JTF'GTMO Detainee Assessment

Transcription

1 S E C RE T / /NOFORN I I DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE " HEADAUARTERS, JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO u.s. uavlr-sranoh, GUANTANAMo BAY' cuba APO AE JTF-GTMO.CDR 22January 2007 MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southem Command' 3511 NW 9lst Avenue' Miami, FL33172 SUBJECT: Recommendation for continued Detention Under DoD Control (cd) for l. (S/NF) Personal Information: o JDIMSA{DRC Reference Name: o Aliases and Current/True Name: JTF'GTMO Detainee Assessment Bijad D al-atavi Bajad Dhayfallah a a a o Date of Birth: 23 August 1971 CitizenshiP: Saudi Arabia Internment Serial Number (ISN): US9SA-OOO122DP., 3. (U//FOUO) Health: Detainee is in (S/NF) JTF-GTMO Assessment: good health. a.(s)recommendation:jtf.gtmorecommendsthisdetaineeforcontinueddetention Under DoD control (cd). JTF_GTMO pr.uio*ry assessedetainee as continued Under DoD Control (CD) on24 October 2005' CLASSIFIED BY: MULTIPLE SOURCES nnlson, E.O , AS AMENDFD, SECTION 1.4(C) DECLASSIFY ON: S E C RE T // NOFORN I I

2 s E c RE T / / NOFORN I I SLIBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for b. (S/NF) Executive Summary: Detainee is assessed to be a member of al-qaida who fought in Usama Bin Laden's (UBL's) 55th Arab Brigade.r Detainee reportedly served as a sub-commander in the Brigade under Abd al-hadi al-iraqi. Detainee is also reported to be a weapons and explosives expert. Detainee was drawn to jihad through a fatwa issued by Shaykh al-aqla,'traveled on his own to Afghanistan (AF), and was captured with Anti- Coalition Movement (ACM) forces during themazar-e-sharif, AF, uprising. JTF-GTMO determined this detainee to be: o A HIGH risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies. o A MEDIUM threat from a detention perspective. o Of MEDIUM intelligence value. c. (S/ND Summary of Changes: There were no significant changes to detainee's assessment since the last JTF-GTMO recommendation. 4. (S//NF) Detainee's Account of Events: The following section is basedo unless otherwise indicated, on detainee's own account. These statements are included without consideration of veracity, accuracy, or reliability. a. (S/NF) Prior History: In approximately 1979, detainee's father died and detainee began working on the family farm in Sajer. Detainee completed 10 years of schooling. From 1988 until 1997, detainee worked as a guard with the Saudi National Security Force where detainee's3 duties included guarding govemment sponsored television, telecommunication, electric, and food processing facilities. Detainee did not receive any firearms training, but was armed with a Belgian rifle (NFI).4 From 1997 until 1999, detainee returned home to work on the family farm.' b. (S//NF) Recruitment and Travel: Detainee was inspired to fight jihad by listening to Shaykh Hamud a1-aqla.6 Detainee spoke to Shaykh Abdullah (I.IFD about what al-aqla had I Analyst Note: The former 55s Arab Brigade serv d as UBL's primary battle formation supporting Taliban gbjectives, with UBL participating closely in the command and control of the brigade. 'Analyst Note: Shaykh Hamud al-aqla is Shaykh Hamud Bin Uqla al-shuaibi who issued fatwas justifying the I I September 2001 attacks on the US and asking Muslims to defend their Taliban brethren. ' IIR o IIR o9o7 02 'IIR " IIR IIR a L S E C R E T // NOFORN I /

3 S E C RE T // NOFORN I I said. Shaykh Abdallah told detainee UBL was not a good Muslim and to avoid al-qaida.7 Detainee spoke to an Afghan by the name of Muhammad (NFI) who gave detainee - information about how to get to Afghanistan and where to stay.e On25 May 2000,'detainee traveled alone to lalalabad, AF, via Dubai, United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Peshawar, Pakistan (PK).to Once in Jalalabad, detainee was taken to the Jalalabad University where he stayed with Abdul Rahman (NFI), the brother of an individual (NFI) that detainee met while traveling from Peshawar to Jalalabad.rr Detainee remained at the University for approximately two days and then went to Kabul, AF, where detainee stayed in the Wazir Akbar Khan area at a Taliban guesthouse called Shirinaw House (NFD. Detainee stayed at the guesthouse for approximately one week before being taken to the frontlines.12 c. (S//NF) Training and Activities: Detainee received training on the AK-47 rifle and hand grenades for approximately two to three weeksl3 at a small unknown Taliban training camp in the Sharikar region, near the frontlines outside Kabul. Detainee never fought during his time on the frontlines. Al-Qaida attempted to recruit detainee, but detainee refused. Detainee traveled to a Taliban guesthouse for rest from the frontlines every two or three days. Detainee was on the frontlines from approximately late May or early June 2000 through late July or early August During one of the trips, detainee was injured in an automobile accident and taken to a hospital in Kabul. Detainee remained in the Kabul hospital for approximately one to one and one half months before, being transferred to a hospital in Lahore, PK, in approximately October In Lahore, detainee received additional surgery and physical therapy on his hand. Detainee remained in Lahore at a Taliban guesthouse G.IFI) until approximately February.2OO1.14 The Taliban paid for some of detainee's medical bills, and detainee paid the balance.'' After completing physical therapy, detainee returned to Kabul and remained in a guesthouse run by Abdul Muttalib (I.IFD until approximately mid-march Detainee then went to Karabagh, AF, and remained in a guesthouse run by an Afghan named Muhammad (I.IFD until approximately mid-april 200I. From Karabagh, ' AUG-2002 t IIR n to-3t , Analyst Note: Detainee is in paragraph F. Detainee did not state the exact date of deparhfe but he did allude to a departure in Mav 'o IIR , l7-i\4ar-2002 " IIR oi46 02, IIR ogot 02, sir l2-mar-2002 tt IIR i 02, sir I2-MAR-2002, IIR ,000t22302 I7-MAR-2002, Anatyst Note: Wazir Akbar Khan aka (Wazira Bhakhan). A variant of Shirinaw is Sharenow. '' MAR Analvst Note: A variant of Sharikar is Shirikar. 'n IIR , ti-mar-2002 " IIR ogot 02 3 S E C R E T // NOFORN I I

4 s E c RE T / / NOFORN I I detainee traveled to and fought in the Khwaja Ghar region of Afghanistan until approximately mid-october Detainee was in a bunker led by Abu Turab al-najdi (S/NF) Capture Information: a. (S/A{F) While in the Iftwaja.9har region, detainee was told the Taliban reached an agreement with General Dostum.' ' Detainee traveled to Mazar-e-Sharif in a convoy where he was detained on approximately 23 November 2001 by Northern Alliance (NA) forces and taken to the Qala-I-Jangi Prison.18 Detainee was transferred to Kandahar Detention Facility on29 December 2001 and placed in US custody.le (Analyst note: Over 70 JTF-GTMO detainee surrendered to General Dostum's troops in late November Dostum's forces took the prisoners to the Qala-I-Jangi prison located outside Mazar-e-Sharifi AF, on24 November After one night in captivity, the prisoners revolted leading to the deaths of NA forces and CIA operative Johnny "Mike" Spann.2o Detainee and other JTF-GTMO detainees, who survived the revolt, withdrew to a basement in the compound until they were recaptured, approximately one week later.21 b. (S) Property Held: o 1,000 Kandahari (NFD not held at JTF-GTMO22 c. (S) Transferred to JTF-GTMO: 20 Janrnry 2002 d. (S/NF) Reasons for Transfer to JTF-GTMO: To provide information on the following: o Taliban organization, leadership, equipment and procedures o Taliban training camp in the vicinity of Taloqan, AF23 tu IIR , Analyst Note: A variant of Abdul Muttalib is Abdul Mutalib. A variant of Khwaja Ghar is Khvajeh Ghar. Abu Turab al-najdi was the emir of MarkezBlla a section of the Khwaja Ghar front line. A v_ariant of al-najdi is al-nejdi. " IIR , Analyst Note: General Doshim was Commander of the Northern Alliance. '8 IIR ogot oz, rrn a ozq olqe oz tn INITIAL screening 29 -DEC Various ISNs OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM - Part 3 - November 2001, Analyst Note: Multiple detainees discussed the uprising that occurred at the Qala-I-Jangi Prison. 2r Deception at Qala-I-Jangi Prison - USSOC - May 2005 "' INITIAL SCREENING 29-DEC-2001, Analyst Note: The 1,000 Kandahari is probably 1,000 Afghani. 23 Analyst Note: A variant of Taloqan is Talqan. 4 S E C RE T / / NOFORN I I

5 s E c R E T / / NOFORN I I (S//NF) Evaluation of Detaineeos Account: Detainee omitted details and associations that would strengthen detainee's ties to al-qaida and the 55'h Arab Brigade. While detainee admits to receiving basic weapons training, detainee has omitted any references to specialized training he possibly received. Detainee was reported to be an al-qaida explosives and weapons expert who received extensive training. These omissions are probably an effort to portray himself as a mere jihadist. 7. (S//NF) Detainee Threat: a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be a HIGH risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies. b. (S//NF) Reasons for Continued Detention: Detainee is assessed to be a member of al- Qaida and a sub-commander in llbl's 55th Arab Brigade. Detainee's name was found on an al-qaida associated document recovered during September 2002 raids in Karachi, PK, as well as other al-qaida documents. Detainee was eighteenth on a listing of high priority detainees presented to JTF-GTMO during the 2002 Saudi Delegation visit. o (S//IIF) Detainee is assessed to be a sub-commander in UBL's 55th Arab Brigade, and explosives expert. o (S) Ali Abdul Motalib Awayd Hassan al-tayeea, ISN US9IZ-0001I DP (IZ- 111), reported on an individual named Abjad Dhaif Allah aka (Abu Umar) assessed to be detainee. Abu Umar was an al-qaida explosives and weapons expert who received extensive training. IZ-II1 further stated this individual was a mid-level commander, well known to al-qaida fighters, and fought on the Kabul and Khwaja Ghar fronts. (Analyst Note: It is assessedetainee, due to the similarities in name, age and alias, is this individual.)24 o (S/A{F) IZ-n 1, photo-identified detainee as Abu Omar al-nejdi, but stated detainee's real name is Bujaad Daif Allah (a variant of detainee's name). IZ-III stated detainee was on the North Line for a lons time and was Abu Tarub's subcommander in the Bilal Group,25 of the Arab Biiga de. lz-i11 stated detainee knew to IIR , Analyst Note: Detainee's Saudi Arabian home telephone number is given as In IIR , detainee gave his father's telephone number in Saudi Arabia as 0l This is only one digit off and may be a typographical error in one of the reports possibly further associating detainee to the person lz-lll identified. " MFR 22-Jvn-2002, Analyst Note: The Bilal Group was a sub-element of the former 55s Arab Brigade. A variant of Omar is Umar. \ S E C RE T // NOFORN I I

6 s E c R E T // NOFORN I I Abd al-hadi al-iraqi26 very well because detainee always went to al-iraqi's office. IZ-I 1 saw detainee twice with al-iraqi and also saw detainee with information needed on the North Line. IZ-I11 believes detainee was a very important person. (Analyst Note: Detainee claimed to have been in a bunker on the frontlines for six months with an individual by the name of Abu Turab who was the bunker leader.)27 o (S/AIF) Muhammad Ahmad Said al-adahi, ISNUS9YM DP (YM-033), also photo-identified detainee as Abu Omar al-najdi, a sub-commander to Abu Turab.28 o (S/A{F) Abd al-rahman Maadha Dhafir al-hilala al-umari, ISN US9SA DP (SA-199), identified detainee as Abu Omar who was at the Rabei position in Kabul.2e o (S/A{F) John Walker Lindh, who was convicted of supplying services to the Taliban, thought the detainee depicted in a photograph shown to him was Abu ljmar, a Saudi from Najd, SA. Lindh said Abu Umar had been in Afghanistan for a long time, "maybe even in the 80s, fighting against the USSR." Lindh recalled seeing detainee on the back lines near Takhar, AF, and Kunduz, AF, after the retreat (I.IFD. Lindh thought detainee had been killed. (Analyst Note: If detainee is the individual identified by Lindh, detainee has withheld details of his background history.)3o o (S/A{F) Said Ibrahim Ramzi al-zahrani,isn US9SA (SA-204), identified detainee as Abu Omar who fought on the frontlines. SA-204 believed detainee was wounded in a castle nearmazar-e-sharif.'' (Analyst Note: The castle is assessed to be Qala-I-Jangi prison.) o (S/A{F) Variations of detainee's name and aliases have been recovered in al-qaida associatedocuments. o (S/A{F) Analysis of floppy disks associated with Karachi, PK, raids against A1- Qaida safe houses on September 2002, revealed an Arabic-language document titled "Passports.doc." A variant of detainee's name, Bajad Dhayf Ullah al-uotaibi, with a variant of one of detainee's aliases, Umar al-najdi, was found on this list. Detainee's name was associated with a safety-deposit box which contained a 26 Analyst Note: Abdul al-hadi al-iraqi had primary operational command of the former 55s Arab Brigade, serving as UBL's military commander in the held. See TD:314/ and IIR Abdul al-hadi al-iraqi is on the USCENTCOM High Value Individuals (HVI) List in paragraph 3.A.1 with the High Value Identification (HVID) Number RTAAOO14. See CENTCOM High Value Individuals (HVI) - 22-MAR ' ' IIR , IIR , 0001 tl IuN-2002 '* SIR 22-Jun-2002 'n IIR , Analyst Note: Detainee is paragraph 114. 'o 11rrxn4; JoHN walker- 302 l2-sep-2002 " FEB Analvst Note: Detainee is number 22 onlist. o S E C R E T // NOFORN I /

7 S E C RE T / / NOFORN I I SIIBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for passport".32 (Analyst Note: Such lists are indicative of an individual's residence within al-qaida, Taliban, and other extremist guesthouses, often for the purpose of training or coordination prior to travel to the front lines or abroad. Trust accounts, also referred to as safety boxes or safety deposit boxes, were simply storage compartments such as envelopes or folders that guesthouse administrators used to secure the individual's personal valuables, such as passports and plane tickets. These items were entrusted to the guesthouse until completion of training or other activity. Detainee claimed at no time did he turn his passport over to anyone. It is not clear if this was the passport Saudi authorities reported being misused below.)" o (S/AIF) An entry containing two aliases of detainee, Begad Deifullah Alqeibi and Omar al-najdi, were found in a document listing 324 entries containing Arabic names, aliases, and nationalities, recovered from raids on safe houses associated with suspected al-qaida in Karachi. Begad Deifullah Aalqeibi and Omar al-najdi were associated with the statement "has possession of a Saudi passport and ATM card."34 o (U/FOUO) Variations of one of detainee's aliases, Abu Omar El Najdi and Omar El Najdi, are located in a translated al-qaida document titled "The Military Committee Programs".3s o (S/A{F) Prior to the Saudi delegation visit in 2002, the Saudi Ministry of Interior General Directorate of Investigations (Mabahith) provided information on37 detainees whom they designated as being high priority. Detainee was eighteenth on the 1ist.36 o (S/A{F) Mabahith noted detainee was on the Saudi govemment's "watch and arrest" list due to information they received reporting detainee's death inmazar-e- Sharif and the possibility of someone else using detainee's passport.3t G.IFD o (S/A{F) According to Mabahith, detainee left Saudi Arabia on 25 May 2000 and traveled to the United Arab Emirates. Mabahith has no record of detainee retuming.3s o (S/A{F) After the Saudi delegation visit, detainee was assessed by Mabahith as one of the 77 Saudi nationals of low intellisence or law enforcement value to the US '" TD , Analyst Note: Detainee is listed as paragraph 41. " IIR ,TD to TD4lql406g3-02, Analyst Note: Detainee is in paragraph 39 on the list with a trust account number of " ". This is the reverse number of as listed intd " Various ISNs AFGP l-JAN-200?r Analyst Note: Variants of Omar al-nejdi are Abu Omar El Najdi and Omar El Najdi. Abu Omar El Najdi is listed on page three of the translated document. Page eight of the translated document lists Omar El Najdi as from Jazirah (Saudi Arabia), arriving onl0l5ll42l Hijri (which converts to I I August 2000 on the Gregorian calendar), college educated, and recommended by Abu al-hassan (NFI). While this is a variant of one of detainee's alias, detainee has not admitted attending a college. Omar El Najdi appears a_gain on page 43 of the translated document. '" TD , Analyst Note: Detainee is listed in paragraph F. '' TD " tn4t4l2l / s E c R E T // NOFORN I I

8 S E C R E T // NOFORN I I Government, but of whom the Saudi Government would attempt to prosecute if transferred to their custody from JTF-GTMO.3e (Analyst Note: It is unknown if the Saudi Govemment still intends to prosecute or further detain detainee.) o (S/A{F) In the initial weeks of detainee's detention at Camp X-ray, detainee emerged as one of the leaders on the cellblock.ao c. (U//FOUO) Detainee's Conduct: Detainee is assessed to be a MEDIUM threat from a detention perspective. Detainee's overall behavior has been non-compliant and hostile toward the guard force and staff. Detainee currently has 55 Reports of Disciplinary Infraction listed in DIMS, the most recent occurring on27 November 2006, when detainee failed to follow guard instructions to surrender a cup full of liquid, believed to be oil. Other incidents for which the detainee has been disciplined include attempted assault, assault, provoking words or gestures, threatening guards, failure to follow guard instructions and camp rules, damage to government property, and possession of food and non-weapon type contraband. Detainee has a total of 11 Reports of Disciplinary Infraction for assault with the most recent occurring on I April 2005, when detainee threw rocks at a guard. In 2006 detainee hadt Reports of Disciplinary Infraction. 8. (S/NF) Detainee Intelligence Value Assessment: a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be of MEDIUM intelligence value. Detainee's most recent interrogation session occurred on 15 September b. (S/NF) Placement and Access: While fighting on the frontlines, detainee possibly acted in leadership positions of a former 55th Arab Brigade sub-unit. Detainee resided in several Taliban guesthouses. Detainee's name was discovered on multiple lists associated with al-qaida safe houses. c. (S/NF) Intelligence Assessment: Detainee's reported role as an assistant commander in the former 55tn Arab Brigade requires further corroboration. Detainee's full timeline, training, and background have yet to be discemed. Detainee has information about IIBL's former 55'n Arab Brigade operations, leadership, weaponry, and wartime tactics. Detainee has biographical information on persons detainee met while in guesthouses, training, the frontlines, and in Mazar-e-Sharif. Other detainees at JTF-GTMO have identified detainee as holding a leadership role in Afghanistan. Additional information is required to develop a more complete understanding of detainee's role in al-qaida. 'n TD-314/30789-O2,Analyst Note: Detainee is in paragraph 16 on list. oo TD ,Analyst Note: Detainee is the first nime listed under paragraph C. 8 S E C R E T / / NOFORN I I

9 S E C R E T // NOFORN I I JTF.GTMO-CDR SIIBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for d. (S//NF) Areas of Potential Exploitation: o Taliban and al-qaida personalities o Guesthouses o Former 55th Arab Brigade o Qala-I-Jangiuprising 9. (S) EC Status: Detainee's enemy combatant status was reassessed on 13 August 2004, and he remains an enemy combatant. HARRY B. H Rear Admiral Commandi S, JR. Navy ' Definitions for intelligence terns used in the assessment can be found in the Joint Military Intelligence College October 2001 guide Intelligence l(arning Terminologt. 9 S E C RE T // NOFORN I /