JTF GTMO Detainee Assessment

Transcription

1 S E C R E T //NOFORN I / 2O3IO2I7 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA APO AE February 2006 MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southem Command, 3511 NW 9lst Avenue, Miami, FL (S/NF) Personal Information: JTF GTMO Detainee Assessment o JDIMSAIDRC Reference Name: Hussim Al Wassim o Aliases and CurrenVTrue Name: Hussein Al Wassim. Wasm Awad Al Omar. Wasm Awwad Umar Al Wasm o Place of Birth: Al Jawf. Saudi Arabia (SA) o Date of Birth: 18 November 1963 o Citizenship: Saudi Arabia o Intemment Serial Number (ISN): US9SA DP 2. (FOUO) Health: Detainee is in good health. He has a history of latent TB with a normal chest x-ray but refused therapy. He has a history of noncompliance.with medications. He has a history of dental cavities and was evaluated and treated by dentist. He has a history of tinea cruris. He has a history of CMA and given prescription glasses by optometrist. He has a history of hemorrhoids. He has history of intermittent episodes of musculoskeletal pain involving the lower back. He has a history of vemrca shaft of penis s/p cryotherapy with liquid nitrogen. He has a history of allergic rhinitis. He has a history of ingrown toenail of the left greater toe but refused therapy. He has a history of scar noted on the left upper arm and lateral thigh. He has a history of scar noted on right tympanic membrane suggestive of healed perforation. He has a history of bilateral pterygium. He went on a hunger strike in September He has a history of acute sinusitis in May He has history of constipation. He has history of GERD and helicobacter pylori and treated in January He has a history of hematochezia slp EGD & colonoscopy which revealed mild nonspecific gastropathy and hemorrhoids in June He CLASSIFIED BY: MULTIPLE SOURCES REASON: E.O SECTION l.s(c) DECLASSIFY ON: S E C R E T // NOFORN / I 2O3IO2I7

2 S E C R E T /i NOFORN I I 2O3IO2I7 has history of anal fissures (>7 yrs) s/p fistulectomy in December He is not taking any routine meds. He has no known drue allereies. 3. (S//NF) JTF GTMO Assessment: a. (S) Recommendation: Based upon information obtained since detainee's previous assessment, JTF GTMO now recommends this detainee for Transfer Out of DoD Control (TRO). JTF GTMO previously assessed detainee as Retain in DoD Control (DoD) on22 October b. (S//NF) Executive Summary: Detainee is assessed to be a probable member of Al- Qaida. Detainee associated and traveled on behalf of the Al Haramayn IlCTtiered nongovemmental orgarization Q.{GO;.r Detainee traveled with assessed Al-Qaida members along an established Al-Qaida transit route. It is assessed this detainee is a MEDIUM risk, as he may pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies. JTF GTMO determined this detainee is of LOW intelligence value. 4. (S//NF) Detainee's Account of Events: The following section is based, unless otherwise indicated, on detainee's own account. These statements are included without consideration of veracity, accuracy, or reliability. a. (S//NF) Prior History: After graduating from the Institute for Teaching in Al Jawf, a technical school, detainee taught at Al Suware Elementary School for approximately three years ( ). Detainee received a diploma in art in late 1989 or early 1990 from the College for Teaching in Al Jawf. Afterwards, detainee taught at an elementary school for approximately three and one-half years until late 1993 or early Detainee then transferred to Sheikh Faisal Elementary School.2 Detainee claimed that he was never ordered to serve in the military, and was never trained on any weapons or explosive devices.l Detainee donated money to the Al Haramayn to support two orphans in Bangladesh.a Two of detainee's older brothers, Ahmed and Umar, studied in the US in the 1980's and worked for t Al Haramayn 0l , Al Haramayn Al Haramayn is a Tier 1 Counterterrorism NGO Target. Tier 1 NGOs have demonstrated sustained and active support for terrorist organizations willing to attack US persons or interests. Al Haramayn (variant Haramain) akaharamayn International Foundation (Mu'assasat al-haramayn al- I(hayriyya). 2 Analyst Note: Detainee reported that his supervisor was Khaled Al Sultan and that he has been employed there for the past seven years. NFI on Al Sultan. FBI May-2002 ' FM usgsa dp; FM us9sa dp o FM4o 2oo5o5l6 - usgsa-ooo338dp 2 S E C R E T //NOFORN I I 2O3IO2I7

3 S E C R E T // NOFORN I I 2O3IO2I7 the Texaco petroleum company in Kuwait. One of his nephews was attending an unidentified university in the US at the time of detainee's capture.) c. (S/NF) Training and Activities: After waiting at the Iran/Afghanistan border for two days, the group entered Afghanistan on 30 September 2001 near Tayyebat, IR, where they spent two days distributing alms (charity).'2 However, before entering Afghanistan, detainee asked the border guards whether the border would remain open or not. He was told that the border was open and would remain open.tt Detainee hired an individual named Abdul Hafiz or Hamid who spoke "Afghani" and Arabic to help him provide money to the refugees.la 3A-226Ieft detainee and SA-3 44 at an unknown location within Afghanistan. When detainee and SA-344 attempted to cross back into Iran on 3 October 2001, they were denied entry.r5 A group of smugglers offered to assist detainee in getting across the border, but he refused their help, citing that he believed this to be illegal. During the month spent waiting to re-enter Iran, detainee stayed at a hotel next to the customs building in Afghanistan. At b. (S/NF) Recruitment and Travel: After leaming from the media that refugees from Afghanistan would possibly travel to Iran, detainee decided to travel to Iran to assist them.o Detainee heard about a trip to Afghanistan from Anwar Hamdan Muhammed Al Nur, ISN US9SA DP (3A-226), who was already planning to go when detainee agreed to accompany him.' Detainee went to work as normal and then left the country for Iran after his classes *"r. ouer.8 Detainee left Sakak, Al Jawi SA with Rasheed Kaid, ISN US9SA DP (SA-344), and 5,4'-226 to disfiibute aid to the poor and refugees in Afghanistan.e Their intent was to go to Afghanistan for a few days for humanitarian reasons and then return to Saudi Arabia and their homes and work.10 The three departed Saudi Arabia after 11 September 2001, traveling to Meshhad, Iran (IR) via Jordan and Damascus, Syria (SY), eventually arriving on the border with Afghanistan.ll ' MFR 08-Aug Analyst Note: All phone numbers associated to detainee have been checked. o TD Analyst Note: Detainee stated he never planned to enter Afghanistan, but has also offered that he originally intended to travel to Afghanistan. t FM+o 2oo5o5l6 - usgsa-ooo338dp t Fgt-3oz ooo338 o9-jun-2003 n FM4o 2oo5o5l6 - usgsa-ooo338dp 'o FM4o 2ooso62i - usgsa-ooo338dp " MFR 08-Aug-2002,FBl May-2002, FBI May-2002, FBI Jun-2003 " MFR 08-Aug-2002, FBt May-2002 " FBI May-2002 Analyst Note: Fearing a mass influx of refugees, Iran officially closed its border to individuals from Afghanistan on I 5 September 2001, two weeks before detainee questioned the guard. Iran deployed additional personnel in a partially successful attempt to prevent unauthorized entry. to FBI l0-may-2002,td Analyst Note: NFI on translator. The "Afghani" language was probably Pashto or Farsi. '' MFR 08-Aug S E C R E T // NOFORN I / 2O3IO2I7

4 S E C R E T // NOFORN I I 2O3IO2I7 one point, the customs officials told him to go cross farther south in Nimruz province, AF, because the border was still open in that area. Detainee refused, saying that he wanted to cross from his current location.l6 5. (S/NF) Gapture Information: a. (S/A[F) Detainee claimed that he and SA-344 decided that their only way out of Afghanistan was through Pakistan due to their inability to re-enter Iran.'' Detainee claimed that he and SA-344 took a two-day taxi trip across Afghanistan, presented valid Saudi Arabian passports to unidentified Pakistan authorities, and were summarily arrested without I 8 explanation. Reporting indicates detainee was arrested 15 December 2001 for charges of trespassing on the Pakistan/Afghanistan border, then transferred to the Pakistani Federal Investigation Agency. Detainee claimed that he and SA-344 spent two months in a Pakistani prison, after which they were transferred to US custody and held in a jail in Kandahar, where they spent four months.te Detainee commented that he was also held in Bagram (Bagram Detention Center), AF.20 b. (S) Property Held: Detainee' screening report stated that his documents included a passport "l,000 Saudi riyals, and $100 USD.2I However, these items are not held at JTF GTMO." c. (S) Transferred to JTF GTMO: 3 May 2002 d. (S/NF) Reasons for Transfer to JTF GTMO: To provide information on the Al Haramayn NGO. 6. (S//NF) Evaluation Of Detainee's Account: Detainee's cover story is assessed false, as are the details of his intentions and activities in Afghanistan. Detainee employed a known extremist cover story of humanitarian assistance to explain his travels to Afghanistan. However, his story contains contradictions with his own statements as well as those of his acknowledged travel companions. It lacks pertinent details, which precludes accurate evaluation of threat and intelligence value. His timeline does not account for a gap of time between early November 'u FBI Mav SIR l9-may-2002 " FM USgsA Dp, FBr t0-may FBI May-2002 tt MFR 08-Aug Analyst Note: Detainee conversely stated he traveled alone. FM 'n FBI May-2002;TD Analyst Note: Reporting indicates detainee and SA-344 were both captured near Chaman, PK on I 5 December 200 I. The location of capture suggests that detainee passed through Kandahar on his way to Pakistan. 'o oooj:g MFR o8-aus-2ooi tt Initial Screeiing 08-Jan-2002 " ltt , c-ds S E C R E T //NOFORN / I 2O3IO2I7

5 S E C R E T //NOFORN I / 2O3IO2I and his reported capture in mid-december of that year. Detainee's employment data prior to travel is also questionable. While detainee claimed to be an art teacher, when asked to identify an artist detainee appreciated, and an artist from the Near East or Arab world, the detainee was unable to do so. Although he stated Al Haramayn provided him with periodic updates, he could not identify the orphans he claimed to have supported through the NGO. 7. (S//NF) Detainee Threat: a. (S) Assessment: It is assessed the detainee poses a MEDIUM risk, as he may pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies. b. (S//NF) Reasons for Continued Detention: Detainee is assessed to be a probable member of the Al-Qaida global terrorism network who traveled to Afghanistan for the pu{pose ofjihad. Detainee's colleagues are associated with terrorist activities or organizations. Detainee's association with a tiered NGO and Al-Qaida members and an unsubstantiated and unconvincing cover story illustrate his extremist ties. o (S/AIF) Detainee admittedly associated with individuals linked to terrorist organizations." o (S/AIF) Detainee stated that Hamdan Al Wadi, the director for Al Haramayn, is a colleague of his and a teacher in Riyadh, SA. Al Wadi is also the Imam of a mosque, Al Mujir Mosque, in Sakak Al Jawf. Detainee then claimed to have never met Al Wadi prior to his trip to Iran.2a ' (S/AIF) Detainee acknowledged support to the Al Haramayn NGO.25 (Analyst Note: While it is possible detainee did have affiliations with the NGO, this aspect ofhis cover story is not supported through detail and is assessed as false. Detainee's actual associations with the NGO are unknown, but may include funding or other assistance for his travels. Travel to Afghanistan for humanitarian purposes is a cover story used by extremists to provide non-incriminating justification for their presence in Afghanistan, especially in the post 11 September 2001 period in which detainee traveled. Humanitarian NGOs have likewise assisted extremists in conducting their travels in support ofjihad abroad.) ' (S/AIF) Detainee claimed that although he was not an employee, he traveled to Afghanistan on behalf of Al Haram ayn.26 Detainee reported he heard that a large number of refugees leaving Afghanistan for Iran before the war began, and he wanted to provide aid to the refugees prior to Ramadan.2T " FM US9SA DP 'o ooo338 MRF o8-aus-2002 " ooo338 MFR o8-au; u SIR 09-Jun-i003, FM US9SA Dp, FBI Jun-2004, FBI May-2002 '' FBI May S E C R E T // NOFORN / I 2O3IO2I7

6 S E C R E T //NOFORN / I 2O3IO2I7 o (S/A{F) Detainee's reported traveling companions, SA-344 and 3A-226, were high-priority targets for a Saudi interrogation team in summer 2002, while detainee was considered low value.'o. (S/A{F) 3A-226 reported that he, detainee, and SA-344 departed Saudi Arabia with the intent of traveling to Khowst, AF to carry out charity work in conjunction with a Saudi charity named Al Ighatha Al Khairia.2e lanalyst Note: This is possibly the Islamic World Aid NGO aka International Islamic Relief Organizatron (IIRO) aka Hay-at al-igathat al-islamiyya al-alamiyah aka Igatha aka Igasa aka Islamic World Relief Organization, which is also a Tier I terrorist NGO. 3,{-226's stated destination of Khowst contradicts detainee's claimed intention to assist refugees fleeing to Iran.) t (S/AIF) 3A-226 has a history of involvement with suspect NGOs, and his name was found on documents recovered from raids on several Al-Qaida associated safe houses.'o Abd Al AzizAbd Al Rahman, ISN US9SA DP (5,4.-264), stated 3A-226 engaged in relief missions for the Al- Qaida associated Wafa Humanitarian Organization in Afghanistan.3t 3A-226 aiso reportedly volunteered to work with relief organizations in Kosovo.32. (S/AIF) SA-344 was reportedly placed on the Saudi Arabia watch and arrest list on 29 October 2001 due to his travel to Afghanistan and the Saudi government's suspicion of his involvement in terrorist activities.33 o (S/A{F) Detainee illegally crossed into Pakistan after spending a month in Afshanistan.3a o (S) Detainee made more than twenty trips outside of Saudi Arabia between April 2000 and September 2001 to Jordan and Kuwait. There are also entry and exit stamps for Iran on 2 October and 3 October 2001, respectively, several days later than his stated timeline.3s Further exploitation is required to obtain the circumstances " ro 3 14 t2i , TD-3 4 I 30i n TD-314n , TD314t , 314t ,TD314t , IIR , TD-314/ o ro4v , TD , TD-3 l4l , and rd tt TD Al Wafa is an IICT Tier 2 terrorist non-governmental organization (NGO). A Tier 2 terrorist NGO is defined as having demonstrated the intent and willingness to supporterrorist organizations willing to attack US persons or interests. " TD " TD-3 r4r2754r-02 'o FBI Jun-2003, FM US9SA DP, C-D (a Consumer IIR evaluation of IIR ) Analyst Note: Detainee stated he did not have a choice about whether or not to go through the Pakistani border because it was the closest to his location. Detainee advised that he went through the Pakistani border in order to get home as soon as possible, but did not have a plan ofaction for after he entered Pakistan. " IIR , C-D (a Consumer IIR evaluation of IIR ) Analyst Note: The CIA's OTS assessed the passport as fraudulent based on travel cachets predating the issuance ofthe passport. However, there are several typographic errors and numerous errors in hijri to Gregorian conversion on the IIR that were not 6 S E C R E T //NOFORN I / 2O3IO2I7

7 S E C R E T // NOFORN I I 2O3IO2I7 pertaining to this extensive travel and discrepancies in his itinerary.36 (Analyst Note: There is an Al-Qaida/extremist presence in Jordan and Kuwait.) c. (FOUO) Detainee's Conduct: Detainee is assessed as a LOW threat from a detention perspective. Detainee's overall behavior has been compliant and non-aggressive with the guard force and staff. Detainee currently has 5 reports of disciplinary infractions with the last occurring on 6 June 2005 when he threatened another detainee. Other incidents for which he has been disciplined include failure to comply, failure to return property, and failure to follow camp rules. In 2005 he has on record one disciplinary infraction. Detainee's last assaultowards a guard was on 30 September 2002, when he threw water on a guard (he was not given a disciplinary infraction). However, as recently as 5 January 2006, the detainee was noted verbally harassing medical personnel with derogatory comments and there were occasional instances of harassment. On 11 May 2004, detainee participated with his bay in singing a song in a hushed tone; guards reported a chorus that sounded like, "LaLa LaLaLa Taliban!" When guards came near the detainees, they quickly stopped singing and began talking as normal. The detainee has spent much of his time living in Camp 4. Medical personnel noticed a correlated sense of entitlement in the detainee when he was in the detention hospital in December Medical personnel quoted the detainee as complaining that he needed better treatment because he "is Camp 4." On 29 January 2004, a guard noted that detainee seemed to have influence over other detainees and that he "asserted himself in a manner that made me feel as if he is used to being in charge and having others do as he says, when he says it." The detainee has sporadic notes of failure to comply (for instance, only 5 such behavior notes in 2005). addressed in the OTS evaluation product. Only the Gregorian passport date of issue is provided on the IIR. The OTS analysts apparently based their assessment on the IIR rather than examination of the original passport, and did not confirm proper conversion of hijri dates. Moreover, the originator of IIR mistook a Persian calendar date for a hijri calendar date, resulting in incorrect Gregorian dates for entry and exit oflran on the IIR. The current disposition of the passport is unknown. Due to the numerous reporting errors, JTF GTMO cannot accurately assess the passport as either valid or fraudulent. 36 Analyst Note: Reporting does not indicate either an enffy or exit stamp from Syria, and the latest cachets from Jordan were dated in August of SA-344 specifically mentioned stopping at a Jordanian immigration office during their travels to get his passport stamped, and records indicate that it was. See IIR and IIR Detainee did note that he had family in Kuwait and once took a holiday in Jordan, which may account for the stamps from Kuwait and Jordan. See FM US9SA DP and IIR S E C R E T // NOFORN / I 2O3IO2I7

8 S E C R E T // NOFORN / I 2O3IO2I7 8. (S//NF) Detainee Intelligence Value Assessment: a. (S) Assessment: JTF GTMO determined this detainee is of LOW intelligence value. Detainee's most recent interrogation session occurred on 6 February b. (S//NF) Placement and Access: Detainee traveled to Afghanistan after 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, he has provided a known cover story without supportive and verifiable details, and he associated with known or suspected extremists. No high value detainee US custody has identified detainee, indicating he was probably not well established in the Taliban or Al-Qaida hierarchy. No reporting indicates detainee served in a leadership or operational planning capacity. He provided money to the Al Haramayn organization and is a colleague of one of its members. Detainee spent over two months in Afghanistan prior to illegally crossing into Pakistan. During that time, he possibly engaged in hostilities with US and Coalition forces. However, the specific details of his activities, itinerary, and associates in Afghanistan and elsewhere are largely unknown, and his value cannot be accurately assessed. c. (S//NF) Intelligence Assessment: Detainee has provided no information proving knowledgeability that his colleague and traveling companion,3a-226, is probably associated with Al-Qaida. Detainee has been unwilling or unable to provide any information on the Al Haramayn organization. Detainee probably can only provide limited and dated information on his time spent in Afghanistan. d. (S/NF) Areas of Potential Exploitation: o Al Haramayn recruitment and operations in Saudi Arabia o Al Haramayn supporto traveling jihadists o Tiered NGO facilitation in Afshanistan o Documentfalsification 9. (S) EC Status: Detainee's enemy combatant status was reassessed on 30 October 2004, and he remains an enemy combatant. 2(?L4"q (,/AY W. HOOD vmuior General, USA Commanding o S E C R E T // NOFORN I I 2O3IO2I7