I I (S) EC Status: Detainee's enemy combatant status was reassessed on 5 November 2004, and he remains an enemy combatant. fu;/4'ful, DAVID M. THOMAS JR. Rear Admiral, US Navy Commanding - Definitions for intelligence terms used in the assessment can be found in the Joint Military Intelligence College October 2001 guide Intelligence Warning Terminology. 11 S E C R E T //NOFORN I I