JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment

Transcription

1 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE HEADQUARTERS, JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO U.S. NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA APO AE April 2008 MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southern Command, 3511 NW 9lst Avenue, Miami, FL (S//NF) Personal Information: JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment JDIMS/NDRC Reference Name: Fayad Akhmed Current/True Name and Aliases: Fayyad, Fayad Yahya Ahmed al-rami Place of Birth: Aden, Yemen (YM) Date of Birth: 1977 Citizenship: Yemen Internment Serial Number (ISN): US9YM DP 2. (U//FOUO) Health: Detainee is in overall good health. 3. (U) JTF-GTMO Assessment: a. (S) Recommendation: JTF-GTMO recommends this detainee for Transfer Out of DoD Control (TRO). JTF-GTMO previously recommended detainee for Transfer Out of DoD Control (TRO) on 11 October b. (S//NF) Executive Summary: Detainee is assessed to be a member of a Faisalabad, Pakistan (PK) cell created by senior al-qaida member Zayn al-abidin Muhammad Husayn, aka (Abu Zubaydah), ISN US9GZ DP (GZ-10016), under direction of al-qaida military operations commander Nashwan Abd al-razzaq Abd al-baqi, aka (Abd al-hadi al- Iraqi), ISN US9IZ DP (IZ-10026), with the purpose returning to Afghanistan (AF) to conduct attacks against US and Coalition forces using improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Detainee adopted and professed a false education cover story. Detainee possibly fled hostilities in Afghanistan along with the other members of the Martyrs Brigade with the CLASSIFIED BY: MULTIPLE SOURCES REASON: E.O , AS AMENDED, SECTION 1.4(C) DECLASSIFY ON:

2 assistance of the Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT). 1 Detainee was arrested at the Issa Safe House controlled by GZ Detainee admitted joining the Jamaat Tablighi (JT), which is assessed to be linked to an al-qaida facilitation network. 2 Although detainee has been cooperative while in detention status, he has provided no information of intelligence value since his capture. [ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ABOUT THIS DETAINEE IS AVAILABLE IN AN SCI SUPPLEMENT.] JTF-GTMO determined this detainee to be: A MEDIUM risk, as he is may pose a threat to the US, its interests, and allies A MEDIUM threat from a detention perspective Of MEDIUM intelligence value c. (S//NF) Summary of Changes: The following outlines changes to detainee s assessment since the last JTF-GTMO recommendation. (Changes in this assessment will be annotated by next to the footnote.) Incorporated information about the activities at the GZ run safe houses Information was added in this assessment about detainee s threats against JTF-GTMO personnel and possible support for jihad Added SCI Supplement 4. (U) Detainee s Account of Events: The following section is based, unless otherwise indicated, on detainee s own account. These statements are included without consideration of veracity, accuracy, or reliability. a. (S//NF) Prior History: Detainee graduated from al-noor College (high school) in Aden in From 1997 until 2000, detainee worked with his brother Abdallah at the al-kawthar Bottling Company, in Sanaa, YM. During 1998, detainee studied under Shaykh Muqbil Bin 1 Analyst Note: The LT is a National Intelligence Priority Framework (NIPF) Priority 1 Counterterrorism (CT) target. Priority 1 targets include issues, opportunities, or threats that rise to, or are expected to rise to, the level of interest of the President, Vice President, DNI, and NSC/HSC Principals and Deputies. This includes terrorist groups, countries that sponsor terrorism, or countries that have state organizations involved in terrorism that pose a clear and immediate danger to US persons or interests. This includes those preparing to employ Weapons of Mass Destruction. 2 Analyst Note: Variants for Jamaat Tablighi are Talique Jammat and Markez al-tablighi. The JT is NIPF Priority 3 Terrorist Support Entity (TSE). Priority 3 TSE have demonstrated intent and willingness to provide financial support to terrorist organizations willing to attack US persons or interests, or provide witting operational support to Priority 1-2 terrorist groups. (Analyst Note: JT is a proselytizing organization and has been supporting Islamic terrorist groups in South and Southeast Asia under the cover of conducting religious activities. Affiliation with the JT, a proselytizing organization, has been identified as an al-qaida cover story. Al-Qaida used the JT to facilitate and fund the international travels of its members.) 2

3 Hadi al-wadii, at the Demaj Mosque in Sedah, YM. Shaykh al-wadii suggested detainee travel to Pakistan with the JT. Detainee then worked for Abdallah s masonry business until detainee departed for Pakistan. Detainee was exempt from military service because of asthma-like symptoms. 3 b. (S//NF) Recruitment and Travel: Detainee met JT member Mustafa Abd al-haq, at the Abu Bakr al-saddiq Mosque in Aden. Al-Haq talked to detainee about how to join JT and encouraged him to travel to Pakistan to study Islam. In approximately July 2001, after knowing al-haq for three days, detainee decided to go to Pakistan and join the JT. Detainee used money saved for the past two years to purchase a visa from the Pakistan consulate and his airline ticket. Detainee already had a passport. In approximately August 2001, detainee traveled to Karachi, PK, via Sanaa. He stayed in an unknown hotel in Karachi for a week. Instructed by al-haq, detainee attended the al-makki Mosque, where he met a Pakistani named Manawar who arranged for his travel to Raiwind Center, the JT headquarters in Lahore, PK. Detainee s passport was stolen while in Lahore. 4 c. (S//NF) Training and Activities: Detainee resided at the Raiwind Center for four or five months while he studied the Koran and other Islamic books. During this time, an individual named Mansour convinced detainee he should study at the Jamia Salafia University in Faisalabad, PK. On 23 December 2001, Mansour drove detainee to Faisalabad. 5 Detainee took four classes during his one and half months at the university. Around mid-february 2002, one of detainee s instructors named Shaykh Zafar Yasin told detainee to leave student housing because Pakistan authorities were arresting Arabs without the proper papers. Detainee went from the university to this house with fellow Yemenis Yasir Ahmad Ali Tahar, ISN US9YM DP (YM-679), Emad Abdalla Hassan, aka (Imad), ISN US9YM DP (YM-680), Muhammad Muhammad Hassan, aka (Muhammad), ISN US9YM DP (YM-681), Muhammad Ahmad Salam, aka (Muhammad), ISN US9YM DP (YM-689), and Ali Abdullah Ahmed, aka (Ali), ISN US9YM DP (YM-693, deceased). Detainee remained at this house, later referred to as the Issa Safe House, for approximately one and a half months until he was arrested (U) Capture Information: JUN-2002, JUN-2002, SIR 07-JUL JUN-2002, JUN-2002, SIR 07-JUL-2002, Analyst Note: Detainee also reported arriving in Karachi in 26 May According to CIR , detainee had a Yemen passport, number , issued in Aden on 20 January 2000, and place of birth as Sanaa, YM. 5 Analyst Note: Detainee reported traveling to Faisalabad a week after Ramadan, which ended on about 16 December Variants for Jamia Salafia include Jamiyah Salfiyah, Jamea Salafeyah, Salafyah University, and Salafi University KB 29-JUN-2002, JUN-2002, SIR 07-JUL

4 a. (S//NF) Pakistani authorities conducted raids at two Faisalabad safe houses on 28 March 2002, arresting more than 30 suspected al-qaida fighters under the command of GZ and killing one. At one location, referred to as the Issa Safe House, Pakistani police and intelligence officials arrested detainee and at least 15 other suspected al-qaida members. 7 At the other safe house, Pakistani officials arrested GZ and at least seven other suspected al-qaida members, and seized manuals, tools and components consistent with the assembly of explosive detonators. The safe houses were operated by the Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT) and were part of a network of LT houses and operatives enlisted by GZ after the fall of Kandahar, AF, to help al-qaida fighters escape Afghanistan. 8 Detainee and others were held by Pakistani authorities first in a prison in Lahore and then at a prison in Islamabad, PK. They were transferred to US custody in May 2002, flown to Bagram, AF, and subsequently flown to Kandahar. 9 b. (U) Property Held: None c. (S) Transferred to JTF-GTMO: 19 June 2002 d. (S//NF) Reasons for Transfer to JTF-GTMO: To provide information on the following: JT and personnel associated with the organization Issa Safe House in Faisalabad where detainee was captured 6. (S//NF) Evaluation of Detainee s Account: Limited information is available to refute detainee s story of being a JT member who traveled to Pakistan to study Islam. Membership in JT is a common al-qaida cover story, and others in the Issa Safe House where detainee was captured claimed affiliation with JT to cover their involvement with extremists. Detainee reported conflicting dates of entering Karachi, possibly attempting to conceal extremist activities. Reporting corroborates that detainee attended the Jamia Salafia University. The true nature of his activities has not yet been fully determined. 7 Analyst Note: Issa s Safe House was also called the Yemeni House and the Crescent Textile Mill House. The following were identified as those arrested on 28 March 2002 at the Issa Safe House: (YM-679); (YM-680); (YM- 681); (WE-684); (AG-685); (YM-686); (LY-688); (YM-689); (YM-690); (YM-691); (YM-692); (YM-693, deceased); (LY-695); (RS-702) and (YM-728). For additional information see IIR , SIR 14- OCT-2004 and FM40 24-SEP TD-314/ , IIR , SAP APR-2002, SAP MAR- 2002, FM40 01-SEP-2005, FM40 01-SEP-2005b 9 TD-314/ , KB 29-JUN-2002, IIR , IIR , IIR , SIR 07-SEP-2004, IIR , IIR , IIR

5 7. (U) Detainee Threat: a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be a MEDIUM risk, as he may pose a threat to the US, its interests, and allies. b. (S//NF) Reasons for Transfer Out of DoD Control: In accordance with paragraph 3b, detainee is recommended for transfer out of DoD control in light of his assessed MEDIUM risk, MEDIUM threat, and MEDIUM intelligence value. Detainee was captured with an al- Qaida cell controlled by GZ-10016, which intended to conduct attacks against US and Coalition forces in Afghanistan. Detainee possibly traveled to Afghanistan for training and adopted a false education cover story to hide the true purpose of his travels. Detainee probably fled hostilities in Afghanistan along with other members of the Martyrs Brigade with the assistance of the LT. Detainee acknowledged associations with members and facilities associated with the JT, which are assessed to be linked to an al-qaida facilitation network. Detainee has threatened JTF-GTMO personnel and voiced his possible support for jihad. (S//NF) Detainee is assessed to be an Islamic extremist and a member of GZ s Martyrs Brigade, a Faisalabad cell intended to conduct IED attacks against US and Coalition forces. Detainee is assessed to have traveled to Afghanistan for training. (S//NF) Analyst Note: Detainee and many of the other detainees captured during the 28 March 2002 raids adopted a false cover story citing education as their purpose for travel to Pakistan. They additionally denied any links to al-qaida or even travel to Afghanistan. These claims have been assessed to be false with reporting from other detainees confirming their travel to Afghanistan, training in al-qaida camps, and participation in hostilities against US and Coalition forces. 10 Several detainees also had false student identification cards created to support their cover story. 11 It is assessed he followed similar paths to those with whom he was captured. Detainee probably used an undiscovered alias in Afghanistan. (S//NF) Detainee lived at the Issa Safe House in Faisalabad for approximately one and a half months while attending the Salafia University. 12 (Analyst Note: The Salafia University is assessed to be the Jamia Salafia University in Faisalabad.) Awad Khalifah Muhammad Abu Bakr Abu Uwayshah al-barasi, ISN US9LY DP (LY-695), an admitted explosives trainer, reported detainee was a student at Faisalabad Salafist University Analyst Note: As an example, ISN US9YM DP claimed he was a student at the University and was identified as such along with detainee; however, YM-680 has also been identified as a facilitator and Usama Bin Laden adherent who swore bayat. For additional information see FM40 24-SEP-2004, RESPONSE R- GTMO ISN Counterfeit PAK , PAK KB 29-JUN

6 (S//NF) As previously noted, Pakistani authorities captured detainee and about 30 other suspected al-qaida fighters under the command of GZ during raids on LT operated Faisalabad safe houses identified as the Issa Safe House and the Abu Zubaydah Safe House. Detainee was captured at the Issa Safe House. GZ stated he created the Martyrs Brigade, a unit conceived to conduct attacks against USbased targets employing remotely detonated explosives activated by Pakistan based triggermen using cell phones. 14 (S//NF) According to open source and other reporting, the residents of the Issa Safe House were part of a network poised to launch attacks against American installations and embassies in various countries. The plan had been finalized but was broken up by the Faisalabad safe house raids that led to the arrest of numerous suspects including its chief, GZ-10016, a key al-qaida facilitator. 15 (S//NF) Muhammad Noor Uthman, ISN US9SU DP (SU-707), stated GZ was the director of the Issa Safe House in Faisalabad. 16 (S//NF) GZ s original plan was to flee Afghanistan and travel via Pakistan to Iran, where he would set up a base of operations for the brigade. GZ claimed Abu Musab al-zarqawi had agreed to send 15 of his best men to join with members of GZ s Khaldan group to form the Brigade. GZ s long-term intent was to train and place suicide bombers or remotecontrolled explosive devices in effort to attack US and Coalition targets in Afghanistan. (Analyst Note: Al-Qaida operative Jose Padilla, the American convicted of providing material support to terrorism, stayed with GZ at the Faisalabad safe house where GZ was captured.) 17 (S//NF) Jabran Said Bin Wazir al-qahtani, ISN US9SA DP (SA-696), reported IZ was responsible for identifying recruits for al-qaida related terrorist activities and putting them in contact with GZ (S//NF) Binyam Ahmad Muhammad, aka (Talha al-kini), ISN US9ET DP (ET-1458), reported GZ and IZ talked with him (ET- 1458), SA-696, and Ghassan Abdallah Ghazi al-sharbi, ISN US9SA DP (SA-682) in Zormat about electronics training. ET-1458, who was also captured with GZ-10016, stated everyone understood they were to receive electronics 13 IIR , FM40 24-SEP-2003, FM40 16-SEP TD-314/ , TD-314/ , TD-314/ SAP APR-2002, KB 22-JUN-2002, IIR , IIR SEP TD-314/ , TD-314/ , TD-314/ , TD-314/ , TD-314/ , TD- 314/ , TD-314/ , TD-314/ , For SU-707 s reporting on Padilla, see MFR 17-JAN- 2003, IIR , IIR , and IIR IIR

7 training in remote controlled IEDs and then return to IZ in Afghanistan to train Afghans on how to build and/or use the devices. 19 (S//NF) GZ described his escape from Afghanistan with a group of other al-qaida operatives under his command via Birmal and Zormat, and Bannu and Lahore, to Faisalabad with the assistance of the LT network of facilitators. According to GZ-10016, the safe houses, as well as transportation and security for these moves was provided by LT operatives. 20 (S//NF) GZ recognized detainee as Fayad Yahya Ahmed (a variant of detainee s name), whom he had seen in Lahore at one of the houses where other Arabs were located. He remembered this particular visit because this house had eight to ten Saudis and Yemenis, which included Abu Ayman al-kurdi, who had lost his right hand because of an accident involving explosives. 21 (S//NF) Detainee is assessed to have followed the same route of escape from Afghanistan to the safe house in Faisalabad as used by GZ-10016, ET-1458 and other detainees. 22 SA-682 wrote a poem venerating several detainees, assessed to include detainee, who were captured at the Issa Safe House and the Abu Zubaydah Safe House. The poem noted GZ was pushing us to glory. 23 (S//NF) Senior al-qaida facilitator Abu Bakr Muhammad Boulghiti, aka (Abu Yasir al-jazairi), reported Fahmi Abdallah Ahmad Ubadi al-tulaqi, ISN US9YM (YM-688), was with a large group of Yemenis in Faisalabad, all of whom fled Afghanistan for Pakistan and were seeking to return to Yemen. 24 YM-688 was captured with detainee at the Issa Safe House. 25 (S//NF) GZ corroborated Abu Bakr Muhammad Boulghiti s statements by stating the Yemenis were moved out of Afghanistan and put into a safe house in Faisalabad to wait for new documents. 26 (S//NF) Ravil Mingazov, ISN US9RS DP (RS-702), received bomb training at the al-faruq Training Camp from mid-august through mid-september (Analyst Note: RS-702 was captured with detainee.) FM40 28-JUL-2004, For additional information on these individuals and their associations, see TD- 314/ , TD-314/ , TD-314/ , TD-314/ , TD-314/ , IIR , FM40 27-JUL TD-314/ , TD-314/ , IIR , SAP APR-2002, Multiple ISNs FBIS SAP MAR-2002, FM40 01-SEP-2005, FM40 01-SEP-2005b, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba 23-DEC-2004, LASHKAR E TAYYIBA, NGIC - Lashkar-e-Tayyiba 1-Jan TD-314/ TD-314/ , FM40 27-JUL POCKET LITTER 00-XXX-2004, SIR 03-FEB-2006, Analyst Note: Detainee is assessed to be the individual identified as the Yemen, Fayad. in the poem. 24 TD-314/ FM40 11-SEP-2003, SIR 07-SEP TD-314/ IIR , IIR , IIR

8 (S//NF) Abdul Muhammad Ahmad Nassir al-muhajari, ISN US9YM DP (YM-728), stated detainee and Ali Abed Allah invited him to go to another guest house with them. YM-728 estimated the date this occurred as February YM-728 later photo-identified detainee as Fayad, who was captured with him at the Yemeni house during YM-728 s stay there. 29 (S//NF) GZ stated Abd Muhaymin sent two engineers (SA-696 and SA- 682) to GZ for remote controlled explosives training. GZ said he began instructing the individuals but they had not completed their training prior to the 28 March 2002 raid on the Abu Zubaydah Safe House in Faisalabad. 30 (Analyst Note: Abd Muhaymin is a variant of IZ s alias Abd al-muhaymin. Another detainee captured at the Abu Zubaydah Safe House included Sufyian Barhoumi, aka (Abu Ubaydah al-jazairi), ISN US9AG DP (AG-694), who provided explosives and electronic detonator training. 31 ) (S//NF) SA-696 confirmed the IED plan, stating that he intended to make circuit boards at the safe house to be used with explosives for operations against US forces in Afghanistan. SA-696 purchased enough components to produce 30 detonators and had produced two test units by the time of the raids. 32 Electronic schematics, electrical components, and a voltmeter were recovered in the raids. 33 (S//NF) ET-1458 acknowledged GZ instructed ET-1458 and others to go to Pakistan for training in remote control detonators and subsequently to return to Afghanistan to train the Afghans. If they did not train the Afghans, then they were to build the devices and provide them for the Afghans to use. 34 (S//NF) Detainee was recruited by the JT in Aden and was involved with the JT while in Pakistan. Detainee admitted he traveled to the Raiwand headquarters of the JT in Lahore and studied there for approximately 4 to 5 months. 35 (S//NF) Analyst Note: Detainee uses a common al-qaida cover story linked to the JT to hide his assessed travels to Afghanistan where detainee probably received basic training, and fled to Pakistan during Operation Enduring Freedom. (S//NF) Affiliation with the JT has been identified as an al-qaida cover story and al-qaida is known to have used the JT to facilitate and fund the international 28 IIR , Analyst Note: Detainee probably informed YM-728 and the residents of the house in Faisalabad that they were moving to another house (Issa Safe House) at the recommendation of Shaykh Zafar Yasin. 29 IIR TD-314/ , TD-314/ , TD-314/ , TD-314/ , TD-314/ , TD-314/ SIR 17-JUN-2002, Analyst Note: AG-694 is listed with his MP Number 198, and the alias Shafeeq in the report. YM-696 reported on other individuals involved in the training in this report as well. 32 TD-314/ TD-314/ , FM40 01-SEP-2005, FM40 01-SEP-2005(b)[1] 34 IIR , FM40 27-JUL-2004, FM40 28-JUL SIR 07-JUL-2002, JUN-2002, JUN

9 travels of its members. 36 Detainee stated a JT member obtained the Pakistani visa for detainee. After traveling to Karachi, detainee was met by a member of the JT who took him to the Makki Mosque and, after an unspecified period, detainee traveled to the JT world headquarters in Raiwind, PK. 37 (S//NF) Analyst Note: While detainee claimed he received assistance from the JT, this assistance was either provided based on his expression to the JT that he intended to perform dawa (missionary work) for the JT, or more likely as part of the established al-qaida facilitation network between Yemen and Pakistan. It is unlikely that dedicated JT members would obtain detainee s travel visa for him in Yemen except in the furtherance of dawa activities. It is equally unlikely that the JT would allow him to stay at the Makki Mosque in Karachi. The Makki Mosque is the central/main JT Mosque in Karachi and numerous detainees have used the Makki Mosque as part of a JT cover story for travel to Pakistan. 38 (S//NF) Detainee has threatened JTF-GTMO personnel. (U//FOUO) Detainee called his interrogator a hypocrite and infidel, and related the reward for unbelievers is hell fire. When confronted about Jews and Christians being People of the Book, detainee countered with paradise is reserved only for Muslims. 39 (S//NF) Detainee made a gesture like he was cutting off his head with his hand and stated if the female member of the JTF-GTMO guard force acted like this, in an Arab country she would die. Detainee then laughed. 40 c. (S//NF) Detainee s Conduct: Detainee is assessed as a MEDIUM threat from a detention perspective. His overall behavior has been sporadically compliant and hostile to the guard force and staff. He currently has 33 Reports of Disciplinary Infraction listed in DIMS with the most recent occurring on 19 March 2008, when he failed to follow guard instructions. He has three Reports of Disciplinary Infraction for assault with the most recent occurring on 7 February 2008, when he committed an aggravated assault. Other incidents for which he has been disciplined include inciting and participating in mass disturbances, failure to follow guard instructions/camp rules, unauthorized communications, damage to 36 IIR , Jamaat Tabligh Provides Cover as of 28-DEC-2005, JITF-CT Special Analysis US Jamaat Tabligh JUN-2002, SEP-2002, JUN Analyst Note: For additional information on the JT and its links to al-qaida, see 28 Jamaat Tabligh Provides Cover as of 28-DEC-2005, IIR , IIR , and Abu Bakr University Analysis (JDIMS, References). Other detainees associated with the Makki Mosque include US9YM DP, US9BA DP (transferred), US9SA DP (transferred), US9YM DP, US9MO DP (transferred), US9SA DP (transferred), US9SA DP (transferred), US9JO DP (transferred), US9YM DP, US9YM DP, and US9YM DP the last three were captured with detainee FM40 23-MAR JDG INTREP dated 22-May

10 government property, assaults, provoking words and gestures, and possession of food and non-weapon type contraband. On 6 May 2006, detainee was caught in possession of an altered pen with a metal casing inside. He delivered it willingly to the guard force. In 2007, he had a total of four Reports of Disciplinary Infraction and two so far in (U) Detainee Intelligence Value Assessment: a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be of MEDIUM intelligence value. Detainee s most recent interrogation session occurred on 1 February b. (S//NF) Placement and Access: As an assessed member of JT, detainee is familiar with the JT organization, recruiting methods, facilitation, and members. As a resident of the Yemeni house where an al-qaida operative was planning attacks, detainee was in a position to know details of the plans, methods, training, and other individuals involved. Detainee served as a facilitator to another detainee who stayed at the safe house where government raids captured over a dozen terrorist suspects. c. (S//NF) Intelligence Assessment: Detainee is an assessed member of JT who traveled to Pakistan to support the organization s activities. Detainee probably has knowledge of al- Qaida plans and members who planned to conduct a bombing campaign against US and Coalition forces in Afghanistan. Detainee facilitated another assessed al-qaida member in staying at an al-qaida affiliated safe house in Faisalabad. Although detainee has been cooperative while in detention status, he has provided no information of intelligence value since his capture. d. (S//NF) Areas of Potential Exploitation: Recruitment of Islamic extremist in Yemen Safe houses in Pakistan Abu Zubaydah Safe House, activities and associates Issa Safe House, activities and associates Planned actions against US and Coalition forces IED and explosives training The JT and LT Associated and leadership, funding, operations JT mosque and religious studies facilitated International travel Al-Makki Mosque and Demaj Mosque Courses of study Support to al-qaida 10

11 s E c R E T //NOFORN I I o The Jamia Salafia University in Faisalabad o Curriculum, ideology, recruitment, safe house associations, and individuals o Ingress and egress routes, and timeline through Pakistan 9. (S) EC Status: Detainee's enemy combatant status was reassessed on 6 November 2004, and he remains an enemy combatant. t 4ru 7/"/(/4X MARK H. BUZB\ Rear Admiral, US Navy Commanding ' Definitions for intelligence terms used in the assessment can be found in the Joint Military Intelligence College October 2001 guide Intelligence l(arning Terminologt. 11 S E C RE T //NOFORN I I