JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment

Transcription

1 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE HEADQUARTERS, JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO U.S. NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA APO AE October 2007 MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southern Command, 3511 NW 9lst Avenue, Miami, FL SUBJECT: Recommendation Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) 1. (S//NF) Personal Inmation: JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment JDIMS/NDRC Reference Name: Abdullah Alamatrafi Aliases and Current/True Name: Abdallah Aydhah Abdallah al-matrafi, Sayf al-makki, Abu Abd al-aziz, Abu Maha, Abu Abd al-aziz al-saudi, Battah Place of Birth: Mecca, Saudi Arabia (SA) Date of Birth: 12 July 1964 Citizenship: Saudi Arabia Internment Serial Number (ISN): US9SA DP 2. (U//FOUO) Health: Detainee is in overall good health. 3. (U) JTF-GTMO Assessment: a. (S) Recommendation: JTF-GTMO recommends this detainee Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD). JTF-GTMO previously recommended detainee Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) on 9 September b. (S//NF) Executive Summary: Detainee is the admitted director of the al-wafa Humanitarian Organization in Afghanistan (AF). 1 Usama Bin Laden (UBL), with whom 1 Analyst Note: Al-Wafa Humanitarian Organization, aka (Wafa al-igatha al-islamia,) is a National Intelligence Priority Framework (NIPF) counterterrorism (CT) Priority 2A Terrorist Support Entity (TSE). Priority 2A TSEs are defined as those entities that have demonstrated intent and willingness to provide financial support to terrorist CLASSIFIED BY: MULTIPLE SOURCES REASON: E.O , AS AMENDED, SECTION 1.4(C) DECLASSIFY ON:

2 SUBJECT: Recommendation Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) detainee associated with during the Soviet Jihad in Afghanistan, assisted detainee in establishing al-wafa. Detainee is a supporter of the al-qaida network and is associated to senior members of al-qaida and other Islamic extremists. Detainee and al-wafa supplied material goods, equipment, money, and weapons to the Taliban, al-qaida and other extremist elements. Detainee and al-wafa facilitated the movement of al-qaida fighters into Afghanistan including the period following 11 September Detainee has a history of participating in jihad, supporting jihadist causes and has expressed his continuing threat to the US. [ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ABOUT THIS DETAINEE IS AVAILABLE IN AN SCI SUPPLEMENT.] JTF-GTMO determined this detainee to be: A HIGH risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests, and allies A HIGH threat from a detention perspective Of HIGH intelligence value c. (S//NF) Summary of Changes: The following outlines changes to detainee s assessment since the last JTF-GTMO recommendation. (Changes in this assessment will be annotated by next to the footnote.) Added inmation about detainee s meetings and association with UBL and other members of al-qaida and Taliban 4. (U) Detainee s Account of Events: The following section is based, unless otherwise indicated, on detainee s own account. These statements are included without consideration of veracity, accuracy, or reliability. a. (S//NF) Prior History: Detainee completed high school in Mecca. Between 1982 and 1984, he served as a tank mechanic in the Saudi Arabian Army achieving the rank of sergeant. In probably the mid to late 1980s, detainee traveled to Afghanistan to participate in the Soviet Jihad fighting against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan one and a half years. 2 While in Afghanistan, detainee received basic training on the AK-47 assault rifle and rocket propelled grenades (RPG). After receiving training, he traveled to Jalalabad, AF, where UBL, Abu Hafs al-masri, Anas al-libi, Hamza al-ghamdi, Saif al-adel and Abu organizations willing to attack US persons or interests, or provide witting operational support to Priority 2A terrorist groups. 2 Analyst Note: The Soviet-Afghan war lasted from late 1979 until early

3 SUBJECT: Recommendation Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) Zubayr al-haili were present. 3 Approximately six months after the withdrawal of the Soviets from Afghanistan, detainee returned to Saudi Arabia. From 1993 until 1997, detainee served as the local director in Mecca the High Commission Muslims in Bosnia- Herzegovina. 4 Detainee returned to Afghanistan sometime between April 2000 and March b. (S//NF) Recruitment and Travel: In approximately early to mid-2000, detainee met with the founder of al-wafa, Shaykh Abdallah al-rayis, who requested detainee establish the non-governmental organization (NGO) al-wafa and set up offices and religious institutes in Afghanistan. 6 Detainee agreed and subsequently traveled to Kandahar, AF. Detainee met with the Afghan Minister of Education, Emir Khan Motaqi, who advised detainee on appropriate locations the religious institutes. Detainee then returned to Saudi Arabia to discuss his findings with Shaykh al-rayis. On his next trip to Afghanistan, detainee established al-wafa offices in Kandahar, Kabul, Herat, AF and Karachi, Pakistan (PK). 7 In 2000, while in Kandahar during Ramadan, detainee met with Abu Hafs al-mauritani. 8 Abu Hafs took detainee to meet UBL to discuss the al-wafa offices in Afghanistan, and the differences between the ideologies of al-qaida and al-wafa. At the end of the meeting, UBL gave detainee a letter authorizing Abu Hafs to assist detainee in establishing additional al- Wafa offices in Afghanistan. In Kabul, detainee submitted the appropriate papers through the office of the Taliban Supreme Commander, Mullah Omar. In the spring of 2001, an al- Wafa office opened in Kabul. 9 c. (S//NF) Training and Activities: In late spring of 2001, the director of Ummah Tameer Nau (UTN), Dr. Bashir Ud-Din Mahmud, and the head of the UTN office in Kabul, Shaykh al-farouq, aka (Suheil al-farouq), approached detainee regarding providing funding 3 IIR , Analyst Note: These individuals later became senior operatives or leaders within al-qaida. 4 Analyst Note: The High Commission Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina is probably the Saudi High Commission Relief (SHCR). The SHCR is an NIPF Priority 2B TSE. Priority 2B TSEs are defined as having available resources and being in a position to provide financial support to terrorist organizations willing to attack US persons or interests, or provide witting operational support to Priority 2B terrorist groups KB 16-FEB-2002, IIR , IIR , FEB Analyst Note: Shaykh Abdallah al-rayis, aka (Nafi), aka (al-habib), is a college professor in Saudi Arabia and the founder and primary financier of al-wafa. A variant of al-riyas is al-riyass. A variant of Nafi is Nafe. 7 IIR , IIR , IIR (b), FEB-2002, IIR Analyst Note: Ramadan 2000 occurred from 28 November to 27 December. Abu Hafs al-mauritani, aka (Mahfouz Ould al-walid), was UBL s religious advisor and head of the Institute Islamic Studies. 9 IIR , IIR (b), IIR , IIR , IIR (b), IIR , IIR , FEB-2002, IIR , IIR , IIR

4 SUBJECT: Recommendation Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) Taliban Ministry of Communication and Electricity projects in Afghanistan. 10 In approximately July 2001, detainee again met with UBL to discuss al-qaida and al-wafa issues. Shortly bee 11 September 2001, detainee met with al-qaida biological and chemical expert Yazid Sufaat and directed him to the al-wafa office in Pakistan. 11 After 11 September 2001, detainee facilitated the movement of al-qaida operatives into Afghanistan. In early-december 2001, detainee crossed from Afghanistan into Pakistan with the help of his translator Muhammad Ajmal. Ajmal convinced Pakistani customs officials that detainee was ill and needed immediate medical attention. Ajmal took detainee to a NGO called al- Ashkar Tiba in Lahore, PK. 12 Al-Ashkar Tiba, assessed to be the Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT), provided detainee with an escort in order to obtain a visa and the necessary exit paperwork bee taking detainee to the airport (U) Capture Inmation: a. (S//NF) Pakistani police arrested detainee at the Lahore International Airport on 11 December 2001 while attempting to return to Saudi Arabia. Detainee was transferred to US custody on 29 December b. (S) Property Held: None Detainee reported possessing the following items at the time of his arrest. These items are not held by JTF-GTMO: 15 $1,000 US Passport Mobile phone Personal items including a suitcase, white towel, blue jump suit, toothbrush, 10 bars of soap, 20 cups, and medical records 10 Analyst Note: UTN is an NIPF Priority 2B TSE. Dr. Bashir Ud-Din Mahmud aka (Sultan Bashir al-din) is a Pakistani nuclear engineer, who may have provided assistance to al-qaida s nuclear program. 11 Analyst Note: Yazid Sufaat is a microbiologist from Malaysia and one of al-qaida's biological and chemical experts. He is reported to have led al-qaida s anthrax research and development program. 12 Analyst Note: The LT is an NIPF Priority 1B target. Priority 1B targets are defined as terrorist groups, especially those with state support, countries that sponsor terrorism, or countries that have state organizations involved in terrorism that have demonstrated both intention and capability to attack US persons or interests 13 IIR , IIR (b), IIR , IIR , IIR (b), IIR , IIR , FEB-2002, IIR , IIR , IIR KB 16-FEB-2002, INITIAL SCREENING 21-JAN-2002, IIR INITIAL SCREENING 21-JAN

5 SUBJECT: Recommendation Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) c. (S) Transferred to JTF-GTMO: 13 February 2002 d. (S//NF) Reasons Transfer to JTF-GTMO: To provide inmation on the following: The financing of al-qaida operations in Bosnia, Pakistan, and Afghanistan using al- Wafa as a front operation Key al-qaida and Taliban leaders 6. (S//NF) Evaluation of Detainee s Account: Detainee has been truthful about many of his activities as a director of al-wafa. However, he omits other details and attempts to downplay his associations with and support to al-qaida by stating that all of his support went to the Taliban or the betterment of the Afghan people. Detainee claimed that he did not agree with UBL and al-qaida s goals and that al-qaida did not trust al-wafa. 7. (U) Detainee Threat: a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be a HIGH risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests, and allies. b. (S//NF) Reasons Continued Detention: Detainee is the founder and director of the al-wafa NGO in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Since his transfer to JTF-GTMO, detainee has expressed his continuing threat to the US, the American people and the Saudi Arabian Government in the event he is released. Detainee was an active supporter of the al-qaida network and provided material support to the Taliban, al-qaida and other extremist organizations. Detainee admitted attempting to purchase missile systems capable of delivering chemical weapons against US and Coalition ces and authorized support to the al-qaida anthrax research program. Detainee used al-wafa money transfers in the support of extremist elements and facilitated the movement of al-qaida members. He is also associated with senior al-qaida and Taliban members. Detainee is on the Saudi Ministry of Interior, General Directorate of Investigations (Mabahith) list of high priority detainees. (S//NF) Detainee was the founder and director of al-wafa in Afghanistan and Pakistan. 5

6 SUBJECT: Recommendation Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) (S/REL USA, GCTF) Detainee stated he was tasked by Shaykh Abdallah al- Rayis, the primary financier of al-wafa, to establish the organization in Afghanistan. 16 (S/REL USA, GCTF) Detainee set up three offices in Afghanistan in Kabul, Kandahar, and Herat. 17 Detainee also stated Nothing happened in al-wafa without my knowledge. 18 (S//NF) Detainee hired the majority of al-wafa employees including: al-wafa s chief medical advisor in Afghanistan and Pakistan Ayman Saeed Abdullah Batarfi, ISN US9YM DP (YM-627); 19 Kabul office director Adel Zamel Abd al- Mahsen al-zamel, ISN US9KU DP (KU-568, transferred); 20 and Karachi office director Jamal Muhammad Alawi Mari, ISN US9YM DP (YM-577), who was probably recruited by Sami Sanad. 21 Abdallah Ali Nayif al-muqati al- Utaybi, ISN US9SA DP (SA-243) was hired as the Herat office director based on a recommendation to Shaykh Rayis. 22 (S//NF) Other al-wafa employed detainees have reported receiving direction or obtaining approval from detainee their activities and that detainee controlled the NGO s finances. 23 (S//NF) Detainee has made statements that reflect that he poses a continuing threat to the US, the American people, and the Saudi Arabian Government. (S//NF) In a statement to US interrogators, detainee said, I swear to God what you are doing, you will pay. You will experience a greater tragedy than September 11th. 24 (S//NF) Detainee threatened that his tribe would exact revenge against the Saudi Arabian government and US citizens his detention, and would kidnap four to five Americans at a time and sever their heads. Detainee also stated that he would continue these acts after he is released; however, these acts could be stopped if detainee received five to fifteen million dollars as compensation his unemployment status during detention IIR IIR IIR IIR , IIR IIR IIR , IIR TD-314/ IIR , IIR , IIR , TD-314/ , IIR SIR 04-FEB SIR 04-JUN-2004, IIR

7 SUBJECT: Recommendation Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) (S//NF) Detainee stated, Not only am I thinking about threatening the American public, but the whole world. 26 (S//NF) Detainee stated he was ready to fight the Americans in self-defense if faced with their presence in Afghanistan. 27 (S//NF) Detainee is a member of the al-qaida network. Detainee, and through his direction, al-wafa, provided material support to al-qaida, the Taliban and other extremist organizations. (C//REL USA AND GCTF) Abd al-aziz Abd al-rahman Abd al-aziz al- Baddah, ISN US9SA DP (SA-264, transferred), reported detainee directed KU-568 and other al-wafa employees to dig wells and provide food, blankets, money and weapons to the Taliban. 28 (S) While detainee was director, al-wafa provided 12 Land Cruiser vehicles, heavy construction equipment and medical equipment and supplies to the Taliban. 29 (S//NF) Al-Wafa was reported to be involved in funneling money to al-qaida in order to conduct training and purchase weapons. 30 (C//REL USA AND GCTF) Detainee attempted to open a training camp north of Kabul, near the Libyan and al-qaida camps. Al-Qaida operative Hamza al-qaiti assisted in the logical preparations the al-wafa camp. The camp was abandoned prior to becoming fully functional and detainee instructed KU-568 to allow al-qaiti to keep the weapons that had been purchased the camp. Detainee also instructed KU-568 to destroy the records related to those purchases. 31 (S//NF) KU-568 stated detainee opened a training camp south of Kabul near Lowgar Province, AF, after the start of the US bombing campaign and that detainee also desired to open a camp near Herat. 32 (S//NF) Detainee attempted to procure chemical warfare weapons use against US and Coalition ces and was involved in al-qaida s attempts to develop or procure Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). (S//NF) Detainee authorized al-wafa to spend $5000 US to assist al-qaida anthrax researcher, Yazid Sufaat, purchase laboratory equipment SIR 23-JUL IIR IIR IIR (b) 30 IIR IIR SIR 10-OCT

8 SUBJECT: Recommendation Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) (S//NF) Yazid Sufaat is a Jemmah Islamiyah (JI) member and associate of JI leader Hambali (aka Riduan Isomuddin), ISN US9ID DP. Yazid Sufaat was arrested in Malaysia providing accommodations two of the 11 September 2001 hijackers during a 2000 meeting in Kuala Lumpur. Sufaat also gave a letter of reference and $35,000 US to convicted terrorist Zaccarias Moussoui. 34 (S//NF) Senior al-qaida member and chief operations planner of the 11 September 2001 attacks, Khalid Shaykh Muhammad, aka (KSM), aka (Mukhtar), ISN US9KU DP (KU-10024), stated that Sufaat and al- Qaida s military commander Abu Hafs al-masri purchased crates of biological equipment to be delivered to Kandahar, allegedly a blood work lab. During later discussions with al-masri, KU learned of al-qaida s pursuit of anthrax. 35 (S//NF) Jamal Muhammad Alawi Mari, ISN US9YM DP (YM- 577), identified YM-627 as Sufaat s associate. According to YM-577, YM- 627 gave Sufaat the telephone number Jamil Qasim who Sufaat was to contact funding assistance. 36 Jamil Qasim was a micro-biology student and served as a junior medical advisor al-wafa in the Karachi office along with YM-577 and Abu Ahmad aka (Imran Uways). 37 (Analyst Note: Although JTF-GTMO detainees deny it, al-wafa probably succeeded in providing direct assistance to Sufaat in Karachi.) (S//NF) Detainee attempted to purchase a computerized laser-guided missile system costing $500,000 US. The missiles would contain a chemical substance, have a range of 1,500 kilometers, and have a destruction radius of 1,500 square meters TD-314/ , IIR , SIR 17-Aug-2006, IIR , TD-314/ , SIR 12-Mar-2004, 34 IIR , IIR , AMEMBASSY Kuala Lumpur Jan-2002, SECSTATE Aug-2002, TD-314/ , IIR , TD-314/ , Analyst Note: The JI is an NIPF Priority 1B CT Target, defined as terrorist groups, especially those with state support, countries that sponsor terrorism, or countries that have state organizations involved in terrorism that have demonstrated both intention and capability to attack U.S. persons or interests. 35 TD , TD , TD-314/ , TD-314/ TD-314/ FM40 27-Jul-2003, TD-314/ IIR (b), TD-314/ , Analyst Note: See SCI Supplement more inmation. 8

9 SUBJECT: Recommendation Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) (S//NF) Detainee admitted he met with Dr. Bashir Ud-Din Mahmud, the president and founder of the UTN in the summer of (S//NF) UTN's members consist of nuclear scientists and military officers. The proclaimed purpose of the organization was to assist in spreading the modern achievements of science and technology among Muslims. However, it is assessed that the reported assistance by the UTN to the Taliban or UBL is likely to have been nuclear or radiological in nature. 40 (S//NF) Detainee denied any knowledge of the UTN's involvement with procuring or building a nuclear weapon al-qaida. 41 (Analyst Note: It is possible detainee was involved in attempting to procure a nuclear weapon al- Qaida, based on his attempt to obtain other weapons capable of large-scale destruction, his support to al-qaida s anthrax research and his established connection to the UTN.) (S//NF) KU-568 reported detainee instructed him to provide monetary assistance to the Sanabil Organization in Kabul. 42 (Analyst Note: The Sanabil NGO has been identified as a source of funding the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG). The Sanabil office in Kabul was staffed by LIFG members. 43 ) (S//NF) On 22 February 2005, detainee told his interrogator, "Yes, I am a member of al-qaida and I took orders from UBL." Detainee then made some challenging remarks against the US and the interrogator. 44 (Analyst Note: This is the only reporting of detainee acknowledging membership of al-qaida. Detainee and others have frequently mentioned friction between UBL and detainee, probably due to detainee s efts to usurp al-qaida s control and emplace al-wafa as a viable alternative source of funding and assistance to the Taliban in Afghanistan. It is possible that detainee made this statement out of frustration and anger. He has not cooperated with interrogators since making this statement, and while assessed to be a supporter of the network, detainee is not assessed to be a member of al-qaida.) (S//NF) Walid Muhammad Salih Bin Attash, aka (Khallad), aka (Silver), ISN US9YM DP (YM-10014), commented that the al-wafa NGO disagreed FEB NGIC - UTN Possible Assistances to UBL 23-SEP-2005, D-4J IIR (b), IIR , TD-314/ , D-4J IIR TD-314/ , TD-314/ , Analyst Note: The LIFG is an NIPF Priority 1B CT Target. Priority 1B targets are defined as terrorist groups, especially those with state support, countries that sponsor terrorism, or countries that have state organizations involved in terrorism that have demonstrated both intention and capability to attack U.S. persons or interests. Variants of Sanabil include Sanabel and Sanibel SIR 22-FEB

10 SUBJECT: Recommendation Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) with al-qaida s opposition to the Saudi government and actively attempted to undermine al-qaida s recruiting and training programs in Afghanistan prior to 11 September (S//NF) Humud Dakhil Humud Said al-jadani, ISN US9SA DP (SA- 230, transferred), reported that detainee disagreed with the message UBL was preaching to the mujahideen concerning martyrdom. Detainee felt that martyrdom was attained by fighting to the last breath, whereas UBL was preaching suicide missions. UBL became upset and threatened detainee s life, ordering detainee never to go near any of the al-qaida guesthouses again and never talk again to the mujahideen about martyrdom. 46 (Analyst Note: This statement identifies that up to this point, detainee had unfettered access to al- Qaida guesthouses.) (S//NF) Detainee sent and received large money transfers while he was the head of al-wafa in Afghanistan. These transfers are assessed, in part, to have provided the noted support to extremism. (S) According to an unidentified senior al-qaida detainee, Shaykh al-rayis had originally been opposed to al-qaida s strategy, but began providing financial support to al-qaida after the US attacked Afghanistan. 47 (S//NF) KU-568 said that while at JTF-GTMO, detainee told him al-wafa sent $100,000 US to UBL. 48 (S//NF) Detainee stated that on occasion he would be instructed by Shaykh al-rayis to disperse funds to individuals unknown purposes. As an example, detainee stated he once provided $20,000 US to an individual named Hamid Gul, based on al-rayis orders, without knowing what the money was to be used. 49 (S//NF) Between 30 April 2001 and 22 September 2001, detainee received money transfers totaling at least $665,000 US. 50 (S//NF) Detainee, through al-wafa, supported extremist training and facilitated movement of extremists into Afghanistan. (S//NF) Detainee stated his brother-in-law came to Afghanistan after 11 September 2001 to fight the jihad against the US. The brother-in-law and at least five 45 TD-314/ IIR IIR SIR 30-OCT IIR (b) 50 TD-314/

11 SUBJECT: Recommendation Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) other individuals received training on the AK-47 assault rifle and RPG in the al-wafa office in Kabul. 51 (S) Al-Wafa facilitated the movement of al-qaida members and other personnel entering Afghanistan via Iran after 11 September (S//NF) Detainee arranged Khalid al-harbi, aka (Abu Sulayman al-harbi), and 13 other individuals to enter Afghanistan via Iran. Detainee then brought al- Harbi to al-qaida operatives Hamza al-ghamdi and Mukhtar al-qatari (possibly KU-10024), who took al-harbi to meet UBL. 53 Detainee stated he has been friends with al-harbi since high school. 54 (Analyst Note: Al-Harbi is noted his appearance in a video with UBL, celebrating the 11 September 2001 attacks.) (C/REL USA, GCTF) Aminullah Baryalai Tukhi, ISN US9AF DP (AF-1012), stated detainee employed him from the fall of 2000 through the fall of 2001 to smuggle Arab and Russian fighters from Iran into Afghanistan. 55 (S) SA-264 claimed detainee took passports and money from individuals entering Afghanistan. SA-264 also stated detainee told him it was a standard practice because the items were safer in an al-wafa office than anywhere else. 56 (Analyst Note: This is a common practice in al-qaida guesthouses as well. Guesthouses held passports and valuables to prevent losing them during movement in Afghanistan.) (S//NF) Detainee is associated with senior members of al-qaida, the Taliban and other Islamic extremists. (S//NF) Detainee was identified as part of UBL s close circle. A eign military intelligence service provided a list of twenty such associates of UBL. Abu Seif al-mekkii, a variant of detainee s aliases, is listed as an Arab from Mecca who manages the special services of al-wafa. 57 (S//NF) Detainee admitted meeting with UBL on at least two occasions while serving as director of al-wafa in Afghanistan. Detainee first met with UBL at UBL s house in Kandahar in late 2000 to discuss Shaykh al-rayis proposal to open al-wafa offices in Afghanistan. The second meeting took place two months prior to the 11 September 2001 attacks and was held to try to resolve 51 IIR (b), FEB of 2, IIR , TD-315/ , TD-314/ FEB of DOSSIER 07-JAN of 9 55 IIR IIR IIR

12 SUBJECT: Recommendation Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) disagreements between al-wafa and al-qaida, which were primarily disagreements between detainee and UBL. 58 (S//NF) Ali Muhammad Abdul Aziz al-fakhri, aka (Ibn al-shaykh al-libi), ISN US9LY DP (LY-212), stated he first met detainee in early 2000 and met with detainee many times at al-wafa in Kabul. 59 (S//NF) Detainee was reported to be in the al-wafa Kabul office during a visit by UBL spokesman, Sulayman Abu Ghayth. 60 (S//NF) Detainee admitted meeting twice with mer Taliban Deputy Governor of Herat, Mullah Abdul Hannan. 61 (S//NF) Al-Qaida financier Fouad Mahmoud Hasan al-rabia, ISN US9KU DP (KU-551), reported meeting members of al-wafa on multiple occasions including detainee. 62 (S//NF) Detainee s name was found in an address book belonging to assessed al- Qaida money launderer, Muhammad Sulayman Barre, ISN US9SO DP (SO- 567). 63 SA-264 stated that SO-567 was an al-wafa financier in Kabul and was in charge of getting supplies from Pakistan to Afghanistan detainee and the Taliban. 64 (S//NF) Mabahith provided inmation on 37 detainees, in order of precedence, whom they designated as being of high priority interest. Detainee was the 13th name on that list. Mabahith had previously had detainee under surveillance recruiting activities. 65 (S//NF) A variant of detainee s name and alias are associated with a phone number found in the pocket litter of a mujahid captured in Croatia in (Analyst Note: Detainee served as the Mecca director the High Commission Muslims in Bosnia- Herzegovina. The mujahid was probably attempting to travel to Bosnia due to the jihad in the country from about 1992 to 1995 and the subsequent large population of eign Muslims in the country.) 58 IIR , IIR (b) 59 TD-314/ IIR IIR IIR FM40 09-FEB-2005, Analyst Note: SO-567 worked the Dahabshiil Corporation, assessed to have been a company used to cover financial transactions al-qaida. 64 IIR TD-314/ TD-314/

13 SUBJECT: Recommendation Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) c. (S//NF) Detainee s Conduct: Detainee is assessed to be a HIGH threat from a detention perspective. Detainee s overall behavior has been mostly compliant and rarely hostile to the guard ce and staff. Detainee currently has 35 Reports of Disciplinary Infraction listed in DIMS with the most recent occurring on 6 September 2007, when he was in possession of food. Detainee has two Reports of Disciplinary Infraction assault with the most recent occurring on 17 January 2007, when he punched the door of his bean hole open striking a guard s hand. Other incidents which detainee has been disciplined include inciting and participating in mass disturbances, damage to government property, failure to follow guard instructions/camp rules, unauthorized communications, provoking words and gestures, and possession of contraband (food). Detainee had one Report of Disciplinary Infraction in 2006, and nine so far in (U) Detainee Intelligence Value Assessment: a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be of HIGH intelligence value. Detainee s most recent interrogation session occurred on 22 November b. (S//NF) Placement and Access: Detainee has a long term association with NGOs and international jihad conflicts. Detainee was the head of al-wafa in Afghanistan. Detainee had contact with known and suspected al-qaida members and leaders and the Taliban. Detainee met with UBL on at least two occasions and he met with major financial contributors and facilitators al-wafa in Saudi Arabia. Detainee was aware of all activities permed by al-wafa in Afghanistan and Pakistan. c. (S//NF) Intelligence Assessment: Detainee has specific inmation on al-wafa s financial and logistical support to al-qaida and the Taliban. Detainee knows the personnel and operations of al-wafa and how they provided support to al-qaida and the Taliban. Detainee probably has inmation on individuals and organizations in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates who finance al-qaida and other Islamic extremist groups. d. (S//NF) Areas of Potential Exploitation: Al-Wafa personnel and operations Key al-qaida and Taliban personnel Support to al-qaida and Taliban Weapons procurement Smuggling operations into Afghanistan 13

14 S E C R E T // NOFORN I I SUBJECT: Recommendation Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD). Al-Qaida and al-wafa cooperation o Zarqawi-associated organizatrons and infrastructure o Biographical and psychological inmation o Terrorist operations in the CENTCOM AOR o Means of communications between terrorists and extremists in Afehanistan. Pakistan. and Saudi Arabia 9. (S) EC Status: Detainee's enemy combatant status was reassessed on 10 November 2004, and he remains an enemy combatant. l. - v(re, MW Rear Admiral, US Navy Commanding. Definitions intelligence terms used in the assessment can be found in the Joint Military Intelligence College October 2001 guide Intelligence lharning Terminology. t4 S E C R E T / / NOFORN I I