JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment

Transcription

1 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE HEADQUARTERS, JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO U.S. NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA APO AE January 2008 MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southern Command, 3511 NW 9lst Avenue, Miami, FL SUBJECT: Recommendation Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) 1. (S) Personal Inmation: JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment JDIMS/NDRC Reference Name: Hassan Mujamma Rabai Said Current/True Name and Aliases: Ghalaab Bashir, Bashir Bu Jumaa Ghalab, Abu al-harith Bujamma, Abdul Harith, Abdel Hamza al-jazira, al-harith al-jazairi, Hassan Bijamina, Bashir al-jazairi, Suhayb al-tunisi Place of Birth: Oum el-bouaghi, Algeria (AG) Date of Birth: 5 February 1976 Citizenship: Algeria Internment Serial Number (ISN): US9AG DP 2. (U//FOUO) Health: Detainee is in overall good health. 3. (U) JTF-GTMO Assessment: a. (S) Recommendation: JTF-GTMO recommends this detainee Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD). JTF-GTMO previously recommended detainee Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) on 14 January b. (S//NF) Executive Summary: Detainee is an assessed al-qaida member who traveled to Afghanistan (AF) where he received training at the al-qaida al-faruq Training Camp and possibly received explosives training. Detainee is assessed to have participated in hostilities against US and Coalition ces and was identified as a leader coordinating supplies and CLASSIFIED BY: MULTIPLE SOURCES REASON: E.O , AS AMENDED, SECTION 1.4(C) DECLASSIFY ON:

2 SUBJECT: Recommendation Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) munitions the al-qaida fighters in Tora Bora. Detainee was possibly selected training as a bodyguard Usama Bin Laden (UBL). JTF-GTMO determined this detainee to be: A HIGH risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests, and allies A LOW threat from a detention perspective Of MEDIUM intelligence value c. (S//NF) Summary of Changes: The following outlines changes to detainee s assessment since the last JTF-GTMO recommendation. (Changes in this assessment will be annotated by next to the footnote.) Upgraded detainee s risk level to HIGH due to detainee s logistical duties in Tora Bora, evidence supporting detainee being chosen a UBL bodyguard position, and his overall lack of cooperation since being detained Added identification of detainee as an emir (leader) in Tora Bora Added reporting about detainee s training Added detainee s alias Suhayb al-tunisi 4. (U) Detainee s Account of Events: The following section is based, unless otherwise indicated, on detainee s own account. These statements are included without consideration of veracity, accuracy, or reliability. a. (S//NF) Prior History: Detainee attended primary and preparatory school, ending in During his adolescent years, detainee stated that Algeria did not provide a suitable environment him to mature in his Islamic faith and that his sister was harassed at school wearing traditional Islamic clothing. From 1997 until his departure Afghanistan, detainee worked as a clothing merchant in his hometown of Biskara, AG. 1 b. (S//NF) Recruitment and Travel: Detainee denied hearing encouragement jihad at his local mosque, but he heard on television and radio that Afghanistan was a true Islamic state under Taliban rule. On 19 August 2000, detainee left Algeria Afghanistan. Detainee claimed to have stopped in Damascus, Syria (SY), to rectify an overcharge by the Libyan travel agency who provided his ticket. From the time detainee arrived in Syria until he departed in 2001, detainee worked at Miramar s Pizza shop in Damascus. 2 During detainee s first week in Syria, he attempted to enroll in the Abu Noor Institute, but his 1 IIR IIR , KB 13-MAY

3 SUBJECT: Recommendation Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) application was denied due to his age. 3 On 25 June 2001, detainee departed Syria to travel to Iran (IR). Upon arrival in Zahedan, IR, detainee went to the Pakistani embassy and inquired about entry into Pakistan (PK). The embassy inmed detainee it would take approximately six months to complete the required paperwork. An individual at a local mosque referred detainee to the Jama at Tablighi (JT) office in Zahedan assistance. 4 On 7 July 2001, associates of the JT office assisted in smuggling detainee into Quetta, PK. 5 From Quetta, detainee traveled to Afghanistan arriving a few days later in Jalalabad via Kandahar and Kabul. 6 c. (S//NF) Training and Activities: Between July and November 2001, detainee resided at the Muhammad Khan Mosque in Jalalabad, studying under the tutelage of Imam Abdul Haq. 7 Detainee claims to have dressed as an Afghan during this time, and no one identified him as an Arab. Detainee stated he never was solicited to join the Taliban to fight against the Northern Alliance (U) Capture Inmation: a. (S//NF) Detainee claimed he fled Jalalabad on foot with unknown Arabs and Pakistanis in mid-november 2001, when the city fell to US and Coalition ces. Detainee traveled through the mountains and stayed in an unknown location approximately one month until 16 December An Afghan guide led detainee and approximately twenty other Arabs to Pakistan, where Pakistani authorities captured detainee and the group. 9 Although his account is essentially accurate, detainee is assessed to have fled Afghanistan with a group of al-qaida and Taliban fighters led by UBL appointed military commander in Tora Bora, Ali Muhammad Abdul Aziz al-fakhri aka (Ibn al-shaykh al-libi), ISN US9LY DP (LY- 212). The group crossed the Afghani-Pakistani border in the Nangarhar region in mid- December Their Pakistani contact convinced them to surrender their weapons and 3 IIR ; Analyst Note: The Abu Noor School, or Abu Noor Institute, in Damascus is considered a common pass-through point terrorists, including some American students who attended the school and adopted extremist ideology. Reference: ACIC TERRORISM SUMMARY 27-OCT Analyst Note: JT is designated as a National Intelligence Priority Framework (NIPF) Counter Terrorism (CT) Priority 2A Terrorist Support Entity (TSE). Priority 2A TSEs have demonstrated intent and willingness to provide financial support to terrorist organizations willing to attack US persons or interests, or provide witting operational support to Priority 2A terrorist groups. 5 IIR , IIR , IIR KB 13-MAY-2002, IIR IIR , IIR ; Analyst Note: Detainee mentioned a student center at the mosque used exclusively by the Taliban. 8 IIR KB 13-MAY-2002, IIR

4 SUBJECT: Recommendation Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) gathered the group in a mosque where Pakistani ces immediately arrested them. 10 Detainee was transferred to US custody from Kohat, PK, on 30 December b. (S) Property Held: Casio model A159W watch 3,000 Pakistani rupees 12 c. (S) Transferred to JTF-GTMO: 01 May 2002 d. (S//NF) Reasons Transfer to JTF-GTMO: To provide inmation on the following: Individuals at the Muhammad Khan Mosque in Jalalabad Egress route of Arabs from Jalalabad through the Tora Bora mountains to the Pakistani border 6. (S//NF) Evaluation of Detainee s Account: Detainee has been uncooperative during interrogation sessions, demonstrating continuing support to extremism and associates who may still be at large. Detainee has provided conflicting, vague, and false inmation. Detainee s claimed delay in Syria is a probable cover earlier entry into Afghanistan and his training at al-qaida camps. Detainee claimed he had enough money to purchase a return ticket to Algeria (or to Afghanistan), yet he applied to the Abu Noor Institute. Detainee admitted being smuggled into Pakistan, yet never explained why he did not enter Afghanistan directly from Iran, especially given the porous border. Detainee provided no specific inmation on the other residents at the Muhammad Khan Mosque during his time there, nor does he provide specific inmation concerning his egress from Afghanistan. Detainee has denied receiving any militant training, yet other JTF-GTMO detainees identified him at al-faruq. Detainee denied participating in any combat against US or Coalition ces, yet he has been identified as present in the Tora Bora region and was captured with a large group fleeing al-qaida and Taliban fighters. Detainee admitted lying about his name a substantial period of his detention and has given conflicting places of birth. 7. (U) Detainee Threat: a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be a HIGH risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests, and allies. 10 IIR , Withdrawal from Tora Bora Analysis 11 TD-314/ , DAB Association of Names to 195 Detainees 29-Dec Analyst Note: 3,000 PKR is equivalent to $48.59 US using the conversion date of 15 December

5 SUBJECT: Recommendation Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) b. (S//NF) Reasons Continued Detention: Detainee is assessed to be a member of al- Qaida. Detainee s name was found on al-qaida affiliated documents and he is assessed to have participated in hostilities against US and Coalition ces. Detainee was identified as a leader associated with the supply and logistics in Tora Bora. Detainee received militant training at the al-faruq Camp and he was identified as being selected to serve as a UBL bodyguard. Detainee also possibly received explosives training. (S//NF) Detainee is assessed to be a member of al-qaida. Detainee s name was found on al-qaida affiliated documents indicating he was a fighter assessed to have participated in hostilities against US and Coalition ces, and stayed at al-qaida guesthouses. (S//NF) Detainee was one of 84 reported fighters that were captured by Pakistani ces after they crossed the border from Afghanistan to Pakistan. 13 (Analyst Note: This is assessed to be the group led out of Tora Bora by senior al-qaida commander LY-212, who was captured with the group.) 14 (S//NF) Detainee s name, Ghalib Bashir (variant: Ghalaab) and his alias, al- Harith al-jazairi, were on a list of captured mujahideen recovered from a hard drive associated with senior al-qaida operative Khalid Shaykh Muhammad, aka (KSM), aka (Mukhtar), ISN US9KU DP (KU-10024). 15 (Analyst Note: The mujahideen were those captured with LY-212 after fleeing the hostilities in Tora Bora.) (S//NF) A variant of detainee s alias, Bashir al-jazairi, was included on a list of emirs (leaders) in Tora Bora. 16 (S//NF) Detainee s assessed participation in hostilities is supported by reporting from other JTF-GTMO detainees who identified detainee at the Tora Bora supply center. (S//NF) Yasin Muhammad Salih Mazeeb Basardah, ISN US9YM-00252DP (YM-252), stated detainee went by the name Abdel Hamza al-jazira in Tora Bora where detainee managed the weapons inventory. 17 YM-252 saw detainee multiple times in Tora Bora following the 11 September 2001 attacks. Detainee checked on YM-252 s fighting group to make sure they had enough supplies. Abdullah al-kuwaiti, (an alias Fuad Mahmud Hasan al-rabia, ISN US9KU DP (KU-551)) served as detainee s leader and head of the supply center in Tora Bora IIR TD-314/ , TD-314/ TD-314/ IIR IIR IIR , IIR , SIR 02-MAR

6 SUBJECT: Recommendation Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) (S//NF) KU-551 identified detainee at Tora Bora working with al-qaida operative Mahr Rafat al-quwari, ISN US9WE DP (WE-519), in UBL s Tora Bora cave complex re-supplying the fighters. KU-551 identified detainee as Suhayb al-tunisi and noted al-qaida commander Abd al-qadus assigned detainee to the supply center. 19 (S//NF) Detainee s name and alias were found on a list of al-qaida members and the contents of their trust accounts. Detainee s trust account contained a passport and unidentified documents. This list was found on computer media recovered during raids against al-qaida-associated safe houses in Rawalpindi, PK, on 1 March 2003 and Karachi, PK, on 11 September (S//NF) Analyst Note: Such lists are indicative of an individual s residence within al-qaida, Taliban, and other extremist guesthouses, often the purpose of training or coordination prior to travel to the front lines or abroad. Trust accounts, also referred to as safety boxes or safety deposit boxes, were simply storage compartments, such as envelopes or folders, which guesthouse administrators used to secure the individual s personal valuables, such as passports and plane tickets. These items were entrusted to the guesthouse until completion of training or other activity. (S//NF) Detainee received militant training at al-faruq Training Camp and was reportedly selected to be a future UBL bodyguard. (S//NF) Richard Dean Belmar, ISN US9UK DP (UK-817, transferred), photo-identified detainee as having trained at al-faruq. 21 (S//NF) YM-252 stated he and detainee attended militant training together at al- Faruq; detainee was one class ahead of YM (Analyst Note: YM-252 s identification of detainee at al-faruq conflicts with detainee s claimed arrival. Detainee stated he arrived in Afghanistan in the summer of 2001, while YM-252 places them at al-faruq in spring YM-252 s reporting is more credible than detainee s reporting. Detainee s cover story claiming an extended stay in Syria en route Afghanistan is probably to hide his al-faruq training.) 23 (S//NF) YM-252 also reported detainee was among a group of 50 selected to become a bodyguard UBL. 24 (Analyst Note: YM-252 does not state detainee served as a bodyguard.) (S//NF) Detainee possibly received explosives training. 19 IIR , SIR 02-MAR-2005, MFR 25-Jun TD-314/ , TD-314/ SIR 31-OCT IIR IIR , IIR IIR

7 SUBJECT: Recommendation Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) (S//NF) Detainee was captured with a Casio model A159W watch. (U//FOUO) The possession of a Casio F-91W model watch (or the silvercolor version of this model, the A159W), is an indicator of al-qaida training in the manufacture of improvised explosive devices (IEDs). A JTF-GTMO detainee identified the Casio watch as the sign of al-qaida, [which] uses the watch to make bombs. The Casio was known to be given to the students at al-qaida bomb-making training courses in Afghanistan, at which the students received instruction in the preparation of timing devices using the watch. Approximately one-third of the JTF-GTMO detainees that were captured with these models of watches have known connections to explosives, either having attended explosives training, having association with a facility where IEDs were made or where explosives training was given, or having association with a person identified as an explosives expert. 25 (S//NF) A variant of detainee s alias (Abu Hamza al-jazairi) was found on a letter addressed to al-qaida explosives trainer Midhat Mursi al-sayyid Umar, aka (Abu Khabab al-masri). The letter stated the individual would arrive 6 May 2001 to attend training. 26 (Analyst Note: Detainee s assessed timeline allowed him ample time to complete basic training in preparation the start of the explosives training. However, the Abu Hamza al-jazairi found in this letter may be Djamel Beghal, who shares the alias with detainee and detainee s possible explosives training requires further investigation. Beghal, also an Algerian, was an extremist tied to the US Embassy Plot in Paris.) (S//NF) As previously noted, detainee was identified as Suhayb al-tunisi. Muhammad Murdi Issa al-zahrani, ISN US9SA DP (SA-713), reported his associate Suhayb al-tunisi had attended the Khabbab Training Camp. Khabbab is a variant Abu Khabab and detainee may be the Suhayb reported by SA-713. This association requires further investigation. 27 c. (S//NF) Detainee s Conduct: Detainee is assessed to be a LOW threat from a detention perspective. Detainee s overall behavior has been mostly compliant and semi-hostile to the guard ce and staff. Detainee currently has 61 Reports of Disciplinary Infraction listed in DIMS with the most recent occurring on 6 December 2007, when he talked while being shackled. Detainee has 3 Reports of Disciplinary Infraction assault with the most recent occurring on 23 May 2003, when he threw water and bodily fluids, and spit on a guard. Other incidents which detainee has been disciplined include participating in mass disturbances, failure to follow instructions and camp rules, damage to government property, 25 For additional details see MFR 24-APR-2002, Casio Watch Electronic Analysis Report 19-Aug-2004, Casio Watches and Relationship to Detainees 20-Apr AFGP TD-314/

8 SUBJECT: Recommendation Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) assault, and possession of food and non-weapon type contraband. In 2006, detainee had a total of nine Reports of Disciplinary Infraction and six in (U) Detainee Intelligence Value Assessment: a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be of MEDIUM intelligence value. Detainee s most recent interrogation session occurred on 23 February b. (S//NF) Placement and Access: Detainee resided in Damascus ten months and utilized the JT office in Zahedan to be smuggled into Pakistan. Detainee s account places him at the Muhammad Khan Mosque in Jalalabad over three months in mid Detainee has been identified by JTF-GTMO detainees as having attended the al-faruq Training Camp. Detainee may have served as a tactical logistician in direct support of al- Qaida s combat operations in Tora Bora. c. (S//NF) Intelligence Assessment: Detainee has intentionally omitted or provided vague details in his account to support a weak cover story. Detainee s affiliation to al-qaida is evident as seen in recovered documents and testimony by other detainees placing detainee at Tora Bora and al-faruq. Further exploitation of detainee s probable relationship with KU- 551 and WE-519 may provide further insight into his role and responsibilities at Tora Bora. There are intelligence gaps in detainee s activities and contacts in Syria, Iran, and Afghanistan. If YM-252 s allegation that detainee was selected to be a UBL bodyguard can be supported by separate reporting, detainee s intelligence value would increase. d. (S//NF) Areas of Potential Exploitation: Al-Qaida supply procedures and support to front line troops LY-212 and al-qaida leadership in Tora Bora JT facilitation of fighters from Zahedan Al-Qaida training including explosives Al-Qaida safe houses Extremist and al-qaida recruiting tactics in Algeria Individuals at the Muhammad Khan Mosque Mujahideen ingress routes into Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan and Syria Extremist routes of egress into Pakistan from Tora Bora. 8

9 S E C R E T // NOFORN I I SUBJECT: Recommendation Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) 9. (S) EC Status: Detainee's enemy combatantptatus was reassessed on 1 October 2004, and he remains an enemy combatant.,lfz %,,t4 Z1#< MARKH.BUZBY / Rear Admiral, US Navy Commanding L-) ' Definitions intelligence terms used in the assessment can be found in the Joint Military Intelligence College October 2001 guide Intelligence Warning Terminology. 9 S E C R E T // NOFORN / I