THE CONFLICT TRAP PSC/IR 265: CIVIL WAR AND INTERNATIONAL SYSTEMS WILLIAM SPANIEL WJSPANIEL.WORDPRESS.COM/PSCIR-265

Transcription

1 THE CONFLICT TRAP PSC/IR 265: CIVIL WAR AND INTERNATIONAL SYSTEMS WILLIAM SPANIEL WJSPANIEL.WORDPRESS.COM/PSCIR-265

2 Overview 1. Leftovers 2. The Conflict Trap 3. Breaking the Conflict Trap

3 Overview 1. Leftovers 2. The Conflict Trap 3. Breaking the Conflict Trap

4

5

6

7

8

9

10 War in the Crimea? Clear that Russia wants some of Ukraine for some reason. Where will West/Kiev draw the line? Taking more risks conflict. But will also pay more if it does not.

11

12

13 Overview 1. Leftovers 2. The Conflict Trap 3. Breaking the Conflict Trap

14 Background Lots of attention on interstate conflict. Not much on intrastate conflict. World Bank: We care about development maybe we should care about civil war?

15 The Result Breaking the Conflict Trap 1669 citations on Google Scholar Fearon 1995: 2039 citations

16 Main Idea Civil war is development in reverse Stops production in useful industries Ramps up production in war making Way, way worse than the costs of war make it seem

17 Costs of War Military expenditures as a percentage of GDP during peacetimes: 2.8% Military expenditures as a percentage of GDP during peacetimes: 5.0% Stats are for developing countries only.

18 Costs of War Expenditures do not immediately return to peacetime levels following conflict.

19 Costs of War Major targets for military operations are: Telecommunications Roads/Bridges Airports Ports Basically, anything you need for an effective economy.

20 Humanitarian Problems Public health? What public health? Food, water harder to obtain. Mortality rates spike.

21 Investment Problems Discount factors plummet. Less incentive to invest. Less investment => smaller GDP growth

22 Money Vacuum Lawlessness increases. Less incentive to keep money at home. Safer option: invest money abroad.

23 Money Vacuum Before war: 9% of money invested abroad During war: 20% of money invested abroad Persists after war ends

24

25 It is bad. PTSD

26 Culture of Violence Individuals growing up in war-torn countries adopt more aggressive behaviors. Could we use a sport with a lot of foreign athletes and measurements of violence to check this?

27

28 Culture of Violence Effect does not exist for players who grew up in countries that had just finished a civil war.

29 TL;DR War really kills your economy for the long term. 2.2% decline in GDP

30 War Bad Economy

31 War Bad Economy

32 War Bad Economy

33 Opportunity Cost Fighting entails risks. If things are really bad for you, they can t get much worse.

34 Overview 1. Leftovers 2. The Conflict Trap 3. Breaking the Conflict Trap

35 Stuck in the Trap Given the cyclical nature of the trap, it is difficult to break. World Bank therefore has recommendations on how external actors can help.

36 Intervention Send in peacekeepers. Stop war. Increase economic outcomes by reducing war s inefficiency.

37 Intervention Mechanisms Peacekeepers can do many things. Today: standing in the way.

38 Intervention Mechanisms Peacekeepers can do many things. Today: standing in the way.

39 NO MORE TALKING

40 The Game You are playing against everyone else in the room. You have two choices: attack or not attack.

41 The Game If neither person attacks, you both receive $2. If both attack, you both receive $1. (War is costly.) If one attacks and the other does not, the attacker receive $3 and the other receives $0.

42 MAKE YOUR MOVE.

43 The Game If neither person attacks, you both receive $2. If both attack, you both receive $1. (War is costly.) If one attacks and the other does not, the attacker receive $1.50 and the other receives $0.

44 PASS THEM UP.

45 WHY DID YOU PICK WHAT YOU PICKED?

46 Suppose Opponent Attacks If neither person attacks, you both receive $2. If both attack, you both receive $1. (War is costly.) If one attacks and the other does not, the attacker receive $3 and the other receives $0.

47 Suppose Opponent Defends If neither person attacks, you both receive $2. If both attack, you both receive $1. (War is costly.) If one attacks and the other does not, the attacker receive $3 and the other receives $0.

48 Result Regardless of opponent s choice, you are better off attacking. Both attack, both receive $1. Mutually worse than both not attacking and both receiving $2.

49 Suppose Opponent Attacks If neither person attacks, you both receive $2. If both attack, you both receive $1. (War is costly.) If one attacks and the other does not, the attacker receive $1.50 and the other receives $0.

50 Suppose Opponent Defends If neither person attacks, you both receive $2. If both attack, you both receive $1. (War is costly.) If one attacks and the other does not, the attacker receive $1.50 and the other receives $0.

51 Result It s a guessing game. You want to attack if the other guy attacks. You want to defend if the other guy defends. Your choice depends on what you think others will do.

52 The Key Difference Attacking a defending opponent was worth $3 originally but only $1.50 the second time. Peace is therefore sustainable if you can make first strikes less appealing.

53 Making the Difference Peacekeepers often stand in between warring parties (literally). Why? Institutions often seek to pinpoint who instigated conflict. Why?

54 Intervention Problems Intervention might not be easy. When to intervene? Will you be welcomed?

55 Remove Funding Two major sources of rebel financing: 1. Natural resources 2. Drugs

56

57 Didn t win best actor Oscar here either.

58

59 Remove Funding Drug trade is profitable for war campaigns because of black market rents. Without it, war zones would have to compete with domestic producers.

60 Aid Just throw money at the situation. This is the common response. But community is capricious.